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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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23 December 1985

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

V ADM ALIKOV ON EXERCISE OF PARTY SUPERVISION, 'KONTROL'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by V Adm I. Alikov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet, under the rubric "Party Life: Toward the Congress": "Verify and Assist"]

[Text] Captain 2nd Rank V. Karasayev is known in the fleet as a highly skilled specialist. And when he makes an inspection, one can hear people call him "severe".... They say that he has a highly developed feeling for any kind of deviations in the operation of the equipment and can unerringly spot violations of the instructions and manuals. The professionalism of the officer, a master of military affairs, was fully demonstrated also during the last comprehensive inspection. When the work of the group which included Captain 3rd Rank Karasayev was summed up, however, this was not his only quality which was revealed and noted. Within a relatively short period of time Valeriy Karasayevich visited numerous combat posts and talked with party and Komsomol activists and with many of the sailors. Furthermore, he succeeded so well in winning over the personnel and getting them to open up that some of Karasayev's conclusions about the climate on the ship, about the causes of a number of disciplinary infractions and their connection to deviations from the rules for operating the equipment came as a complete revelation to Captain 2nd Rank O. Getsin and other officers.

To the conclusions were added precise and thoroughly conceived recommendations for assuring navigational safety, improving the technical competence of the personnel and eliminating the causes of the nonregulation relations.

I do not know whether Valeriy Karasayevich heard statements to the effect that he was getting into things which were not his concern, that there are officials whose functional duties require them to study questions of discipline, socialist competition and so forth. I believe he did. Many people love to make such admonitions.

Captain 3rd Rank Ye. Voronin, squadron underwater weapons officer, limits his checking functions during inspections to technical matters alone. He does not go into related or parallel problems having to do with maintaining regulation order, uniting the ship crews and other matters. He feels that they are not part of his MOS (military occupational specialty). It needs to be said that some people use this argument fairly frequently.

"I'm sorry, but this is not my MOS," one staff officer told me with some awkwardness but fairly confidently, when I asked him how the socialist commitments were being fulfilled in a unit in which he had made an inspection.

Not my MOS--and that is the end of it. I know my job and I am responsible for it. What more is expected? This is the logic behind such reasoning. When I hear things like this, an ancient parable automatically comes to mind. A wounded warrior went to a doctor. The latter cut off that part of the arrow projecting from the wound and told the soldier that he would now have to go the specialist in internal diseases, that he was a specialist in external illnesses and had done his job.

Representatives of the modern seagoing specialties who know the secrets of radio electronics and cybernetics should not be offended by the comparison with the ancient healer. The analogy was prompted by statements of certain comrades about "my MOS and his." When you think about this, however, understand first of all how incompatible this approach is with today's demands of the party. Every job is organized by man. Every question is resolved through people, by stimulating this human factor. This is why consideration for the individual, for the climate in the collective, and a broad view of the indoctrinational work performed therein are essential for assessing any aspect of the life of a ship, a unit or subunit. And these must be a part of the work of every inspector, every commission, no matter what specific issue is being studied.

From the time we are lieutenants, we are aware of what an important event it is in the life of every officer, every military collective, when the staff, the political organ or some other higher authority inspects our performance and conditions in the area assigned to us. The lessons from inspections remain with us a long time, some of them our entire lives. Sometimes, the personality of the inspector remains in our memory for many years. We use his techniques and methods in our own subsequent work. We try to master the style, sometimes even the manners of a superior, a person grown wise in the service and in life, the inspector.

Let us think about it. Our times have enlarged the meaning of the word "inspector," which is translated from the Latin as examiner or observer. A different interpretation of the word--teacher, mentor or advisor--has become the main and more ordinary (but then what is ordinary about it) meaning for us. We proceed from precisely this interpretation as we improve the system for verifying performance, one of the unshakeable principles of the Lenin workstyle. To verify and assist, to check out the situation and take specific and immediate steps on the spot to improve it--this is precisely the approach toward which the fleet military council orients those communists entrusted with performing inspection functions. This is entirely consistent with V.I. Lenin's instructions that when making an inspection it is important not so much "to catch" or "to expose" as to be able to rectify. He further stated: "Skillful correction in good time, this is the main task...."

Captain 1st Rank N. Rogach is an astute expert on service on a ship. The officer and political worker gets his bearings with ease in matters of missile and

torpedo training and has a good knowledge of navigation and of the complex management of the electrical and engineering and other divisions on a submarine. His extensive technical perspective helps him not only to assess the psychological features of the submariner's service, without which it is impossible to perform effective indoctrinational work with the seamen, but also to resolve specific combat training problems. I shall cite a typical example.

In an attempt to focus the efforts of the party aktiv on the ships more on working with the men and on effectively motivating the sailors to perform the combat training successfully, Rogach worked in a thorough manner on one of the submarines which long had deficiencies in the organization of the torpedo firing. The cause of the poor performance was revealed. Necessary adjustments were made in the classes and drills, and smooth interaction was achieved among the divisions. This was immediately reflected in the level of success of the torpedo firings.

Captain 1st Rank Rogach provided a lesson on how specifically to rectify a situation on the spot and without delay. This enhanced both the personal prestige of the political worker and that of the political organ which he represented.

Incidentally, it is a very important part of the work of every inspector to measure up to the prestige of the organ under whose assignment he is working in the unit and to do everything possible to reinforce that prestige. As the embodiment of strict demandingness on the ships and in the subunits, people entrusted with inspection functions must be twice as demanding of themselves. First of all, this is a matter of thoroughly and carefully preparing for the visit to a unit, being prepared to work seriously, hard and with responsibility, which calls for strict analysis based on principle, demanding and objective evaluations, rational and realistic recommendations. The fleet staff and political directorate and the other agencies of control orient their representatives to work in precisely this manner. When briefing the comprehensive groups and later, when the results of their work are summed up, the importance of thoroughly understanding the matters covered by the plan is stressed, and attention is focused on the fact that every inspector is first of all a political fighter of the party, the active bearer of its ideas to the masses of fightingmen.

We attempt to see that the inspector provides a model in his personal behavior when working in the units, in view of dozens and sometimes hundreds of people. Conceit and arrogance on the part of inspectors, their acceptance of "gifts," all sorts of bathhouse, fishing and hunting services which certain commanders and chiefs generously provide in order to receive a good rating and favorable conclusions, seriously undermines the prestige of the higher authority represented by the inspector.

Captain 2nd Rank V. Khulga was received with all sorts of honors in the unit which he was to inspect. The drinks and the good hors-d'oeuvres to which he was treated by Captain 2nd Rank B. Borzov somehow immediately pushed into the background the inspection which the officer had been assigned to make.

Khulga did remember the matter at one point, to be sure, and, flushed with alcohol, announced that he was "taking over command." He then began issuing instructions inconsistent with common sense.

The appropriate conclusions were drawn from the officer's conduct, of course, but it should be noted that the party organization in which Khulga is registered demonstrated liberalism in assessing the incident and did not assess it from a standpoint of principle until it had been reminded.

As they improve the system of control, having adopted a firm course of implementing the requirements set forth at the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that not a single party organization and not a single worker must be left without control, the fleet political organs are now attempting to focus their main efforts and the efforts of the entire party apparatus on vital work with the men and are shifting the center of their activity onto the organization of the job and the elimination of red tape, formalistic-bureaucratic and pretentious methods of supervision. Control must be organized in such a way that it motivates people to learn to work in the new manner, develops initiative and creativity and promotes the undeviating implementation of party directives. We strive to teach all of the communists-and-supervisors the art of organizing the work in this manner, and are learning it ourselves. We are equipping ourselves with accumulated and new experience. I can say with satisfaction that after Captains 1st Rank I. Bogachev and B. Belyakov, Captains 2nd Rank V. Zyubanov, N. Toropov and V. Shcheglov, Lieutenant Colonel N. Semin and other comrades have worked on a ship or in a unit, the mood becomes markedly more business-like there, and most shortcomings are eliminated immediately or else the basis is created for eliminating them in the near future. At the same time, specific reserves and possibilities are identified, as well as ways to reinforce the mobilizing efforts with precise organization. We strive to see that all of the staffs and political organs, all of the party organizations and the communists in the fleet attempt to measure up to those guidelines indicated for us by the party, to those models which we have.

11499

CSO: 1801/31

MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

INSUFFICIENT KOMSOMOL WORK ON ATHEISM

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Sep 85 p 2

[Article by Captain V. Zyubin, reporter for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "An Unforeseen Event - Why the VLSM Committee Work with a Religiously Inclined Soldier Was Ineffective"]

[Text] Almost half a year has passed since Private V. Zhuk was transferred to the reserves, but he is still remembered. Even though he was considered to be just an average soldier. He received no service commendations and kept to himself all the time.

The likeable fellow with the dark wavy hair is also remembered by regimental VLKSM / All-Union Lenin Young Communist League/ committee secretary Senior Lieutenant S. Koshkarovskiy. The conversation I was having with him flagged.

"Well, that's over and done with", said Sergey Lvovich, stooping slightly and knitting his brows as he sat. He was holding a notebook containing the plans for the unit VLKSM committee work. He kept rolling it into a tube and unrolling it. He answered most questions relative to the religiously inclined soldier reluctantly, using single words. He then exclaimed in an outburst: "Is that all that we have to do? What about strengthening of discipline - who has the greatest burden? The Komsomol! There are instruction, the struggle for economy and savings, mass sports work!"

Yes, there is much work for a unit Komsomol to do. However, it is difficult to agree that a wide range of concerns can serve as justification for shortcomings in atheistic education. This particular aspect also deserves attention. Nevertheless, let us take up each topic one at a time.

At first in the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant I. Yarov the recruit was not immediately the subject of conversations. Private V. Zhuk did not attract attention; he was quiet and modest. He coped with military driver duties. It is true that he never showed initiative and did only that which he was told to do and no more. In time, however, strangeness in his behavior came to be noticed.

Before training on a Sunday he did not want to service his vehicle. "It is a sin", he said. On another occasion after retreat, company

orderly Junior Sergeant V. Shapovalov came upon Private V. Zhuk in the utility room holding a lighted candle: He was preparing to pray.

After being informed of this, the company VLKSM office members simply made a gesture of helplessness. The incident was extremely uncommon. While they thought about it and tried to decide what to do, time was passing. The soldier involuntarily attracted attention to himself. Jokes and remarks with him as the subject abounded. They were mostly harmless, but the man became more withdrawn and kept himself apart from the collective.

The case of the religiously inclined soldier became known to the unit VLKSM committee. Senior Lieutenant Koshkarovskiy visited the company and spoke with Vasiliy. Although the Komsomol secretary did not prepare himself specially for the visit (relying on his school knowledge of scientific atheism), he was confident of success. It seemed to him that nothing could be simpler than to prove an obvious fact: There is no God. However, it was a hard nut to crack. Vasiliy Zhuk listened politely to the secretary's fervent speech on the attainments made in science and space flights, nodding his head several times, while the corners of his mouth formed a wry smile. The men parted unconvinced of each other's viewpoint.

After this encounter a change was made in the regimental VLKSM committee plan: A note was added relative to holding a discussion with young soldiers on the harm done by religion. That is where the matter ended. It was obviously another case of the habit of reducing accomplished deeds to entry onto the same gray sheet of paper as a discharge of responsibility.

Let us digress for a moment. We rightly have much to say about the important trait of the Komsomol leader of maintaining closeness to people. However, to become closer to people does not mean only spending less time sitting in the office. You will not ascertain true feelings in the collective, what is bothering people, what is next to the heart of each young person if there is a tendency to shuffle paper to the detriment of that which we know to be painstaking work with individuals.

Thus, if we use this as a basis to examine the Private Zhuk affair, no genuine closeness to people is apparent. Yes, VLKSM secretary Senior Lieutenant Koshkarovskiy did spend some time in the company and, yes, he spoke with the religiously inclined soldier. But was he enriched by any observations after the meeting? What conclusions did he reach? How did he help the man who fell into the web of religious prejudices? Even now the secretary finds it difficult to answer these questions. What is the explanation of his failure to advise the company Komsomol members on how to handle the believer and involve him in social work without humiliating him and release him from the biblical spell? Unfortunately, Senior Lieutenant A. Lopanik, Lieutenant V. Borisevich and other members of the VLKSM committee also were not at their best in this case. They simply forgot about Private Zhuk. At a time when Komsomol work was in full swing, if one is to believe the records. Lectures on atheistic education were being read somewhere, and there was an abundance of other mass measures in this regard. But the religiously inclined soldier secretly crossed off each service

day in his calendar, made his runs, serviced his vehicle, participated in details, and . . . crossed himself.

The "eccentricities" of Private V. Zhuk had the inevitable result of attracting attention anew to the sub-unit. One of the young soldiers became interested in his devices. People started to turn to him for help as an experiment, so to speak. For example, Private G. Botvin asked him to "cast a spell" over a sore tooth. A comrade of his made a request for interpretation of a bad dream. For the sake of objectivity let us state that Gennadiy's tooth did not stop hurting after this; he decided this approach was useless and ran to see a stomatologist. The other soldier did not suffer diminished cheerfulness or optimism. However, such facts, you will agree, should have put the Komsomol committee members on guard. Alas! The matter took on a somewhat humorous color.

Individual communist leaders also were not equal to the occasion. Political officer V. Kondrashov became interested in the religiously inclined soldier. The officer met with him and tried to somehow dispel the soldier's delusions. But no progress was made. I was told that a short time later copies of a lecture entitled "Science and Superstition, Religion and Everyday Living" were made in the regiment. What happened was typical: Someone forgot to deliver it in the company where Private V. Zhuk was serving at the time . . .

Educational work with a believer is as we know a difficult and delicate matter, requiring proper theoretical preparation and, I would say, non-bureaucratic, special, sympathetic interest in the fate of a man. Life itself - our best teacher - constantly reminds us of this.

Another incident occurred in another unit. The name of a religiously inclined soldier was Vladimir R. (I do not give his surname for obvious reasons). The same as Private V. Zhuk, he started to discuss in confidence manifestations of supernatural forces supposedly encountered by acquaintances of his - "reliable" people. This was not ignored by the military collective. Communist Captain S. Oleynik, Komsomol secretary Senior Lieutenant K. Koshcheyev . . . One cannot name in this short account all those who responded to the plight of the young man. They understood that a false step or a thoughtless word would alienate the man for a long time. Each person (and I mean each one!) did what he could to help the stumbling man to look at the world through other eyes and start believing in himself. For example, when the men would be on their way to the library, they would be sure to say: "Vladimir, come with us!" A contest would be heating up on the football field, and again friendly words would be heard: "Vladimir, man the goal! We can't do it without you!" They did not permit the man to become alienated; they surrounded him with care.

Work was progressing on a wide front, so to speak. The platoon agitators worked hard. An evening of questions and answers provided the young people with much that was of interest. The Komsomol members did not forget to invite to the company a lecturer from the Znaniye district society. It was the collective which helped the believer to overcome religious prejudices.

Unfortunately, as we can see, in the Komsomol organization headed by S. Koshkarovskiy, no particular efforts of this sort were exerted. Vasiliy Zhuk left the unit a believer as before.

It is not difficult to imagine the weight in the collective carried by the words of the Komsomol leaders relative to the principle involved and the irreconcilability toward any manifestations of an alien ideology, when a man hiding a cross is sitting with them in the same auditorium.

"There are no people of that sort in the unit at the present time." This statement was made several times by the VLKSM committee secretary and by other comrades. The reasoning was: "Why stir up the past? The soldier was a bad lot and caused us much trouble, but now he is gone. Therefore, there is no reason to worry about improving atheistic education." Another opinion on this score was expressed by political officer V. Zima.

"Believers are rarely found among young recruits, but they do exist", said Viktor Ivanovich. "You already know about one."

When my temporary duty assignment was nearing completion, I again visited the company. The men were preparing to assume their duties. Several young soldiers in the utility room were sewing their collars and pressing their uniforms while conversing with enthusiasm. While each soldier was doing his work, the conversations touched on the service and news from home. One phrase caused my ears to prick up: "I had a strange dream yesterday..."

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CSO: 1801/19

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MILITARY COMMISSARS MEET IN ULYANOVSK

Moscow KASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 May 85 p 2

[Article by Major General A. Beskorovaynyy: "Educating Patriots"]

[Text] The commanders of military commissariat political sections met in Ulyanovsk.

A member of the military council, Chief of the Ground Force Political Directorate Colonel General M. Popkov, delivered a speech on the state of and missions for further improving party political work to improve voyenkomat [military registration and enlistment offices] combat and mobilization training and to improve the quality of young people's training for service in the USSR Armed Forces.

Colonel General Yu. Naumenko, Lieutenant General N. Ter-Grigoryants, Major Generals I. Rogatin, N. Gusev and head of a Komsomol Central Committee sports and defense-mass organization section V. Vasin spoke on various aspects of military commissariat political department activities.

First Secretary of the Ulyanovsk CPSU Obkom G. Kolbin spoke at the meeting. He talked about the great work done by the oblast party organization in educating the population about military-patriotic issues.

Commanders of political sections exchanged methods and familiarized themselves with the organization of military political work at the Automobile Works imeni V. I. Lenin and in Ulyanovsk DOSAAF training institutions and organizations.

12511
CSO:1801/243

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

ARMED FORCES IN DEVELOPMENT OF 'MATURE SOCIALISM'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 85 (Signed to press 5 Aug 85) pp 9-17

[Article by Col K. Vorobyev, doctor of philosophy, professor, under the rubric "Toward the 27th CPSU Congress": "The Armed Forces of the USSR: Social Aspects of Development"]

[Text] The work of our party and of the Soviet people, who are proceeding toward the 27th CPSU Congress, is aimed at accelerating the nation's economic and social development. Lasting peace and reliable defense of the socialist achievements against the aggressive intrigues of imperialism and its accomplices are essential for the successful resolution of key problems involved in the great creative process. The struggle for security of peoples and efforts to strengthen the nation's defense capability and improve its Armed Forces are matters of prime concern to the party and the Soviet State.

"We are forced to invest the essential funds in the nation's defense," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev stressed at a conference in the CPSU Central Committee on accelerating scientific and technological progress. The Soviet Union will continue to apply maximum effort to halt the arms race, but in the face of imperialism's aggressive policy and its threats, we cannot permit military superiority to be achieved over us. Such is the will of the Soviet people."

The Soviet Armed Forces, established and directed by the Lenin party, are fulfilling their mission in a worthy manner. As a part of the Soviet society, they develop along with it and experience the profound influence of processes occurring in the nation. With the USSR's attainment of mature socialism, our army has been altered considerably with respect both to its functions and to its internal state and the quality of the personnel. Its powerful combat capability, which consists of a solid alloy of a high level of technical equipment, combat skill and indestructible morale on the part of the personnel, is based on the advantages of socialism.

Unlike all of the class-antagonistic formations, the socialist society does not need military force to resolve any sort of internal social or political problems. It is distinguished by social unity of the people and the absence of class antagonisms. The Soviet society today represents a developed system of socialist social relations, a working class united as one economically,

politically and ideologically, the kolkhoz peasantry, the popular intelligentsia and all of the country's nations and ethnic groups. The establishment of such a system of relations, the 26th CPSU Congress noted, has opened up broad possibilities for completing the reorganization of all spheres of public life based on the collectivistic principles internally inherent in socialism.

The existence of the Armed Forces of the USSR is presently necessitated exclusively by external conditions: the existence of world imperialism and its aggressive, anti-Soviet, antisocialist aspirations.

The Soviet Union consistently pursues a Leninist policy of peace and actively advocates the consolidation of security of peoples and extensive international cooperation. The USSR's foreign policy is directed toward the prevention of aggressive wars, the achievement of universal and total disarmament and consistent implementation of the principle of peaceful coexistence by states with different social systems.

To counter the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist commonwealth nations, the forces of imperialism and reaction are making increasingly persistent attempts to impose their will upon peoples. They have not rejected their delirious plans to destroy the most progressive social system by military means. Imperialism's militaristic circles, primarily those of the United States of America, are attempting to achieve strategic military superiority over the USSR at any cost, counting on nuclear blackmail and armed threats to undermine real socialism, stifle the national liberation struggle of peoples and weaken the world workers' and communist movement.

The growing aggressiveness of imperialism, primarily American, is manifested in the acceleration of military preparations, the equipping of the Armed Forces with new models of weapons of mass destruction, the activation of NATO's militaristic activities, an attempt to piece together new military-political blocs directed against the socialist nations, expansion of the network of military bases around the USSR and its allies, and the inciting of dangerous military conflicts in various regions of the planet. The aggressiveness of American imperialism is expressed in concentrated form in its strategic military concepts. The U.S. military, with the approval of the White House, is now gambling on a surprise "preventive" nuclear strike against the Soviet Union and other nations of the socialism commonwealth. The deployment of American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, plans advanced by the Reagan Administration for militarizing space and the Star Wars preparations also serve these objectives.

The daily concern of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet State with maintaining the nation's defensive strength and the combat capability of our Armed Forces at the highest level are perfectly natural and justified in this situation. The Soviet people must have firm confidence that the fruits of their creative labor are reliably protected.

The execution by the Soviet Armed Forces of the function of protecting the socialist homeland is necessitated not only by the fact that they are the immediate defenders of our homeland's borders. The very fact of their existence and the combat strength and constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces

of the USSR are contributing to the establishment of international conditions conducive to the development of all the socialist nations and the acceleration of the world revolutionary process. Our army carries out its historical mission in close combat fraternity with the armies of member-states of the Warsaw Pact, which, as stated in the communique on the meeting of high-level party figures and statesmen of the fraternal nations in April of this year, will continue to strengthen itself in the interest of collective defense.

History has demonstrated that the most effective path to peace is a determined struggle against aggressive forces and the countering of their material strength, including military power, with the strength of peace-loving peoples capable of cooling off the hotheaded warmongers. We know what great importance V.I. Lenin attached to the need for us to maintain a constant state of readiness to repel possible imperialist aggression and to strengthen the Soviet State's military might in the interest of maintaining peace among peoples. "...We must accompany our moves toward peace," Vladimir Ilich stated, "with the exertion of all our military preparedness..." ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Completed Collected Works], Volume 40, page 248). Foreseeing the possibility of imperialist adventures against the Soviet Nation, V.I. Lenin wrote the following: "...There is no way to prevent it other than by strengthening the defense capability" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Volume 53, page 298).

Following V.I. Lenin's behests, our party devotes unweakened attention to the strengthening of the national defense and the equipping of the Armed Forces with the most modern weapons. Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of defense, has stated that thanks to the party's concern and the selfless labor of our people, the army and navy today are provided with modern weapons and combat equipment and have personnel and highly trained military cadres infinitely devoted to the cause of the Communist Party and the socialist homeland, with everything necessary to successfully carry out their assigned missions. The Soviet Armed Forces are prepared to fulfill their duty to the homeland at any time.

As an extremely important element in the political system of our society, the Armed Forces of the USSR are set up in accordance with its general principles and bear the stamp of its characteristics and specific features. These features and characteristics reflect the army's social nature, its properties as a class organization.

In any society the army's combat efficiency is closely linked to the nation's economic and sociopolitical structure, to the level of its cultural development. The nature of the society's class organization determines also the functioning of the main patterns of development of the military organization. World history has shown that a more progressive social structure has always provided also conditions conducive to the establishment of a powerful army when necessary. F. Engels stated that the nation with the highest level of civilization has the advantage militarily (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Volume 11, page 438).

Socialism has indisputable advantages with respect to providing reliable military protection for the nation. Even during the years of civil war and foreign

military intervention the new system of management which was developing, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the alliance of the working class and the peasantry made it possible in an incredibly difficult situation to successfully mobilize the manpower and material resources to totally defeat the young Soviet Republic's internal and external enemies.

The war forced upon us by Hitler's fascism was not just a confrontation of two armies. It was also a struggle between two opposite social systems. It was of a profoundly class nature and was exceptionally acute, determined and uncompromising. That war could only be won by a nation with fundamental advantages internally inherent in its social system. Such advantages as the planned use of its economic capabilities, the great enthusiasm of the people, their social unity and the wise leadership of the Communist Party permitted our nation, despite the loss of important economic regions and extensive production and energy capacities at the beginning of the war, not just to catch up to, but to surpass fascist Germany in the production of weapons and combat equipment. And this, along with the unprecedented mass heroism of Soviet soldiers and officers and the military commanders' great art of military leadership, was the most important source of our Great Victory.

The system of management and the social organization of the developed socialist society make it possible to maintain the combat efficiency of the Armed Forces at the very highest level.

Weapons and combat equipment are the most important component of the army's combat strength, of course. And the provision of the Armed Forces of the USSR with them depends upon the nation's level of economic development and its material capabilities. The Communist Party devotes constant attention to improving the economy and developing the society's productive forces. The April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out that our nation has achieved large successes in all areas of life. It has a powerful and thoroughly developed economy and skilled cadres of workers, specialists and scientists. We are solidly in leading positions in the world in many areas of development of production, science and technology.

Life does not stand still, however. It demands continuing changes and reforms, particularly in the economic area. It is essential to convert the economy to intensive growth and thoroughly enhance production effectiveness. The plenum noted that the party regards greatly accelerated scientific and technical progress as the main means of intensifying the national economy. Priority is assigned to machine building, machine-tool building, instrument making and the production of computer equipment, electrical engineering and electronic equipment.

The accelerated development of the economy and technological progress will continue to have an enormous influence with respect to strengthening the nation's defenses and the combat strength of the Armed Forces.

The Communist Party and the Soviet State develop a military-technical policy and define ways to improve the material foundation of the Armed Forces on a strictly scientific basis and based on the international situation developing in a given period. The implementation of this policy provides for the planned

and uninterrupted provision of the army and navy with the most modern types of weapons and combat equipment and the stockpiling of strategic reserves and material supplies in case of war.

An awareness of the great goal of building communism and of the need to reliably protect it on the part of the Soviet Nation's workers gives them great energy. With their selfless labor they attempt to realize socialism's possibilities as completely as possible and to increase the national wealth.

Our homeland's history shows the great, unparalleled labor achievements of which a people aware that it is working for its own good, in its own interests, is capable. And our party constantly reinforces and develops this awareness. This is particularly essential today, because continued intensification of production is impossible without a concerned, enterprising and creative attitude toward the cause on the part of every worker at literally every work station. Personnel of the Armed Forces are also indoctrinated with the best examples of the people's labor.

Fulfilling the USSR's economic development plans and applying all the advantages of our society to further improve material production are an extremely important requirement for maintaining the USSR's defense capability and the combat strength of the army and navy at the proper level.

The social and political advantages of developed socialism and its social organization are having a profound effect on the Armed Forces. Our society's social-class relations and its political system serve as the foundation for development of the army, and they determine the social image and the political substance of its activities.

The new kind of relations between the working class and the peasantry, the establishment of socialist democracy and equality of nations and ethnic groups, and the emergence of a new type of individual have always influenced the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. All of these factors are affecting the Armed Forces even more profoundly in the contemporary situation.

The following are permanent values and inseparable features of the developed socialist society and of our way of life: a guaranteed right to work and to be rewarded for that work for every citizen, care of the individual from birth to extreme old age, broad access to spiritual culture, respect for the dignity and the rights of the individual, and continuous expansion of the workers' participation in the running of the society's and the state's affairs. These are the most important source of our people's social optimism, of its solidarity and unshakeable spiritual strength.

The party promotes in every way intensification of the processes leading to the creation of a classless socialist society and to the continued prospering and coming together of the nations. It strives to see that social relations universally and strictly conform to the social justice inherent in our system. All of this ensures a high level of equality which can only be achieved under socialism and is bringing about the further strengthening of the Soviet people's social and political unity.

The social and political processes influence the development of the Armed Forces in many ways. First of all, the equality of the people, the unity of their basic interests and the social justice which exists in our society provide a solid foundation for unity of the army and the people. Relations between the army and the people, as we know, are an extremely important socio-political and class characteristic of the army. This is one of the main sources of its strength. As a tool of the politically exploitative classes and a means of maintaining the system for oppressing the working masses, bourgeois armies cannot have common class interests with the people. They are alienated from the people and serve antipopular purposes. Ruling circles of the imperialist states therefore carry out military organizational development so as to isolate the army from the popular masses and place it in opposition to the class interests of the workers.

The socialist army, which is established to protect the power of the working people, is closely united with them. V.I. Lenin stated that "the Soviet organization has made it possible to establish an armed force of workers and peasants which is linked to the workers and the exploited masses far more closely than in the past" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Volume 38, page 92).

All classes and social strata, nations and ethnic groups in the USSR are vitally interested in strengthening the nation's defense capability and enhancing the combat strength of the army and navy. The people not only supply the army with materiel, but also give it ideology and attitudes. And the more harmonious the class relations in the society, the more effectively they influence the spiritual strength of army personnel.

The solidarity of our nation's working class, its kolkhoz peasantry and intelligentsia and the commonality of their interests and objectives in the building of communism provide the solid social foundation for the state's great moral and political strength and for the morale of personnel in the Soviet Armed Forces.

We know that in the developed socialist society not only is there a trend toward the coming together of the classes of workers and peasants, of all the social strata, and the overcoming of social and class distinctions among them, but that the classes and social strata themselves are being altered, and their political activeness, professional level, general cultural level and education are rising. The working class is the main element in the Soviet society's social and class structure. It occupies a leading position in all areas of public life, and its revolutionary-reform and productive activity determine social progress. This is reflected also in military organizational development.

V.I. Lenin repeatedly stressed the fact that only the proletariat--primarily the industrial proletariat due to its particular place within the system of social relations--can create a qualitatively new organization, a revolutionary army made strong in the struggle against the enemies of the workers by its ideals, its discipline and organization and its heroism.

This natural law has not lost its effect in the contemporary situation, but is manifested even more fully. Associated with industrial production, including

the defense industry, our working class today is making the main contribution to the manufacture of the means of armed conflict for outfitting our army and navy.

The ideology of the working class, Marxist-Leninism, which has now become the ideology of all our people, comprises the main substance and the foundation of the political strength of personnel in the Armed Forces. The social and psychological qualities of the working class--collectivism, organization and discipline--play an important role in the indoctrination of Soviet fightingmen. These remarkable qualities and class self-awareness are developed in the fightingmen, their hatred for the enemies of the Soviet State is intensified and their preparedness to provide a resolute rebuff to any aggressor is enhanced in the process of the ideological, political and indoctrinational work performed by commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations with the personnel.

Profound changes are occurring in the spiritual makeup of the kolkhoz peasantry as agricultural production is industrialized. Their work is making a substantial contribution to the strengthening of national defense. A collectivist mentality has become firmly established among them, and there is a growing number of people who work with the machinery and mechanisms with which agriculture is being increasingly saturated. This is producing a rapid rise in the technical competence of the modern peasantry, including the youth drafted into the army. All of these features are extremely important for training the fightingmen.

Rapid growth of the intelligentsia and workers engaged in mental labor is a characteristic of the developed socialist society. They now make up one-fourth of the nation's employed population. Soviet scientists, designers and engineers are at the forward edge of science and technology. It would be impossible to outfit our army with the most modern combat equipment and weapons without their inspired creative labor.

The Soviet Armed Forces today live and work in a situation of all-around development of our society's political system: improvement of the socialist state system, the continuing development of democracy, the strengthening of the legal foundation of state and public life, and stimulation of the activities of mass organizations of the workers.

The Communist Party takes the democratic nature of the socialist system into full account as it carries out the military organizational development. This makes it possible to enlist all of the workers in the development of the army, to use their enthusiasm, political and production activeness, patriotism and internationalism for strengthening the Armed Forces. The democratism of the developed socialist society is reflected also in the army, in its way of life. A large number of democratic standards and corresponding institutions function in the Armed Forces. In the army situation, of course, one-man command moves to the fore as the most important principle underlying Soviet military development. However, the sole commander relies upon the initiative and creativity of his subordinates in his work, takes their opinion into account for making decisions and directs the work of public organizations in his unit or subunit or on his ship. Party and Komsomol organizations, people's control committees

and groups and officers' comradely courts of honor operate in the army and navy, and meetings of various categories of personnel are regularly held, at which decisions are adopted to further enhance the combat readiness and to strengthen discipline and organization in the military collectives.

An enormous advance has occurred during the years of Soviet power in the educational level of our nation's people, in its overall culture and awareness. Around 90 percent of our employed population today has a higher, secondary or incomplete secondary education. Recently, more than 4.6 million young people have completed a secondary general education school and around a million have graduated from a higher school each year. More than 106 million of our people are involved in various types of training. Soviet readers are served by more than 133,000 public libraries with stocks of 2.1 billion copies of books and pamphlets.

The general education level is particularly high among the young, from which men are drafted into the military service. The time has passed when a draftee with a secondary education was a rarity, let us say, in a motorized rifle subunit. Almost 100 percent of the youth entering the Armed Forces today have a higher or secondary (complete or incomplete) education.

The high level of the draftees and the complexity of modern military affairs demand highly skilled officer cadres capable of training and indoctrinating fightingmen of the army and navy. The level of development of pedagogical science in the nation and the methods employed by the higher school provide quality training for officers at military academies, institutes and schools. More than 70 percent of the officers in the Soviet Armed Forces today have a higher military or specialized military education, and the percentage is even greater in certain services of the Armed Forces. All of this makes it possible to provide quality combat and political training for personnel of the army and navy.

Such is the influence of developed socialism's social processes upon the Armed Forces. As an inseparable part of the society, our army and it have the same life. All servicemen are citizens of the USSR with full rights.

Since, because of external factors, our army exists, it plays a large role in the life of the Soviet people as a part of the society, as a highly organized mass of people. Local party organizations and state authorities consider in their economic and mass political work possible help they can obtain from units stationed in the area in the performance of certain activities. Soviet fightingmen help with the building of roads, with the harvest, efforts to combat natural disasters, and so forth. Each year motor vehicle battalions are formed in a number of military districts to help the agricultural workers harvest and transport the crop. The conscientious work of the fightingmen is greatly appreciated by our party and government, by local and soviet organs. There have been cases in which soldiers and officers have performed selfless actions and risked their lives to save kolkhoz fields from fire. The entire nation is familiar with the deeds of the railroad troops who helped build the Baykal-Amur railroad line.

The modern army and navy are plentifully supplied with diverse equipment. By mastering it the fightingmen become technically skilled specialists. Those who did not have technical skills prior to their induction into the military service acquire it in the army and take it with them when they return to the national economy. This helps the young people become skilled workers at plants and construction projects, on the kolkhoz and sovkhoz fields and farms. Also extremely important is the fact that fightingmen released into the reserve after having been tempered in the army or navy work extremely hard and bring a spirit of comradeship, mutual assistance and discipline into the labor collectives. Enterprise directors willingly hire yesterday's soldiers and sailors, who, as a rule, justify the confidence vested in them.

Participation by fightingmen in the economic work of the population and the close cooperation between military units and the production collectives strengthen the unity of the army and the people, spiritually temper the servicemen themselves, help them to thoroughly understand their common national interests and increase their sense of personal responsibility for the accomplishment of tasks involved in the society's further development.

The army has a considerable role also in our society's political life. Servicemen take an active part in public-political activities conducted by the party and the state. Soviet fightingmen have traditionally been very active in election campaigns. They unanimously render their votes in elections for candidates in the bloc of communists and nonparty members. The very best servicemen are elected people's deputies, members of local party and Komsomol organs, delegates to party conferences and congresses.

Fightingmen in the army and navy also demonstrate their activeness by discussing the most important political events of national and international life, drafts of state laws and party documents at meetings of the personnel in units and on ships, at party and Komsomol meetings. The servicemen provide a great deal of assistance to local organizations in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the Soviet people and in the preparation of the youth for military service. Thousands of various technical groups and hundreds of youth and military-patriotic associations have been created and are functioning in the nation with the help of army and navy Komsomol members. Servicemen work with the civilian youth at military sports camps and conduct military sports games. Our commanders and political workers consider sponsorship of general education schools, vocational and technical schools to be an important part of their service work. Military educational institutions perform useful work with secondary school graduates. Open-door days are held at schools, and officers tell the young people about the occupation of armed defender of the homeland.

It would be difficult to overstate the role of the Russian language in the patriotic and international indoctrination of the young generation. It is in fact the second native language of a considerable portion of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. It is a means of international communication and cooperation which permits every nation and ethnic group to become familiar with the achievements of all the Soviet peoples and of world culture. The Russian language has a great role also in the strengthening of our nation's defense capability and in the indoctrination and unification of the multinational

Soviet Armed Forces. It is the language of advanced military thinking, after all, the language of the army of peace and socialism. A good mastery of the Russian language, which is begun in the school and continues in the labor and the military collective, makes it much easier for every fightingman to reach the pinnacles of combat skill and fulfill his military duty.

The army's indoctrinational role in the socialist society is manifested in the enormous importance active military duty has for the youth. For millions of Soviet people it has been an effective means of ideological and physical conditioning, a means of developing discipline and organization. An indoctrinational effect is exerted upon the young person by the entire structure of military life and its strictly regulated rhythm, but primarily by the purposeful ideological and mass political work performed by commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations to enhance the social activeness of the fightingmen, to expand their political knowledge and instill in them a vital interest in the party's foreign and domestic policy and international events. The Soviet individual retains the class conditioning and ideological strength developed during his service in the army throughout his life. They help him to be a conscientious, industrious and aware worker in any area in the building of communism.

The great and indisputable advantages of socialism have a beneficial effect upon the development of the Armed Forces and the improvement of their combat strength. These advantages are objective ones. The extent to which they are used and their effectiveness depend upon how thoroughly they are recognized and taken into account in the people's practical work. The Lenin party orients the military cadres toward the thorough application of our society's social achievements for further enhancing the fighting efficiency and the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

PROBLEMS OF OFFICERS FAMILIES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 85 (Signed to press 5 Aug 85) pp 46-51

[Article by Lt Col A. Nekrylov under the rubric "Party Life": "There is no Such Thing as Another Person's Sorrow: Follow-up on a Letter"]

[Text] This letter in the diverse mail received by the editors following publication of the article "Without a Heart of Ice" evoked the greatest interest. This was probably because people do not frequently write to share their joy, perhaps even happiness. They mostly write about their troubles and ask for help.

Galina Naumenko told how she also arrived at a remote garrison several years ago with her husband, a lieutenant. They lived far out beyond the travelled roads. Getting to and from work was difficult, as were leisure time activities. Her only joy during those first months at the garrison was Sergey, her husband. Although he left early for his job and returned late, during those brief hours left for her she was happy and believed that everything would work out for them, would be the same as for other people. A good apartment, a job in her field and of course, children. What is a family without children?

Disaster struck them without warning. One day Sergey returned from work later than usual. She detected the smell of alcohol. "You see," he explained awkwardly, "it's the birthday of one of our comrades. He invited us to help celebrate it. It would have been awkward to refuse." She attached no significance to the incident. They would go to visit people and would sometimes invite people to their house for dinner with drinks in order to brighten up the boring garrison life. Her husband never passed up a drink at the table. In time he developed such a liking for alcohol that he would come home inebriated every couple of days. This later became a daily occurrence. She begged him to stop drinking. She shamed him. She cried. Sergey would give his word and then not keep it. He began having problems at work. Then there were penalties. Galina knew about all of this. It was a small post, after all, and nothing could be kept secret. She was tormented. She attempted to avoid appearing in public. She was ashamed for herself and for the man she loved. And the day came when she could take it no longer. She packed her suitcase and left for her parents' home.

"And do you know what I decided after living away from Sergey?" Galina wrote. "After reflecting a long time about how it all could have happened, after some torturous thinking about what I was to do, I suddenly realized that I had betrayed Sergey. Yes, I had betrayed our love. I should have fought for him, tried to save him, helped him to become a human being again. I had been a coward, though. I had run away, had done what was best only for me. I made up my mind to go back and fight for my Sergey."

And she did fight for him. At her initiative a poetry club was organized at the garrison. When she first suggested it at a meeting of the women's council, they almost ridiculed her, to be sure. "Poetry?" they said. "Our husbands are tired when they come from work. The prose of life is more to their liking." "The prose of life means drinking vodka," Galina said with indignation. Lieutenant Colonel Fedor Stepanovich Kalmykov, who had recently arrived to serve as unit political worker, supported the young woman, however. He too had already noticed that there were many people at the garrison who, like Sergey, were fond of drinking.

Evenings of poetry reading were held every Saturday. Mostly young women came in the beginning. Then, one by one, they brought their husbands along. Some of them came "just to have a look." They would glance with skepticism at the samovar, the jars of jam and the pastries baked by the women themselves, and they would stay. They came again and again. And what poetry they read! They heard the poems of Pushkin and Blok, Lermontov and Mayakovskiy, Tyutchev and Yesenin, Tvardovskiy and Bagritskiy.... And the people began thinking more about the meaning of life. All of the beautiful things about which the great poets spoke could not fail to affect them. Grains of sand wear down stone. And beautiful words spoken to people are thousands of times more powerful than grains of sand.

"Things are now going well for us. Sergey does not drink. Things are going well for him at work. I am employed in my field. We now have a 3-year-old son, Sergey Sergeyevich, growing up. It is very difficult for me to understand women like the Olga discussed in the article "Without a Heart of Ice." You seem to sympathize with her. I do not, because love exists for women like her only when the sun shines. A little cloud only has to appear over their heads, and they take off, go where it is brighter and cozier. Happiness does not come about by itself, however. It is not sold along with the wedding ring or issued with the marriage certificate. It has to be gained through suffering. I myself am happy. And I am very grateful for this to Fedor Stepanovich, our political worker, to the other senior comrades and the communists who helped me gain this happiness."

This is the kind of letter we received from Galina Naumenko, an officer's wife. Reading it reminded me of another letter, one from my comrade alongside whom I had lived more than a single year. He recalled his divorce process with pain and longed, longed greatly for the wife who had once been his but was now someone's else. Five years had gone by since they had parted. Aleksandr had not found another, nor had he looked for one. And she already had her own family. He wrote with such pain in his heart: "If I could just turn back the clock to that time, I would not have the loneliness and emptiness today, and my service would be going much better."

Everything which happened was amazingly ordinary. He had flown and had frequently been held up now at the airfield, now in the classroom. Irina had worked at the school. When she did not have classes she had frequently whiled away the time alone. She became dissatisfied. There were reproaches, and both sides poured out their resentments in their arguments. Neither of them would make any concessions at all. Finally, Irina could bear it no longer. "I can't take it any longer!" she snapped at her husband. And she left.

People at the garrison had different thoughts about the incident. Some of them said that Irina did not understand that she was not merely the airman's wife but also his partner in the military. Others were inclined to think that the young people were not compatible. One thing is for sure, however, in my opinion: the family did not receive support at a difficult time. There was no friendly advice for them, no positive words from senior comrades grown wise from living. Indoctrinational work was not performed with families there.

The life of a serviceman is not a smooth one. Frequent moves, worry about a husband leaving on a flight or a cruise, living arrangements which are not always good, frequently a lack of work in one's field and limited leisure time possibilities sometimes result in conflicts large and small, in family quarrels, which inevitably affect the service performance of the officer or warrant officer. It is therefore perfectly obvious that since the family has such an enormous influence with respect to shaping the attitude of an individual departing for his service job, he therefore needs constant friendly support.

This kind of assistance and support on the part of senior comrades is not always provided, however. "I am the wife of Lieutenant Kurbatov, Olga Anatolyevna Kurbatova.... I read your article "Without a Heart of Ice." It made me want very much to tell you about our family life. We arrived at my husband's service post in Kharkov from Leningrad with the hope that the unit command element would help us arrange for housing. When my husband went to report in, however, he was given to understand that since he could not wait to get married, he would have to find his own way out of the situation. If he wanted to keep the family together, of course. And my husband is trying...."

Then there was another letter. Warrant Officer Rudenko's wife asked for protection for herself and her family against attacks by Senior Lieutenant Nersinyan. She told about unworthy conduct on the part of the officer-and-communist and his spouse: "When is all of this going to end? I have a job which requires great effort and enormous energy. Where am I to get it in this situation? And why are people permitted to overstep the boundaries of our moral principles"? She goes on to report that she, Rudenko, complained to the formation political section but that nothing has changed. There is no one to intervene and settle the conflict.

I honestly admit that after having read these letters I could not help asking myself how we can account for such callousness toward family problems. After all, we know that our party attaches enormous importance to concern for the individual. And the future commanders and political workers are not

taught in a single school or a single academy that the officer's family is a matter of secondary concern, which can be ignored. On the contrary, they state vociferously that in order to enhance combat readiness it is very important to keep the officer's personal life, relations within the family and his leisure time activities constantly in mind--in short, to see the individual. What will he be like tomorrow when he arrives for flight work, for example? Will he be rested and in a good mood and consequently, capable of fully demonstrating his capabilities? Or will he be irritated, sleepy, have a headache? Can we really fail to think about such things? I do not want the reader to misunderstand. No one plans to make generalizations out of these deficiencies in the work performed with the families of officers and warrant officers, and certainly not to dramatize the situation. There is absolutely no basis for this. On the contrary, we could cite hundreds and thousands of examples of how commanders, political workers and party activists show truly paternal concern for the young families. This is a rule of life for us. They feel the sorrow of others as though it were their own. They find both the time and a way to help those who have encountered difficulties or even gotten into trouble. Following Olga Kurbatova's letter to the editors, it was only necessary for certain OICs to demonstrate sensitivity and concern for the family, and many of the problems were immediately resolved. Olga was issued a temporary residence permit, provided with a job and authorized to receive medical care. The family has been placed on the waiting list for an apartment. I would simply like to know, as a human being, why deviations from this rule occur, even though rarely, in the army milieu, where people united by the difficult conditions of military service especially value friendship and military comradeship.

Some people are inclined to think that technological progress is to blame for it all, that the machines have pushed man into the background, or more accurately, forced him out of the sphere of attention of the command element. It is apparently something else. Quite simply, certain commanders and political workers are drawn to the armchair style of leadership: look at papers in the office, issue instructions by telephone and hold a conference. If there is no water in the apartments and pipe has to be obtained somewhere right away to repair the pipeline, that can wait a day or two. If you go to the senior commander about an apartment for a subordinate, that can be even more trying. You sometimes have to argue and prove your case, and that involves getting worked up and impairing your health. It is better to get out of the situation somehow on your own. And all of this gives rise to indifference, to a lordly and contemptuous attitude toward people.

Captain V. Lebedev, secretary of the party bureau at an air garrison, was once asked about the life of Senior Warrant Officer V. Fomin, a communist, about his activities after work. There were reasons for this interest.

"Rumor has it that he has some family problems, that because of this he is not behaving entirely decently in his personal life," the party bureau secretary said, shrugging his shoulders. "But you can't do anything with rumors."

That is correct, of course. The party organization is too serious a collective to lower itself to the level of various idle chatter and gossip. I would

say only that information from the communists can sometimes also be passed off as rumors. It depends upon how you take the information. But let the rumors be. There were also incidents which could not simply be brushed aside, no matter how much one wanted too. Senior Warrant Officer Fomin was committing immoral acts in his personal life and gross infractions of military discipline. The senior commander was imposing penalties upon him, but the party organization paid no attention. It was as though the collective existed in and of itself, and he, communist Fomin, in and of himself. Party meetings and party bureau sessions were held. They did not discuss him, however.

The secretary did attempt to remember, with the help of Fomin himself, why the party activists had wanted to discuss Fomin's case in the bureau. It seemed that it was for being rude to subordinates. He mentioned the month. The senior warrant officer shook his head imperturbably, however:

"No, it didn't happen then. At that time I was spending 3 days in the guard-house."

In about 5 minutes he did in fact produce a record of his arrest, indicating that he had served his time.

"So you've even been there," the party bureau secretary said with something between surprise and sarcasm, and then fell silent.

There is another aspect of the problem we are discussing, however, which, it seems to me, cannot be ignored. When the families of young officers and warrant officers do not receive attention, it is frequently not because of callousness or indifference. A commander, political worker or party bureau secretary sometimes knows very well what is happening in a lieutenant's family but is embarrassed to speak with him or his spouse openly, to give them advice. It is another man's family, you see, and it would be awkward to interfere. There are times in life, though, when it is necessary, simply essential, to interfere. This should be done tactfully and intelligently, however.

I recently visited a remote garrison. Airman of the regiment in which Lieutenant Colonel D. Kosolapov is political worker serve there. The regimental commander and his deputy for political affairs arrived there almost simultaneously. They learned from the personnel that their predecessors had not spared themselves, that they had worked without days-off, from reveille to retreat, but were completely unable to get the collective out of its slump. The problems in the flight training remained the same. Military discipline in the lagging subunits had not improved. The new regimental commander and Lieutenant Colonel D. Kosolapov, his deputy for political affairs, had to give serious thought to the situation. How were they to work at it? What direction were they to take? And they found the right way.

I have to cite the following example in connection with this. One of the best pilots was suddenly like a different person. He had become absent-minded and morose. What had happened to his former enthusiasm, his zeal on the job. One day he showed up for flight work after a sleepless night. His name had to be

crossed off the flight schedule, of course. Lieutenant Colonel D. Kosolapov decided to have a frank talk with the officer. He asked the latter delicately and tactfully why he had been so absent-minded of late. It turned out that his wife was leaving him.

"She announced that she intends to leave, that she is fed up with being stuck in these backwoods." The political worker could see unbearable suffering in the officer's eyes. "What can I do, Comrade Lieutenant Colonel? I can't live without her, you know."

That very day, after work, the political worker had a talk with the young wife. He learned that she had grown up in a city, in comfort, that she could not imagine her life without theatres, museums and exhibits. She had done the best she could to find the strength to remain in those backwoods, where bears sometimes wandered up to the porches. It did not last long, however. She became bored.

It was necessary to exert a great deal, a very great deal of effort to convince the young woman that she was doing the wrong thing, to convince her that she should do everything possible, now, while she was young, not to lose that great thing, love, which is given to a person perhaps only once in life. There were talks and there were other measures, each of which provided a bit of invigorating sustenance for the soul.

There was enormous benefit to the cause which they served--a high level of combat readiness. Everything straightened out, as they say, for the pilot. Once again he would leave on a flight bouyant, composed and prepared for any unexpected event.

It would undeniably be absolutely incorrect to reduce this problem to a matter of apartments, jobs for the wives and talks in "troubled" families. No, the problem is far more complex than it would appear at first glance.

A lieutenant wrote from Sverdlovsk. I read the article "Without a Heart of Ice." The magazine touched upon a subject which is important to the young officers and their families and to which they can relate. It was difficult for us at first. We had neither decent housing nor a job for my wife in her field. We now have all of that. We have a comfortable apartment with all the conveniences, and my wife is working in her field. I achieved this by trying to get out of the army several times. This is not enough for me, though. I dream of having my own apartment, a dacha and a car. You can write what you like in your magazine, but I am sticking to my opinion. And I have my wife's complete support. It is our business, ours alone.

It is not the pessimism of the lieutenant, who wishes to remain anonymous, not the fact that he does not believe there is good, which is frightening. That could pass rapidly. It is a fact that even in our army milieu, which is rightly an excellent school of ideological-political indoctrination and spiritual growth for the individual, we still encounter the attitude that life is a matter of consumption. A desire to obtain all of the benefits at once, without having done anything for society.

Captain V. Sergeyev, a political worker in one of the units, once told about a discussion which had taken place during classes in the system of political training for warrant officers. The question of communist morality came up in the discussion of the subject. During the brief discussion, one of the students recalled an article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA about an enterprising young man who knew how to "make" money. Many of the warrant officers spoke with indignation about the morally degenerate man and tried to understand the causes of his degeneration. But some of the comrades talked about what they would do with "big" money. One said that he would buy a dacha and a car and put the rest in the bank. Another said that he already had a car, a dacha as well, that he had received it all from his parents. He would take a trip around the world.

"You ask what connection this has with discipline, with behavior within the family and the collective?" Sergeyev asked. "A most direct connection. We still have plenty of bourgeois Philistinism. And it is manifested both with respect to material things and in relations among people. The interest in consumption can be seen in certain comrades. A colleague needs help? Why should I become involved? Let his commanders teach him. I would have nothing to show for it, after all. With such ideas one can work with the equipment in a slipshod manner, be in no rush to join the formation. And is this not what we need to talk about first and foremost if we want to eliminate disciplinary infractions from our life, if we want to achieve a situation in which the individual conducts himself in the manner required by our communist morality on the job and in his personal life"?

I would not go so far as to say that everything Captain Sergeyev says is right. There is certainly something to think about, however. It has long been known, after all, that all deviations from generally accepted standards of behavior, the same as unconscientious fulfillment of one's duty, are rooted in the mentality of the Philistine, in his general attitude toward the world, in his understanding of life. And the trouble is not just that the concepts of simple respectability and the spiritual values of the individual who lives in our socialist society were not instilled in the young person from childhood and he therefore does not have real respect for himself or for other people. Part of the problem is the fact that attention is rarely given to manifestations of this kind of Philistine mentality and they are not combatted in the military collective.

The individual always owes the society, and not the other way around. And when the young officer or warrant officer receives the keys to a new apartment, he must understand that he has to pay for all of the benefits which our socialist state provides him. Pay with honest and conscientious labor. Indoctrination is absolutely essential, however, in order to have this understanding.

The family.... What a powerful force it is. It inspires the individual to work with enormous effort, to perform feats for the homeland. And I would not be in error if I said that it is a matter of great state importance to think about and be concerned with the making of the family, with developing in the people good moral principles and a sense of responsibility to our society for the fulfillment of their duty. And this requires being aware of every individual, so that no one is left alone with his sorrow.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MILITARY DISCIPLINE, LEGAL EDUCATION OF SERVICEMEN

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 85 (Signed to press 5 Aug 85) pp 58-62

[Article by Lt Col Justice Yu. Vinokurov, candidate of legal sciences, docent, under the rubric "Stronger Discipline--Better Combat Readiness": "So That There Are no Infractions: From Experience in Performing Indoctrinational Work in a Subunit"]

[Text] Guards Captain A. Bezshlyaga has commanded a company for several years. Guards Lieutenant M. Biryukov, deputy commander for political affairs, has worked with him for almost 2 years. The subunit they head is the best in the unit. As a rule, the personnel receive the highest rating for all of the combat training tasks. The subunit has been an excellent one and has firmly retained the regiment's challenge cup for a long time. The number of soldiers outstanding in the combat and political training and the number of rated specialists grows from one training period to the next. Firm military discipline has been maintained for more than a single year there.

"Without aware discipline," Guards Lieutenant M. Biryukov says, "we would never have been able to achieve the excellent results in the combat and political training. The matter of strengthening discipline, maintaining firm regulation order, assuring that the daily routine and the class schedule are adhered to and preventing breaches of discipline and other offenses is therefore constantly at the center of attention in all our work.

The subunit's successes are the result primarily of joint, precisely coordinated organizational and indoctrinational work on the part of the commander, the political worker, the party and Komsomol organizations, which focuses on the successful accomplishment of the tasks facing the subunit. Well organized legal education of the fightingmen has played far from the least important role. It has done a great deal to enhance their legal awareness, to develop respect for Soviet law and socialist legality, to develop a sense of need to strictly observe the laws and military regulations and orders from commanders and chiefs, and to create a climate of intolerance of offenses, and in the final analysis it has helped to prevent them.

As a means of purposefully and systematically influencing the awareness and the minds of the fightingmen for purposes of developing in them deeply rooted and strong legal views, convictions and feelings, and instilling in them a

high level of legal sophistication, skills and habits of correct conduct, legal education is an inseparable part of the ideological and indoctrinational work. It is rightly considered to be one of the effective means of strengthening military discipline, law and order and of preventing offenses. The officers in the company do a great deal to see that the soldiers and NCOs know well and consciously observe the Constitution of the USSR and Soviet laws, and that they strictly and precisely observe the oath, military regulations, other legal enactments and the orders of commanders and chiefs.

Legal education activities there are included in the monthly plans for party-political work to strengthen military discipline. They are planned and conducted on the basis of requirements set by the CPSU, the Soviet Government, the USSR minister of defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, commanders and chiefs, the actual state of military discipline and the desires of the personnel. Officers, NCOs, party and Komsomol organizations and agitators take an active part in the legal propaganda. Senior commanders, military legal experts and workers from the VAI [Military Automotive Inspection Service] and police agencies are periodically invited to address the men.

We know that it is impossible to achieve precise observance of the laws if the fightingmen do not know them or do not know them well. Enhancing the fightingmen's legal knowledgeability helps them to properly observe the laws and helps to prevent infractions of discipline. Purposeful work is therefore constantly performed in the subunit to publicize Soviet laws and CPSU decisions on matters of strengthening legality and order, and to inform the fightingmen of the requirements contained in orders issued by the command element. The latter, as we know, detail and specifically describe the laws and indicate the best ways to observe them.

Special attention is devoted to publicizing the requirements contained in the general military regulations, the legal foundation of life and work for the troops. A good knowledge of the regulations and their absolute observance is one of the main requirements for achieving firm discipline and good results in the combat and political training.

In addition to the study of general military regulations, talks are regularly conducted in the scheduled classes and during the hours of mass political work to explain the individual requirements contained in the regulations. This helps the fightingmen gain a better understanding of the meaning and the content of those requirements. The personnel listened with interest to a talk by the company commander on the subject "Military Regulations on Relations Among Servicemen," a talk by Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Rybakov, a platoon commander, on the conduct of servicemen in public places, and one by Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Bobrov, a platoon commander, on relations between commanders and subordinates, senior and junior personnel. Based on specific examples from the life of the company and other subunits in the unit, examples with which many people are familiar, these talks not only make it possible for the men to gain a more thorough understanding of the meaning of the regulations and the need to observe them undeviatingly, but are also of great indoctrinational importance. They help to publicize the positive and promote public condemnation of those fightingmen who commit individual acts of negligence in the service.

As a rule, immediately after a new legislative act is passed, company personnel are informed of its content, and its meaning and vital necessity are explained to them. Particular attention is given to those points in the laws which apply to the fightingmen. For example, the company commander addressed the men soon after the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet approved the new "Statute on Material Liability of Servicemen for Losses Caused the State" in January 1984. He explained the requirements contained in the statute to them in intelligible form. He simultaneously reminded them of the regulation duties of the fightingmen to protect and preserve the military and other supplies and equipment entrusted to them, named the soldiers and NCOs who excel in matters of thrift and listed possible reserves for conserving materiel. Incidentally, there have been no shortages of supplies and equipment in the subunit, no one has been brought to material liability, there has been a saving of fuels and lubricants and other supplies, and the operating life of the equipment has been extended.

Arrangements were made in the collective for the fightingmen to study the decrees passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government and the ukase passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet which specified steps to intensify the campaign against drunkenness and alcoholism. Classes and talks were conducted by the company commander, his deputy for political affairs and the platoon commanders. The texts of these decrees and the ukase have been placed in the legal information room. The study of documents on this matter is combined with propaganda against alcohol. The unit doctor told the fightingmen about alcohol's harmful effect upon human health, for example.

Legal propaganda is ordinarily conducted each Wednesday during the hours of mass political work. Wednesday is called legal information day there. On that day the fightingmen receive information on new legislation and on changes in and additions to existing laws. Among other things, they were promptly informed of changes in and additions to the Law on Military Crimes. On legal information day, talks are also conducted and articles on legal subjects published in the press are read. The company keeps a record of the soldiers' attendance at activities dealing with legal matters. They are repeated separately on subsequent days for those who did not attend because they were on duty.

The subunit has a notebook of questions which the personnel are to be asked. Every soldier and sergeant can write down in the notebook a legal or any other question of interest to him at any time. The new questions are periodically analyzed and systematized by the subunit commander, the party organization and the Komsomol bureau. A decision is made as to who can give the most complete and substantiated answer to them, and in what form. A decision is also made as to whether to gather all the company personnel, to meet with the personnel in the platoons or to answer the soldier or sergeant individually. When for some reason the company officers are unable to resolve a question or provide an answer to it, they turn for assistance to the higher command element or to military legal experts. The regimental commander, Guards Captain V. Karpov, battalion commander, Guards Captain S. Zhdanov, his deputy for political affairs, and other officials have repeatedly provided answers to question submitted by the fightingmen and talked with them. Senior Lieutenant

of Justice S. Prokopenko, a worker with the judge advocate's office, answered a question submitted by Guards Sergeant S. Zyabukin on the basis for criminal liability of the servicemen for nonregulation relations. He presented a talk replete with instructive examples.

The questions submitted by the fightingmen actually determine the subject matter of the legal propaganda. This system of enhancing the personnel's legal knowledge evokes lively interest in them. In 1984 the soldiers and NCOs put around 50 questions on legal subjects into the notebook. They received detailed answers to all of the questions.

The subunit's life itself frequently suggests the theme for talks on legal subjects. In one case the talks and lectures might be prompted by the fact that the personnel or individual fightingmen have a poor knowledge of some law or of certain regulations. In another case it might be an attempt to violate military discipline, the inadmissibility and harmfulness of which must be brought to the collective's attention.

Upon learning that Guards Private A. Nechayev had suggested to his colleagues S. Timeryanov and V. Verblyuchyavichus that they drink some alcohol, for example, the political worker ordered Guards Lieutenant M. Biryukov to conduct a talk on "Drunkenness is the Source of Offenses." Guards Captan Bezshlyaga also had a talk with Private Nechayev. At their own initiative, the Komsomol members examined Nechayev's conduct at a meeting of the platoon Komsomol group. These comprehensive measures produced positive results. There were no more cases of consumption of alcohol or even attempts to use it by either Nechayev or the other fightingmen.

Here is another example. One of the soldiers in the unit went AWOL. Although there had been no such violations of discipline for a long time in the company, it was considered essential to conduct a talk "On the Liability of Servicemen for Going AWOL" for the personnel.

Particular attention is given to the legal education of new replacements. In the beginning the young fightingmen do not have an adequately precise understanding of their service duties, they lack solid professional skills and frequently experience a lack of confidence. A series of group and individual talks are conducted with them in accordance with a special plan, the vast majority of which involve explaining regulations. The laws which govern the procedure for performing the military service work and fulfilling various service duties are also explained. These measures, in combination with others, help the young soldiers to rapidly fit into the structure of army life.

The legal information room, where the material is periodically updated, helps a great deal with the publicizing of laws and consequently, with the enhancement of the personnel's legal knowledge. The fightingmen's attention is drawn by its attractive arrangement and by the fact that it contains laws or excerpts from laws, as well as articles on legal subjects and popular legal pamphlets. This material teaches them about V.I. Lenin's precepts to fightingmen on the observance of the law and about the CPSU's requirements with respect to strengthening legality, and provides them with essential information on laws in effect.

The section "Recommended Reading," which lists articles and pamphlets on legal subjects which may be beneficial to the soldiers, is of interest to the fightingmen. It also has a notebook containing the recommended material.

The editorial board of the company's wall newspaper DOBLEST helps to publicize legal knowledge. A wall newspaper is turned out at least twice a month. It periodically contains information on legal subjects. This is indicated by the titles themselves: "Not a Step Away From Regulations," "Strictly Observe Regulations," "Protect Military and Other Property," "Reliable Protection for the Military Equipment" and so forth. The news bulletins "Satire Gazette," "Technical Bulletin" and "The Rationalizer's Corner" also contribute to the legal education of the personnel. The articles contained therein acquaint the soldiers and NCOs with colleagues who have demonstrated initiative in the performance of their military duty. They also learn about cases of negligence on the part of individual soldiers, about their slips and infractions. Pamphlets and books on legal subjects are discussed in the company. Specifically, a useful discussion was held on the book "V perevode s yuridicheskogo" [Translated From Legal Language]. Several individuals in each platoon read it ahead of time. During the discussion they commented that they had derived many new and useful things from it and expressed the desire that such activities be conducted more frequently.

Of all the diverse forms of legal education work the individual talk is preferred in the collective. Such talks are conducted most frequently as a result of individual deficiencies in the performance of the fightingmen or because of a lack of knowledge or an incorrect understanding of the laws or military regulations. The subunit officers (they are all communists), members of the Komsomol bureau and agitators take part in them. The individual and differentiated work performed with the personnel produces good results. It increases the legal awareness of the fightingmen, improves their conduct and prevents disciplinary infractions. For example, Guards Private T. Nikitkov, a platoon agitator, noticed that Guards Private O. Korniyenkov was violating the rules for servicing the equipment. He talked with the latter, reminded him of the rules and pointed out that they must be observed.

The publicizing of positive experience helps to enhance legal awareness and prevent infractions of regulation order. All of the personnel learn about the successes achieved by the soldiers and NCOs. The names of the best fightingmen are always mentioned when the results are summed up, at formations, in the classes and in talks. News bulletins are devoted to them. The collective is always informed about zeal demonstrated by a soldier in his work, about the precise fulfillment of military duty and regulations, about the prevention of offenses. Guards Lieutenant Yu. Biketov, a platoon commander, commended Guards Private Ye. Golitsyn for vigilant performance of guard duty. A special news bulletin was issued on this event. An announcement was made to all of the company personnel about Golitsyn's zeal and his commendation.

The legal education ordinarily does not produce good results when the life and work of the subunit are not organized in strict accordance with regulations, when firm regulation order is lacking and the daily schedule is not observed. The commander and all of the company officers keep this in mind and give a

great deal of attention to applying the regulations in life. One has a sense of order throughout. The daily schedule is precisely observed, and there has not been a single case of disruption of the classes or other activities. The beds are always neatly made and uniforms kept neatly on hangers. Everything is kept in good repair at a place specially designated for it. The quarters are clean. This accustoms the personnel to order, neatness and the observance of established rules.

Legal education in combination with other types of indoctrinational work and intensive training help to unite the military collective and to create in it a climate of intolerance of shortcomings, negligence and infractions of regulation order. This in turn is a guarantee of good results in the combat and political training.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

W. GERMAN 'FALSIFICATIONS' OF CAUSES OF WAR

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[Article by Maj N. Yefimov, candidate of philosophy, under the rubric "On the Fronts of the Ideological Struggle": "In the Distorted Mirror of Anticommunism: The Problem of War and Peace and Its Bonn Expositors"]

[Text] Today the problem of war and peace is at the center of attention of millions of the planet's inhabitants. Growth of the mass antiwar movement is forcing socialism's class enemy to attempt to provide its own answer to the most burning issue of the era, to work out a sort of alternative to Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and peace. Hundreds of research centers are working on this task in the capitalist nations. Philosophers, sociologists and political scientists are endeavoring to create concepts on this problem from the standpoint of the class which they serve. Bourgeois ideologists are attempting to refute the basic principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The source of wars and the causes of the danger of war in the contemporary era, for example.

So many false theories have been advanced to explain the outbreak of wars and armed conflicts. Some "men of science" in the West see the roots of war in man's "natural aggressiveness", others perceive them in his specific mental makeup, others in the rapid development of scientific and technological progress, in "acts of God" and supernatural forces, and yet others find them in the policy of certain heads of state (princes, khans, emperors, presidents and prime ministers), in their personal political ambitions, their desire for hegemony, their craving for profits, religious intolerance, militant nationalism and so forth.

Subterfuges of the Ideological Diversionists

West German bourgeois therotecians demonstrate great zeal in explaining the ideological basis of the problem of war and peace. Specialists with the Science and Policy Fund, which is financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, research institutes in Bonn and Hamburg, the Clausewitz Association, the Wehrkunde, a military studies association, and numerous other state and private organizations and institutions are employed in this field in the FRG.

Judging from everything, however, Bonn's ruling circles consider their efforts to be clearly inadequate. FRG Minister of Defense M. Worner has called upon the priests of falsehood "to pursue the spiritual debate on the problem of peace and the securing of peace even more vigorously and aggressively." Our ideological enemies are stepping up the "scientific investigations" which imperialism's ideological diversion machine employs in its operations.

The methodological flaws of the theoretical investigations are entangled in vile anti-Soviet slander. When they consider the causes of wars in the contemporary world, imperialism's West German apologists see the source of the danger of war in the foreign policy course... of the Soviet Union. In the FRG, and incidentally throughout the capitalist world, there continues to be no more divergent explanation of the cause of current international tensions than the fabrication about "Soviet aggressiveness" and "Moscow's expansionism." It would hardly be possible to think of anything more blasphemous or false than to place the blame for the threat to peace on the planet onto a state which has struggled tirelessly for peace since the day it was founded and whose people have suffered so much from enemy invasions!

The ideological diversionists resort to various stratagems to support this malicious myth. They attempt in every way possible to thrust into the mass consciousness the idea of the USSR's "military superiority" over the West by means of cleverly concocted "facts" and "factual trivialities." The Bonn propagandists play the same anti-Soviet tune that Washington plays and lie without a twinge of conscience. But then how could we speak of a conscience with respect to people for whom slander has become a well-paid profession!

Filling their social order, which emanates from the pinnacles of power on the Rhine, the West German press, radio and television constantly issue reports on new Soviet combat ships, aircraft and missiles. And they deliberately remain silent about the fact that we are developing a certain model of combat equipment in response to the development of new and improved armaments in the NATO nations, that the USSR is forced to do so in order to maintain the military balance.

Day after day the idea is instilled in the West German resident that "the Soviets are arming and Moscow is building up its offensive capability." Political and military figures, diplomats and military experts from the NATO nations present anti-Soviet fabrications in the newspapers and magazines. The USSR "is counting on military force," current FRG Minister of Defense M. Worner solemnly states. He is echoed by West German diplomat (G.-G. Vik), who states that the Soviet Union "has assumed the role of a power striving for a hegemonistic position in Europe."

Juggled figures on the balance of military power of the USA and the USSR, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, are also put into play. The anti-Soviets hope, and not without justification, that the falsified figures will make an impression on many West German readers (they are not in a position to check them out and discover the falsity of the NATO "arithmetic," after all). For example, when Bonn's professional falsifiers consider the balance of strategic capabilities of the USSR and the USA, they frequently focus attention primarily on two components of the strategic Triad: intercontinental ballistic missiles and

submarine-based ballistic missiles. They compare the number of missiles, the number and types of warheads and the power of the nuclear charges. They frequently fail to mention the strategic bombers equipped with cruise missiles, which make up an extremely significant portion of the strategic nuclear capability of the United States.

The West German "lovers of truth" also make extensive use of the following technique. They fail to mention the fact that the American medium-range missiles deployed in a number of West European nations--108 Pershing II and 464 cruise missiles--are strategic weapons with respect to our nation, because their range permits them to reach targets in the Soviet interior. The same is true of the capabilities of American deck-based aircraft. The American fleet is in areas directly adjacent to the borders of the USSR and allied socialist states, after all.

The West German anticommunists attempt to convince public opinion that there is a "threat from the East" also by citing our nation's history. For this purpose they resort to a formal comparison of individual moves by czarist Russia and the Soviet State in the international arena and draw the pseudo-scientific conclusion that their foreign policy courses "coincide." Articles in the leading theoretical military journal of the FRG, EUROPAISCHE WEHRKUNDE, among others, are filled with fabrications about our nation's "adherence" to the traditions of the autocracy's foreign policy course. The authors seek manifestations of the mythical "Soviet expansionism" in the most diverse regions of our planet.

The fact should be stressed that most of the references by the Rhine propagandists to "traditional Russian expansionism" have no basis even historically. For most of their centuries-long history, our nation's peoples were forced to repel attacks by neighboring states: from the east, from the south and from the west. Why do the Messrs "lovers of truth" remain silent about the fierce defensive battles fought by Russ in the 13th-15th centuries, about the struggle against the onslaught by the Osman Empire and against uninvited "guests" from the western borders? And what about Chudskoye Ozero, Kulikovo field, Smolensk, Poltava, Borodino, Sevastopol? These names have become a symbol of the courage and heroism of the Russian homeland's glorious sons who protected their native land against the enemy.

The troubadours of anticommunism from the FRG try to find the causes of current tensions in the world and wars of the contemporary era also in Marxist-Leninist theory. Naturally, they distort its basic tenets and insolently count on the fact that most of the population of the FRG do not know even the fundamentals of communist ideology. This is true, as an example, of H. Geisler, G. Brakelman and Yu.de. Mezieres, who, in a book with the title "Elimination of War," contrived to detect the sources of the mythical "communist expansion" and the "military threat" to the West in Marxist-Leninist theory. These fabrications of the West German anticommunists are certainly not original, however. The same kind of statements have been made in similar slanderous opuses by scribblers in other capitalist nations.

The basic idea behind this kind of reasoning is that since Marxism-Leninism believes that socialism must win on the worldwide historical scale, this means that the socialist nations are striving to achieve this by means of "war" or "covert subversive activities" against the capitalist nations. The methodological flaw in this thoroughly false thesis lies primarily in the fact that the bourgeois ideologists grossly distort the communists' understanding of ways to achieve socialism's worldwide historical victory. Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the premise that a revolution cannot be introduced from outside, that it is a result of "internal ripening," of the socioeconomic and political development of a given capitalist nation, the logical extension and the highest point in the class struggle between the workers and the bourgeoisie in the specific nation.

With respect to the socialist nations, they certainly do not promote development of the world revolutionary process with "secret operations" or "acts of military intervention" as the enemies of socialism slanderously maintain, but primarily with successes in social and economic development.

We exert our main influence upon world development with our economic policy, V.I. Lenin stated in 1921 ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Volume 43, page 341). This important tenet of communist ideology is particularly important in the nuclear age. Today as never before, the ideals of Marxism-Leninism can be implemented only if peace is preserved. How could the communists, the most genuine humanists on earth, build a new society on nuclear ashes? The new social order can and will be victorious only beneath a peaceful sky. It will inevitably replace the old order on a worldwide scale because of the objective laws of development of human civilization, because of the historic necessity to provide space for development of the productive forces, which is increasingly restrained by the limitations of production relations based on private ownership.

The truth can be temporarily concealed but not destroyed. It is subject neither to time nor to the desires of people. The historical truth goes unequivocally against the falsifications of bourgeois ideologists. It is impossible to obscure the Soviet peace initiatives, and the truth about our peace-loving foreign policy passes through the class cordons.

The Dangerous Prescriptions of the "Peace-Makers"

Man has dreamed of eternal and universal peace on the planet from the earliest times. Thinkers of all times and all peoples have persistently sought ways to eliminate wars from human society: in ancient Greece, in the land of ancient China, in Russ. Many inquiring minds have dealt with this problem also on German land. Nor are certain bourgeois thinkers of our day exceptions. In the era of imperialism, to be sure, most of the bourgeois ideologists are motivated not so much by a desire to achieve lasting peace among peoples, as were many of their spiritual predecessors, as much as by a desire to wrest the ideological initiative in this area away from Marxism-Leninism, to weaken the attractiveness of its concept of peaceful coexistence among states with opposite social systems.

There is no shortage of the most diverse concepts and "models of peace" in the West today: conservative, liberal, clerical, social-reformist, pacifist. Their abundance in the bourgeoisie's ideological arsenal is due both to the existence of various social groups within the ruling class, whose economic and political interests do not fully coincide, and to the inability of this class, which is departing from the historical arena, to work out a clearly defined concept of peace. The enemies of socialism are therefore forced to fight for the minds of people not with the quality of their ideas but with quantity. In the final analysis, however, the entire multicolored kaleidoscope of ideas and pseudo-ideas can be broken down into two large groups belonging to the two large camps of the international bourgeoisie: the crude-bourgeois, aggressive-bourgeois camp and the pacifist camp (V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch.," Volume 44, pages 407, 408).

Let us turn to the views of politicians and ideologists in the bourgeoisie's militaristic wing, members of which are now determining the foreign policy course of Bonn, Washington and London. The views of the advocates of militarism can be defined hypothetically as a concept of "peace from a position of strength." They maintain that peace between the two social systems is possible only as long as the USSR knows that "its military attack" upon the West would be hopeless. Expressing such views, M. Worner, as an example, has stated that Soviet politicians "will not unleash a war and will not resort to the use of nuclear weapons as long as the risk to them is greater than the anticipated gain." The theoreticians of anticommunism maintain that the foreign policy of the Western nations can therefore preserve peace only if it is based on the power of the NATO military machine. This is exactly in the spirit of Frederick the Great, who declared: "Diplomacy without weapons is the same as music without instruments." In our era, however, the nuclear "instruments" in the hands of foolhardy politicians could turn into a knell for the planet.

The sorry theoreticians on the Rhine stubbornly refuse to acknowledge this, however. Echoing their colleagues on the banks of the Potomac, they glorify the monstrous weapons of mass destruction in every possible way. They interpret them as nothing other than "a means of preserving peace." One frequently encounters statements like the following in West German magazines and books by bourgeois authors: "Peace without nuclear weapons is an unrealistic desire.... We cannot reject nuclear weapons precisely for the sake of preventing war," "Nuclear weapons are a political weapon. They must prevent the initiation of military operations." and so forth.

An analysis of the works of West German bourgeois ideologists shows that they have been resorting to something like the "theft" of individual theoretical tenets of communist ideology more and more frequently in recent years. In the interest of providing an ideological camouflage for the militaristic preparations of the imperialist states, our ideological enemies have "borrowed" from the Marxists the tenets that armed forces are a guarantee of peace, that a balance of power must be maintained in order to avert war, and so forth, as an example. Naturally, these tenets are presented to West German public opinion with an anticommunist, anti-Soviet interpretation.

Hiding behind demagogic lamentations about their "love of peace," the Bonn Pharisees gave their agreement to the deployment of American first-strike missiles, although their nation was already literally covered with nuclear weapons and means of delivery from the USA. This is not the worst part, however. The ultra-rightists are seriously thinking about ways to obtain these deadly weapons themselves. Now talks are held on joint West European nuclear forces, now the paltry idea is tossed out: Why not outfit the Bundeswehr itself with nuclear weapons? The nation has nuclear reactors, and the Council of the Western European Union adopted a decision in the middle part of last year to remove from the FRG the last restrictions on the production of conventional offensive weapons, including long-range missiles and strategic bombers.

In the situation of appeals from Washington for a new "crusade" against socialism, the mentality of the "eternal past," infected with the incurable revanchist and anti-Soviet virus, is excited by the delirious idea of restoring the former imperial grandeur and beginning another "Drang nach Osten." Perhaps we will be lucky this time. "American is with us now," after all. The alarming symptoms of the dangerous delirium in the militaristic minds are making themselves felt more and more frequently in the policy of a nation from whose territory the flames of a world war have already emanated twice.

Militaristic forces in the FRG today are essentially operating in unison with Washington's aggressive circles, which are drawing Bonn into the new and dangerous undertaking of the American military, the notorious Strategic Defense Initiative. The people across the ocean are not looking after the FRG's interests, however. The strategists from the Pentagon bunkers with their impossible calculations for victory in a nuclear war need Bonn's economic and military strength primarily as a component of NATO's capability. The FRG is viewed through the militaristic eyepieces abroad not just as possible staging area, but as a convenient one: if a war is initiated against socialism, it is closer to the USSR and a long way from the American borders! The national interests of the FRG and the future of its people are not taken into account. The Pentagon strategists have many like-minded accomplices also on European territory, people who consider nuclear war to be acceptable. West German philosopher W. Klucksen, for example, asserts in his opus "Force and the Use of Force" that based on "moral convictions" it is necessary "also to accept the risk of a nuclear war." What kind of morality is this?

West German bourgeois ideologists resort to various tricks to justify the pro-American trend in the FRG's military policy. Among other things, they toss out to the public the paltry and fallacious idea that the FRG is "forced" to belong to NATO and have a close alliance with the USA. T. Sommer, for example, starting off with that same old postulate about the USSR's "aggressiveness," attempts to convince one that the USSR's military strength in Europe must be "countered" but that the FRG is "too weak" to do so alone. The conclusion is drawn from this that foreign troops are essential in the FRG and that it must rely closely upon the USA, which has a nuclear capability.

Through the efforts of the oversea "hawks" and their West German followers, the combat strength and offensive capabilities of the Bundeswehr, which

is already the most powerful army in the capitalist part of Europe, are being built up year after year. The nation's military budget for 1985 is almost 50 billion West German marks.

The Bonn "peace-makers" hypocritically try to justify the built-up in conventional weapons by "concern" for preventing a nuclear war. To avoid being forced to use nuclear weapons in case of a "Soviet attack," they say, it is essential to build up the conventional armed forces, provide the troops with more and more new tanks, infantry combat vehicles, aircraft and artillery guns and to give particular attention to the high-precision weapons systems. In fact, however, talk about the defensive focus of the accelerated build-up of the NATO armies is false and hypocritical. It is ideological camouflage for preparations for aggression against the USSR and its allies.

The West German theoreticians are advancing yet another prescription for "establishing peace"--"peace according to the imperialists." They make their agreement to a relaxation of international tensions in Europe contingent upon recognition of the permanence of the social status quo in the capitalist world. They are essentially talking about getting the communist movement to agree to the perpetuation of social oppression. According to the logic behind the reasoning of the anticommunists, the communist parties in the capitalist nations should give up their selfless struggle for the rights of the working class and all of the workers, for their liberation from the oppression of exploitation. And the anticommunists demand that the socialist nations reject the principle of proletarian internationalism and halt their support for the forces of social progress--that is, recognize the right of the imperialist powers to interfere unhampered in the internal affairs of sovereign states, to overthrow governments unsuitable to the West in regions which they graciously declare to be a sphere "of vital interest" of the West.

The attempt by part of the imperialist bourgeoisie to get socialism "to agree" to secure the social status quo in the world is due in great part to a lack of understanding of the objective nature of the social changes occurring on the planet by bourgeois social thinking. The stereotypical anticommunist thinking prevents many Western politicians and ideologists from correctly viewing or soberly assessing the realities of our complex and contradictory world. For many of Bonn's bourgeois theoreticians the growth of the national liberation struggle, the assumption of power by progressive forces and the exacerbation of class conflicts in this or that nonsocialist state in Africa, Asia or Latin America are the "actions of Moscow," a result of its "secret operations."

The FRG's propaganda system makes willing and active use of this version of events in the world for slandering the foreign policy of the USSR and frightening the inhabitants with "Soviet expansion." While expatiating on our nation's "blame" for international tensions and for numerous local conflicts, the ideological diversionists toss in the paltry idea that in order to preserve peace it is essential to continue the build-up of the Bundeswehr's fighting strength, to obediently follow the USA's lead in the international arena and to accept the growth of military expenditures.

Absurdities in the Arsenals of Falsehood

The current ideological situation in the capitalist nations, including the FRG, is characterized by increased influence for the views of pacifist-minded bourgeois and petty bourgeois thinkers and religious figures. They are motivated by an awareness of the dangers of a nuclear war and by a sincere desire to help find a way out of the complex situation which has developed in the international arena.

On the political level, the growth of pacifism in the bourgeois society is unquestionably a positive development demonstrating a desire by the forces of reason to prevail over the militaristic madness of ruling circles in nations of the West. It is precisely this desire which is helping to establish a broad antiwar coalition of social forces--communists, Social Democrats, the church, some members of the bourgeois parties and representatives of the environmental protection movement--in short, people with diverse political views and outlooks.

This is precisely what does not suit imperialism's militaristic circles, which are aware of the danger of a united front of fighters for peace to their plans to further intensify the arms race and exacerbate international tensions. Relying upon the controlled mass media, they are doing everything possible to break up the antiwar movement, prevent the communist parties from gaining increased authority in it and divert the movement onto a false path. Fabrications about "treacherous plots" by the communists to use the proponents of peace to weaken the West and other absurdities from the masters of falsehood are put into play for this purpose.

Refined ideological speculations are engaged in with respect to the communists' attitude toward pacifism. Taking individual Marxist statements about pacifism out of context, the ideological diversionists attempt to distort the views of Marxism-Leninism on this matter. Our ideological enemy remains silent about the fact that the communists regard pacifism as a trend in bourgeois social thinking on the one hand and as a political movement on the other. As one of the groups in the antiwar movement, the communist parties regard the pacifists as equal comrades-in-arms in the struggle for peace. They advocate serious collaboration by all the antiwar forces and joint actions in the struggle against the danger of a nuclear catastrophe. "When it is a matter of peace," German Communist Party Chairman G. Mies stresses, "we communists are prepared to make acceptable compromises and are prepared always to stress that which unites and to push aside that which divides."

Although the communists are the most consistent advocates of joint actions by all the antiwar forces, they also engage in a well-based theoretical dispute with the opponents of Marxism-Leninism. They reveal the scientific baselessness and erroneousness of non-Marxist views on the problem of war and peace, their illusory and Utopian nature.

Ideological disagreements exist between Marxism-Leninism and pacifism, among other things, in the question of the source of wars. Unlike the pacifists, the communists approach this problem not from the standpoint of abstract

humanism but from precisely defined class positions. Wars are generated by the very nature of the exploitative order, which is based on the system of private ownership of the means of production with its inherent relations of exploitation of the majority by the minority and greed for unrestrained economic enrichment by the dominant class. The intensification of capitalism's general crisis and the growing influence of the military-industrial complexes are further increasing the aggressiveness of the imperialist states, particularly the USA, and increasing their expansionistic aspirations. The imperialist bourgeoisie are capable of any military adventure in their attempts to retain their fabulous profits and their class supremacy.

In the situation of confrontation between the two social systems, the Marxists feel that it is possible and essential to strive for peaceful coexistence by the socialist and capitalist states based on the preservation of the balance of military capabilities and the gradual lowering of their level. World war is not inevitable today. "...We believe," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated, "that there are perfectly realistic possibilities for restraining the forces of imperialism. The conviction that a world without wars and weapons is practically attainable is gaining strength in the minds of people on earth."

For the workers the path of peace is the most desirable route to social and national liberation. It is consistent with their own interests and with the interests of preserving peace on the planet. After all, a local conflict today could serve as the fuse for a global conflict. When the exploitative class does not want to voluntarily leave the historical arena under the onslaught of forces for social progress and resorts to armed force, however, peoples have no alternative but to take up arms. The patriots of El Salvador and Guatemala, South Africa and Namibia are forced to fight for their freedom in fierce battle with punitive forces. And their struggle is a just one, no matter how hard the anticommunists try to demonstrate the reverse.

West German imperialist ideologists fiercely attack Marxism-Leninism for its affirmation of the validity of distinguishing just and unjust wars in the contemporary era. They attempt to contrast the communists to other participants in the antiwar movement, to depict members of communist parties as "wolves in sheep's clothing." Our ideological enemy declares with Jesuitic cunning: Let the communists reject their concept of a just war, and the "free world" will believe in their peaceableness. The imperialist bourgeoisie thus tries to divide the movement of fighters for peace in the capitalist nations and at the same time, to mislead public opinion with respect to the nature and the character of wars for national and social liberation of peoples and wars to protect a socialist homeland.

The stepped-up activities of ideological foes require great political vigilance on the part of the Soviet people and of fightingmen in the army and navy. The "disclosures" of the bourgeois ideologists are replenishing the arsenal of false theses of the imperialist propagandist machine, which is accelerating and becoming more refined and insidious by the year. The "investigations" of bourgeois theoreticians are turned into a dangerous subversive tool by the pen of liars skilled in the field of ideological diversion. It is directed against Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and peace and

toward disguising the real sources of the danger of war, toward justification of the militaristic preparations of the USA, the FRG and other NATO members.

Combatting the anti-Marxist and anti-Soviet fabrications of our class enemies involves extensively and persistently explaining the Marxist-Leninist position on the true causes of wars and armed conflicts in the contemporary era. It is not a matter simply of exposing certain militaristic-minded politicians, but one of substantiated demonstration of the deep-seated sources of the danger of war, which are rooted in imperialism.

Today, during the year of the 40th anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War and of World War II in general, the Soviet people say with complete justification that the most effective way to strengthen security is to successfully fulfill national economic development plans and increase the homeland's defense capability.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

REVIEW: SHINKARENKO -- MEMOIRS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 85 (Signed to press 5 Aug 85) pp 90-92

[Review by Lt Gen F. Stepanov of the book "Nesushchiye fakel" (Bearers of the Torch) by Maj Gen G. Shinkarenko, under the rubric "Criticism and Bibliography," Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, 284 pages]

[Text] They Provide Inspiration for a Feat

Among the books recently published in the series "Military Memoirs," one's attention is drawn to the memoirs of Major General G. Shinkarenko. The author, who during the war served as commissar, deputy commander for political affairs and chief of the political section of the 188th Rifle Division and then the 133rd Rifle Corps, writes about what he himself saw and experienced. He writes about the difficult battles and the mass heroism of Soviet fightingmen who fought on the Northwest Front, in the Ukraine and in Moldavia, in the liberation of the Far North and then Hungary, Yugoslavia and Austria, about the combat fraternity with Bulgarian and Yugoslav troops. A significant place in the book is given over to describing party-political work on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

Considered on a broader level, the book contains an interesting, true and exciting account of the far-reaching sources of our natural victory, of the spiritual greatness of the Soviet homeland's defenders and of that enormous and extremely difficult job performed by commanders, political workers and party organizations, which was materialized throughout the war in the great combat skill of Soviet fightingmen and in their moral and political superiority over enemy troops. The author also paints a memorable picture in his book of the combat operations of our fightingmen and brilliantly shows how the combat training of commanders, political workers, rank-and-file soldiers grew and gained strength from one day to the next, from one battle to the next.

Running through the entire book is the idea that the Soviet people's outstanding feat was inseparable from the multifaceted, purposeful work performed by the Lenin Communist Party. It was precisely the party's guiding role, its enormous political, military, organizational, economic and educational work which were the main source of the Great Victory, its determining factor. The Soviet people pinned all of their hopes for saving the homeland on the party.

They saw in the party the only force capable of organizing the total defeat of the enemy. Many of the fightingmen wanted to be communists. The book states that the party's draw was enormous. Just during the first 3 months of 1942, for example, 390 individuals were accepted as candidate members and 168 were accepted as party members in the division. The vast majority of those who became communists were people who had demonstrated their devotion to the party and to their military duty with their military deeds and their blood.

An enormous responsibility was placed upon the individual when he was issued his party card. "I recognize the great burden of responsibility," Lieutenant Ye. Ponomarev wrote in his application for party membership. "...I want to become a communist in order to trounce the enemy even more forcefully, as our Bolsheviks are trouncing him." This was the application from one of 200 fightingmen in the division who joined the party in August 1942, during the period of explanation of Order No. 227 issued by the People's Commissar of Defense. Its main requirement was: "Not a step back"! And the more difficult the situation became, the more people wanted to link their destiny to that of the party.

Many lines in the frontline political worker's memoirs are devoted to the communists. Their avant-garde role in the accomplishment of the combat missions was one of the important factors behind the achievement of victory in the battles with the German fascist invaders. It is a difficult position to be a communist in a war, the author writes. They fulfilled with great dignity the role of the vanguard assigned to them by the party Charter and by the dictates of their heart, inspiring and uplifting others with their personal example and their fervent party word.

The phrase "active vital stance" was not a part of our common vocabulary during the war, the book notes. The communists were distinguished by precisely such a stance, however--that is, by constant moral-political and psychological preparedness and the ability to accomplish the combat mission in the best possible way.

One page in the book contains a resolution adopted at a party meeting in one of the companies. This is what it says: "1. Demand that the communists take the avant-garde role in an offensive; 2. Require the communists to explain the mission in an offensive to all of the personnel; 3. Instruct Senior Sergeant V.F. Dmitriyev, member of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)], to be the first to rise to the attack with the slogan "Forward, for the homeland"!

Yes, the war demanded constant fervor, real courage and heroism from the communists. "It was the communists," the author stresses, "who were expected to carry the torch drawing the men toward feats and illuminating the path to victory for them." Many of them died on the fields of battle with the hated enemy. Even a heroic death in battle was a sign of the party spirit, however. This was the law of life and work for the party in the war, a fighting party.

A significant place in the book is given over to the experience in party-political work, a special type of weapon used by the army of the socialist

state. Experience in organizing and conducting it in various combat situations is revealed with specific examples and in inseparable linkage with the accomplishment of combat missions.

Take the battle at Novoye Ramushevo. The author is right when he says that this battle was one of the small episodes of the war as a whole. There were numerous such local battles on the front. It meant a great deal to the division involved, however. The book uses this example to illustrate the multifaceted work performed by commanders and political workers to mobilize the soldiers, NCOs and officers to break through the enemy's defense and route the opposing enemy. At the center of attention of the political workers was concern for correctly distributing party forces and Komsomol members, building communication trenches to the starting lines for the attacks, organizing interaction among assault troops, riflemen, artillerymen and combat engineers, and many other matters. During the battle they included the prompt clarification of the combat situation, the replacement of party and Komsomol activists put out of action, the publicizing of those who had distinguished themselves, and so forth.

The book gives special attention to showing the substance of the organizational and ideological work performed by the political section. It is perhaps described in greatest detail in the example of the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog offensive operation in January 1944. The effectiveness of this work was demonstrated in the great offensive spirit demonstrated by fightingmen of the division, which was awarded the title Nizhnedneprovsk for its successful accomplishment of the combat mission.

The author's thoughts about the place and role of the political section workers in a combat situation are of interest. It was the rule in the political section, the book points out, to have maximum communication with the fightingmen and to see to their rest prior to a battle. Naturally, this is in addition to the work pertaining to provisioning, to all that which is done in advance. All of the communists, not to mention the political workers, were given assignments to hold meetings and talks with the men on the eve of an offensive. During the fighting at the Dneprovsk bridgehead, the author states, both workers in the political section and those at the regimental level were constantly in the emplacements and trenches. Setting a personal example of courage and valor, they explained to the fightingmen the importance of the bridgehead captured on the right bank of the river and the requirements of the oath. They saw to it that company party organizers, agitators and the editors of operational newssheets put out of action were promptly replaced. They precisely defined the distribution of communists and Komsomol members in the subunits each day. And naturally, the personal communication of the political workers with the fightingmen prior to and during the battle had an extremely beneficial affect with respect to the combat activeness of the personnel.

When we read a book about frontline political workers, we always seek the answer to the question of what made it possible for them to so powerfully influence the minds, the feelings and the will of people in the most stressful, sometimes critical situations in which the combat work was performed.

In this respect one's attention is drawn to the following lines: "Many of the heroes were political workers made wise by life and with the ability to get into the hearts of the men, to inspire and encourage them. I would not venture to say how they achieved their goal. The main role was most frequently played not by enthusiastic talks at mass meetings, however--although this was not alien to them--but by the example of their own behavior, their personal charm, kind words and heart-to-heart talks, which became imprinted in the memory for years to come. One immediately felt a sort of closeness with such people. You trusted them the first time you met them." The author rightly considers the personal example of courage and valor set by the commander and the political worker to be one of the most effective forms of political work. He states that personal bravery is a mandatory requirement for the political worker. All of the other merits were accepted and evaluated at the front only in combination with this quality.

The political work performed at the front was multifaceted in substance. The task of developing a feeling of socialist patriotism in the personnel was constantly at the center of attention of commanders, political organs and party organizations, however. This all-powerful, proud and joyous feeling, the awareness of personal responsibility for the fate of the homeland, the author writes, was the main thing which motivated the men to forget about physical pain and to scorn death, which elevated them spiritually and inspired them to perform feats. It was precisely this feeling which was the source of the mass heroism. Great importance was attached to indoctrinating the fightingmen in a spirit of friendship of peoples of the USSR and proletarian internationalism, to exposing the misanthropic, aggressive nature of fascism, the monstrous crimes of the German fascist invaders.

The book tells how the commanders and political workers used party-political work, particularly political agitation, to instill in the hearts of Soviet fightingmen a firm conviction as to the correctness of our cause and the inevitability of our victory over the hated enemy. The memoirs extensively show the great importance attached to indoctrinating the fightingmen in a spirit of strict fulfillment of orders and instructions from the command element, the requirements contained in the oath and in regulations, and Soviet military discipline.

Speaking of the sources of the high political and moral level of the Soviet fightingmen, the author of the book specifically singles out the unity of the army and the people, the front and the rear area. It was specifically manifested in various forms: letters and gifts to the front from workers in the rear, visits to units and formations by representatives of republics, krais, oblasts, enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhoses, concerts by theater and movie actors and variety performers and so forth. Fightingmen in the division received 2600 individual gifts and 219 group presents on the 24th anniversary of the Red Army alone. The Northwest Front received 68 carloads of gifts just from Chelyabinsk residents, and the Perm citizens brought 28 carloads. Fightingmen of the front received just as many packages from the workers of Sverdlovsk and Kirov oblasts. All of this, the book states, was a visible expression of the Soviet people's concern and consideration for the homeland's defenders.

The final section of the military memoirs tells about the great liberation mission of the Soviet Army, about the combat fraternity with Yugoslav and Bulgarian soldiers. The author describes for the reader in detail the course of combat operations of the 133rd Rifle Corps, in which he was chief of the political section at that time. The reader is provided with a picture of the difficult and fierce battles fought to liberate the peoples of Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Austria.

The Soviet fightingman brought liberation from fascist slavery to the peoples of Central and Southeast Europe. And he was greeted as a soldier-and-liberator who had honorably fulfilled his international duty. The author recalls that forward detachments of corps formations entered the territory of Slovenia in April 1945. Residents of the villages of Odranca, Chlopichino, Gradishche, Seaborca, Vel, Polono and many others greeted them triumphantly. Festively attired, rejoicing people greeted the Soviet fightingmen as dear, long-awaited guests.

The fighting on the Drava River, the author notes, was yet another remarkable demonstration of the combat friendship of the Slavic peoples. Joint efforts by Soviet, Bulgarian and Yugoslav troops there completely frustrated the enemy's concept, which was to develop an offensive into the rear area of forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front from two staging areas on the right bank of the Drava. The former chief of the corps political section recalls meetings and friendly talks with Vladimir Stoychev, commander of the 1st Bulgarian Army, Lieutenant General Stoyan Trendafilov, commander of the Bulgarian 4th Army Corps, General Lado Abracic, head of a group of representatives of the Yugoslav Army's General Staff, and others.

Party-political work, the author states, was an important weapon in the arsenal for our victory. It was conducted by commanders, political workers, communists and Komsomol members. It was conducted every day and every hour. And its enormous force lay in the mass nature of its components, in the continuousness and purposefulness of the actions.

I believe that the present generation of commanders and political workers, all Soviet fightingmen, will derive many useful things and learn a great deal from the book "Nesushchiye fakel." It will help them to relate to the great feat performed by the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War and to gain a more thorough awareness of the truth of history, of the inexhaustible sources of the strength and invincibility of the socialist system, of the Soviet Armed Forces. The book will undoubtedly play an important role in arming the officer cadres and the party aktiv with frontline experience in organizing party-political work.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

BRIEFS

FAMILY OF AVIATORY--Captain A. Kupriyanov is serving in a regiment in which his father served at one time. He is studying new aviation equipment diligently and assiduously. He was recently promoted. Alexey's father, Lieutenant Colonel Vasiliy Vasilyevich Kupriyanov, has devoted 33 years to his beloved work. He is presently serving in headquarters of an air unit. Two sons were born to the Kupriyanovs at a remote station. Both chose careers in aviation. Alexey is stationed in the vicinity. The younger son - Oleg - is in military pilot training in Orenburg. The Kupriyanovs are respected people in the post. They are always bright and cheerful. Time and again active participation in amateur talent activities have earned them certificates of appreciation and valuable gifts. I asked Galina Ivanovna Kupriyanova the question: "What hopes do you harbor?" She answered: "I await the safe return of the older son from blights and the arrival of letters from the younger son." Oleg writes nice letters. He dreams of becoming a real officer and if possible flying in his father's regiment. [Lieutenant Colonel A. Ladin, RED STAR reporter, Central Asian Military District] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Sep 85 p 2] 13005/12790

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WARSAW PACT

BRIEFS

FRIENDSHIP OF CZECH, SOVIET UNITS--A friendship that is strong and proven over the years binds the men of the Air Defense of the Central Group of Forces and their colleagues in the Czechoslovak People's Army. The brothers-in-arms visit each other regularly. The unit was visited recently by a group of CPA men. The visitors became acquainted with the life and routine of their Soviet friends and with the organization of the training process. Later there were contests in which each event was timed. The winners were subordinates of Sr. Lt. V. Kazakov and (CPA) Sr. Lt. Ya. Kuncha, who exhibited a high degree of skill and coordination in their actions. The encounter took place in a sports facility, where the comrades-in-arms competed in strength, agility and endurance. Outstanding performers were Sr. Lt. A. Maleka, Privates S. Ivasikov and A. Ortikov, (CPA) Sgt. V. Gasneda, (CPA) Sgt. Maj. K. Shtek and others. [Maj. V. Maslov, Central Group of Forces] [Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Sep 85 p 2] 13005/12790

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ARMED FORCES

DISRUPTION OF TRAINING OF YOUNG, RESERVE OFFICERS 'TYPICAL'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 May 85 p 1

[Article by Colonel A. Yurkin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Lieutenants Need Help"]

[Text] According to the results of winter combat training, the air defense missile subunit commanded by officer V. Natanzon was in last place in the unit. And it had been considered outstanding.

What conclusions could one make for the summer training period from what had happened? How did the missile men intend to eliminate shortcomings in the organization of their combat training and in competition?

Many officials feel that the fact that the subunit was among those falling behind was an annoying misunderstanding. Officer Natanzon says, "We carried out our missions well and only some careless comrades hindered us."

Officers S. Panchenko and I. Trofimov share that point of view. They also think that if several men were pulled out of the collective, the situation would normalize itself and the subunit would almost automatically regain the rank of outstanding.

The error in these points of view is apparent when the organization of competition, especially among junior officers, and there are many of them, is analyzed. There is one feature in particular -- many of the lieutenants were called up for two years after completing civilian VUZ's [institutions of higher education]. And how was this taken into account? Frankly speaking, it wasn't. Here are some examples that support this.

Experience shows that as a rule junior officers called up from the reserve are well trained theoretically, but need help in mastering the practical aspects of the equipment. Because of this, commanders and senior comrades in many units help the lieutenants develop an independent training plan and take on commitments which would facilitate the improvement of their practical skills in working with equipment. It would seem that this type of help for young missile men, one that has proven itself so well in PVO [Air Defense] Forces, would also be widely used here.

But what do the individual commitments of the junior officers in this subunit look? like. They all look alike, like twin brothers, and almost none have any specific points for developing practical skills with equipment. The elements of formalism instilled from the beginning in the commitments of the junior officers became obvious during the concluding exercises which showed the low level of the officer training. For example, Senior Lieutenant M. Zakharov did not reach his planned level of proficiency with equipment.

"Zakharov was slow in mastering equipment because he lacked zeal," declared officers Natanzon and Panchenko in unison.

It is difficult to agree with this argument. The proper conditions for the officer to improve his professional knowledge were not created during the winter training period. Even when he was preparing for the semi-annual timed work, he was pulled away for domestic work. And Zakharov was not in the subunit the day I visited. He had gone outside the garrison along with Lieutenant S. Rychkovoy on an unplanned mission. Taking junior officers away from training and from the completion of their own primary duties had become the norm and not the exception in this unit. Lieutenants are assigned as vehicle commanders to deliver goods to voyentorg [Military Trading Organization] and to take children to school and lieutenants are also pulled away for other domestic work.

No, Senior Lieutenant Zakharov was not lazy like some other subunit officers. Those people whose service duty obligated them to promote the development of junior officers did not help him thoroughly master equipment and carry out his commitments.

As I was finishing up my conversation with Major Trofimov the telephone rang. A vehicle commander was needed immediately.

"Zakharov isn't here and Lebedev already has an assignment," said Major Trofimov, reviewing a roster in his notebook. "Lieutenant Anchugov will come. This is how you spell it..."

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LT GEN PILIPENKO ON SELECTING CAREER AS OFFICER

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in RUSSIAN 9 Jun 85 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant General Pilipenko, Chief of the Kiev Twice Red Banner Combat Engineer Communications Academy imeni M. I. Kalinin: "The Profession of The Motherland's Defender"]

[Text] During the opening days of the Great Patriotic War Mikhail Korneyevich Pilipenko was not quite seventeen years old. He and his father voluntarily went to the front and by 22 June 1941 he had received his baptism under fire while destroying an enemy aerial assault force landing. He fought as a scout-signal man at Staraya Russa and Demyansk, took part in the Battle of Kursk, the Korsun-Shevchenkovski Operation and in battles for the liberation of the Ukraine. He entered the party in 1943. He was awarded the rank Hero of the Soviet Union for bravery and heroism displayed during the Dnieper assault crossing and the liberation of Kiev. During the post-war years Pilipenko commanded signal subunits and units and was an instructor. He completed the Signal Military Academy imeni S. M. Budenny. At the present time Lieutenant General M. Pilipenko is chief of the Kiev Twice Red Banner Higher Combat Engineer Signal Academy imeni M. I. Kalinin. Pilipenko is an honored citizen of Kiev.

Spring, 1944 in Moscow. Streets and squares were flooded with pale sun. Overflowing with happiness and still not myself after meeting with M. I. Kalinin who had decorated me with an award from the Motherland, I was on my way to see the Commander of the Red Army Chief Signal Directorate, perplexed at why such a high ranking director wanted to see me.

After congratulating me on my award, Marshal of Signal Troops I. T. Peresypkin asked about my ambitions. I answered that everyone had the same ambition, to quickly rout the enemy and reach Berlin.

"And after that? What do you want to be? Have you decided yet?"

"I have. I want to be a teacher. In my native village."

A smile appeared on the Marshal's face. He said, "That's a good job. I once dreamed about that same thing. But... We are communists and we must go where we are needed most. The general opinion is to send you to a military academy. Victory is near, but judging by everything, our enemies will not soon disappear after the war. We will have problems without an army and skillful combat officers. Good sergeant, you must become such an officer. You really must. The officer corps is an extremely important profession. For the country and the people. Remember this -- for the country and the people. And remember it well, forever!"

This meeting with the Marshal changed my fate. I often remembered his words after I entered the academy, seeing deeper and deeper meaning in them. The meaning boiled down to the fact that an officer must recognize his destiny and the full measure of his responsibility for the security of the Motherland, her reliable defense. An officer serves his people and his Fatherland and this service is a sacred obligation and a lofty duty. And it cannot be carried out without giving all of one's strength and ability, all of oneself without holding back, to the matter entrusted to you. This conviction was reinforced in the academy and I tried always to remain true to it.

Certainly, everyone has his own reason for selecting the military profession. But we all have common traits and those are love for the Motherland, pride in the heroic profession of the officer corps and the desire to serve our people in a worthy manner. A man who has recognized the noble role of an armed defender of his Motherland has a heightened feeling of military duty and this feeling fills his life with deep meaning, makes it purposeful and active, inspires him to selfless labor and to successfully overcoming difficulties for the sake of his assigned goals. And strictly speaking, an officer begins with a realization of the importance of military duty, the discovery of communist conviction, political maturity and a readiness to carry out his patriotic and international duty.

The frontal years are a convincing example of this. At the start of the Great Patriotic War officer cadre at military academies were trained in a very short time -- from four to ten months. Those in officer courses were trained even less -- from two to six months. Imagine -- you have mastered the training program designed for one year in just several months and you become, for example, a commander of an artillery or tank platoon. And you are immediately at the front, in battle against an experienced, strong enemy intoxicated with his successes. How much effort, will and persistence do you need to prepare yourself for such a fight, to learn to skillfully overwhelm and defeat! But duty demanded this and it was dictated by a awareness of the danger hanging over the country. Yesterday's schoolboys, students, workers and collective farmers became commanders and political workers, confidently leading platoons, companies and often battalions and regiments. I know many of them very well. They also studied intensely at the front, during the times between battles, using every free minute. They learned themselves and they taught us. They learned so as to win, to defeat the enemy not by numbers, but through know-how. Hundreds of thousands of officers were decorated with orders and medals and more than 6000 achieved the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union.

It is a great honor to be in the ranks of our glorious officer corps, to be an heir to the military traditions of the older generations. But the responsibility is also great.

The April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum clearly defined what a modern leader must be and what the demands on him now are. Today it is not enough for him to simply be an executor. The meaning of such business qualities as competence, a feeling for innovation, initiative, daring, readiness to take responsibility on oneself and the ability to assign a mission and follow it to completion is ever increasing. And a military leader, whether he be a commander, political worker or combat engineer, must totally master all of these.

During the difficult war years many of our commanders and political workers acquired the knowledge, habits and quality that are necessary for an officer, as the saying goes, on the move, at times through trial and error. Remembering those years, one involuntarily thinks about what tremendous training possibilities military academy cadets have at their disposal today. And how one is offended by a cadet who is able and full of strength and energy, but who works without trying, is satisfied with the minimum that he can acquire and lives, hoping to compensate in the future for what he has let slip by. Such a graduate joins a unit or ship and often is unable to fully carry out his functional responsibilities for weeks or months. And indeed our profession is such that each of us at our military post must be ready to carry out our assigned task at any moment. Not in the future when we have filled in the gaps and compensated for what we let pass, but today, now. And everyone, chiefs and subordinates are evaluating you with one measure -- what you can do now. And yet at times some cadets do not think about this when they prepare for independent service in units.

The ability to work with people is a very important quality for an officer. What young officer has not dreamed about becoming a commander for whom subordinates are ready, as the saying goes, to go through hell and high water! To do this one must be an example for everyone and must learn to rely on the forces of society, on party and Komsomol organizations to get to the point where your word finds a lively response in everyone's heart. It is certainly not easy to do all of this. But a person who is persistent and purposeful, for whom the service has become a real calling and life's purpose, can achieve this goal.

During my long career I have met many commanders and political workers who have become examples for people to pattern their lives after. The first of these was Lieutenant Pavel Ivanovich Nikolayev, a communist and commander who combined extremely high exactingness with a sincere concern for his subordinates. We were really ready to go through hell and high water for him.

I will give a single example. Our 1318th Rifle Regiment was engaged in a fierce battle on the approach to the Dnieper. The enemy faltered after several attacks and the subunit commander by Lieutenant Nikolayev rushed forward through one of the breaches that had formed in the enemy's defense. He had been assigned the mission of securing a bridgehead on Trukhanov Island and holding it until the main regimental force came up.

The Hitlerites moved back to the Dnieper as they fired. When they reached the very banks and began to untie fishing boats, just how much they outnumbered us became immediately evident. And suddenly Nikolayev ordered the subunit to drop down. This decision was perplexing to me and apparently to others, for by dropping to the ground we lost the tempo of the attack, thus deliberately dooming ourselves to failure. But when the lieutenant ordered the machine gunners to open fire and ordered the rest of the soldiers to secretly move through the underbrush on the Hitlerites' flank, what had caused his decision became obvious. Up until that time our advantage had been that the enemy did not know how strong the subunit was. By continuing the attack on the enemy flank and going into open terrain, we would have lost this advantage. The enemy could have come to his senses and taken advantage of his superior forces. Nikolayev did not give the enemy a chance to do this.

Our appearance on the enemy's flank was a surprise to the Hitlerites. We threw ourselves forward in a unified onrush, driving the Fascist away from the boat and using them to rush to the island. Nikolayev was in the forefront. Bullets whistled and mines and rounds exploded nearby but our onrush was unstoppable. We carried out our combat mission.

This is an example of the front-line commanders whose experience is now studied by their heirs.

I think that it is very important, especially for young officers, to pick out an example to pattern yourself after and to follow that example always and in all ways. Our Armed Forces are rich in people who can and must be used as examples. Thousands of officers have already been decorated with high state awards for outstanding service in the post-wars years and the best of them have received the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union. Their fiery example and glorious deeds are a source of inspiration and of inspired service to the Motherland.

The thoughts and noble aspirations of the Soviet people, the builders of communist society, are lofty. And it is a great honor to be a trusted guard for its achievements. The Motherland and the Soviet people can be calm, for the officer corps, just as all the Armed Forces, are reliably defending their labor and are carrying out their patriotic and international duty in a worthy manner.

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ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITOR, RESPONSES

Communications Unit Poorly Trained

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jun 85 p 2

[Letter from Sr Lt V. Urin, Northern Group of Forces: "But We're Not Concerning Ourselves With the Main Thing..."]

[Text] Dear editors! I am serving in an independent signal and radio maintenance battalion. I am assigned as the officer in charge of a radar station (RLS). As long ago as during my compulsory service I came to love my specialty and for that reason I decided to stay in the Armed Forces. I served 6 years as a warrant officer and became an officer in 1979. I have always tried to treat the work assigned in such a way that I wouldn't be ashamed to face my comrades.

The following situation has compelled me to appeal to the newspaper. I have been serving in the battalion for 3 years. And I will say frankly that I haven't once provided support for flights with my station during that time. I haven't trained one radar operator, since I have no crew. So it turns out that no one needs the radar station. No one even demands that I remove the dust from the units. The station will be covered with rust and I don't think anyone will pay any attention. The radar station commander is needed only for various details and trips as the commander of official vehicles.

It is possible that I am mistaken about something, but as a specialist I see that minor tasks are sometimes being performed by other aviators in our battalion, as well as by me. But the main point is that work on the equipment and the training of communications specialists have been moved to the back burner here.

The battalion personnel are not idle, of course. We are continuously building something, and a garrison boiler house and a bakery have been assigned to us. Aviators unload freight cars of coke, coal, flour and other freight four or five times a month. We do this mainly at night.

We have not been slighted with respect to details, either. The battalion officers stand duty six to eight times a month, and the warrant officers even more than that.

In a word, our operational aviation subunit has been turned into a rear guard and support battalion. We would probably be able to resign ourselves to this if we were not disqualified as specialists. We manage to provide communications support for flight subunits, especially under field conditions, very seldom. For this reason, the technical and specialized training of the personnel is inadequate. Theoretical lessons generally are not being conducted here, although a schedule is made up regularly.

Dear editors! I am not complaining about the difficulties of service, and my comrades aren't, either. It is just a pity that they cannot be endured for the sake of combat readiness.

And here is another thing. I don't know what my superiors are thinking about when they make up a report on training in the battalion of specialists being transferred to the reserve. But when I see the amazement expressed in the faces of these soldiers, before their departure from the subunit, when they read the entry in their service record in the paragraph "registered military specialty," I am so ashamed I wish the earth would open beneath my feet. What kind of a specialist is he if he hasn't learned about combat equipment during his service and hasn't operated it generally? But then, everything is fine in the entries. Need I really continue further?

Uniform Supply Problems Cited

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jun 85 p 2

[Letter from Sr Sgt Z. Pekanova: "Violators Against Our Will"]

[Text] As strange as this may seem, the servicewomen in our independent medical battalion have never received the full military uniform prescribed for them. You are improperly dressed sometimes because of this, even in formation.

Unfortunately, Capt S. Mukhin, who is responsible for supply, does not respond to our "why?" in practically any way. The essence of the problem, apparently, lies in the fact that the garrison where we are serving is remote. Sometimes the clothing store doesn't have one item and at other times it doesn't have another item. It is even difficult to pick up such articles as berets, footwear and belts in the proper size.

When the same thing happened with overcoats, we decided to turn to the garrison tailor shop. But the tailors and cutters just threw up their hands in a helpless gesture: a woman's uniform is not their specialty, you see. It turned out that even the voyentorg [military trading establishment] in Alma-Ata is not sewing such clothing. How can this be?

There are fewer servicewomen, of course. But can't we really have just one specialized tailor shop in the district? And traveling [vyvezdnyye] brigades attached to it which could take orders at the garrisons. We should obtain everything that is prescribed at the store. But until we can, we are committing uniform violations, as they say, against our will.

Officer Training Shortcomings Noted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jun 85 p 2

[Response to letter under the rubric "After a Statement by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA":
"So Just What Does He Want?"]

[Text] Critical correspondence from Capt 3d Rank S. Ishchenko was published under this heading on 1 March. It concerned shortcomings in work with officer personnel in a military engineering detachment where Maj N. Chirov is the deputy commander for political affairs.

As Capt 1st Rank A. Korovin, first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Northern Fleet, informed the editorial staff, the criticism has been acknowledged as correct. The newspaper's statement was discussed in the fleet's political directorate with the participation of the line political staff of military engineering units. The political department of the Severovoyenmorstroy [Northern Fleet Naval Engineering Service] has reviewed the long-range plan for the professional training of political workers, taking the criticism expressed into consideration.

The matter of work with officer personnel has been discussed at party meetings of the military engineering detachments. Specific recommendations for improving the instruction and training of young officers have been given to the unit command.

For his neglect in party and political work, Maj N. Chirov, deputy commander of the military engineering detachment for political affairs, was made answerable to the party. For procrastination in providing officers with a clothing allowance, Maj A. Kotko, deputy commander of the detachment for logistic support, has received summary punishment. The serious shortcomings in training work with officers were strongly pointed out to the detachment commander, Lt Col V. Belousov.

Punishment for Unverified Accusations

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jun 85 p 2

[Response to letter under rubric "After a Statement by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA":
"Because of Sclerosis"]

[Text] The topical satire by Col A. Drovosekov, published under this heading on 28 March, told about Col I. Kabakov and Capt Yu. Netesov, who reported to different echelons of command the abuses permitted by officers which allegedly took place.

Maj Gen G. Chuchkalov, first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Leningrad Military District, informed the editorial staff that the events cited in the satirical piece related to officer Kabakov really took place. In the course of an administrative and party investigation, as well as discussions in the political directorate, he admitted that in writing his

statement he made use of unverified rumors. The primary party organization has expelled CPSU member I. Kabakov from the party for giving false information to central organs. The party commission attached to the political department of the district's rear services, taking his open repentance into account, considered it possible to retain him in the CPSU after giving him a severe reprimand and making an entry on his registration card.

The response signed by Maj Gen V. Kardash, chief of the political department of the Moscow Air Defense District Rear Services, states that the newspaper's statement was discussed with the supervisory personnel and secretaries of the party organizations of units and components of the district's rear services. Measures were stipulated and are being carried out to improve officers' moral training. For his unworthy conduct and slander of fellow officers, a petition was presented by a comrades court of honor for officers for the transfer of Capt Yu. Netesov to the reserve. The party commission attached to the political department expelled him from CPSU membership.

Traffic Inspector Not Trained

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 85 p 2

[Letter to editorial staff from Warrant Officer A. Gavrish, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Someone Else's Role"]

[Text] Dear editors! I am assigned as a tank commander. Consequently, I bear full responsibility for the crew's combat readiness and the instruction and training of subordinates. However, I am not always able to perform my official duties as the work requires. Very often we warrant officers are separated from our crews. I have to serve on details an average of three times a week. They also include those that are not stipulated by regulations, when we fill the role of a so-called person in charge.

But details of another type have compelled me to take up my pen. We are quite often assigned as duty vehicle inspectors. I stand at my post and think: well, why make a traffic inspector out of me--I never made a study of motor vehicles.

I raise my baton, stop a vehicle and begin checking its technical condition, but I myself am not convinced of the correctness of my observations.

I will master the motor vehicles, of course, but time is needed for this. I know that other vehicle inspectors may be encountered on the roads who are not fully trained for their duties. I think they are of little benefit.

Flight Exercise Slackness Noted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 85 p 2

[Response to letter under rubric "After a Statement by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "But What Is the Enemy?"]

[Text] This is what correspondence from Lt Col P. Chernenko, published on 21 March, was entitled. It concerned the intolerability of slackness and oversimplification in the organization of tactical flight exercises.

As Col G. Kirillovskiy, first deputy chief of the political department of the Air Forces Red Banner Far East Military District, informed the editorial staff, the facts cited in the correspondence have been confirmed. A meeting of the unit's party committee heard officer K. Vereshchagin, air regiment deputy commander for flight training and CPSU member. Problems connected with the preparation of flight personnel for the conduct of maneuvering air combat were discussed at party meetings of the air squadrons.

The article was discussed in units and at the headquarters of the Air Forces in the district, with commanders, political workers, and with all the active party membership. A combination of measures aimed at high-quality preparation to master the most complex forms of flight training was undertaken. The shortcomings in the squadron commanded by Lt Col V. Rozit have been eliminated.

Housing Exchange Scored

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 85 p 2

[Response to letter under rubric "After a Statement by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA": A Reanimation of Conscience"]

[Text] A letter from Capt 1st Rank (Ret) Ye. Korovin was published under this heading on 14 April. It concerned the mental trauma inflicted upon a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Capt 2d Rank (Ret) N. Troitskiy, and the real state of affairs in the very strange exchange of apartments, as a result of which a lonely, ill person was deprived of his own comfortable apartment.

Ye. Generalov, chairman of the Sevastopol Gorispolkom, informed the editorial staff that the newspaper's statement was reviewed at the collegium of the ispolkom's public health department and in all the city's preventive medicine institutions, as well as at the work place of physician A. Dutnyak and his wife L. Dutnyak. Their conduct in relation to the veteran has received universal condemnation. The exchange undertaken by them was permitted at one time, taking into account that there were no legal grounds for denying it, but the room in which the Dutnyaks were living was not mentioned among those unfit for habitation. The room has been determined unfit for permanent habitation by an inspection conducted at this time. The shortcomings in this work were pointed out to the ispolkom housing administration and it was instructed to take steps against those at fault for the issuance of incorrect documents on the condition of the room where the Dutnyaks had been living. Statements of claim have been sent by the city's public procurator to the people's court for review of the matter of annulling the exchange of living space between N. Troitskiy and A. Dutnyak.

Capt 1st Rank S. Zubatykh, acting chief of the political department of the Black Sea Fleet's Rear Services, stated that L. Dutnyak has been expelled from CPSU membership by decision of the political department of the fleet's

rear services for the loss of party qualities expressed in the deception when living space was exchanged, as well as dishonesty in consideration of her personal affairs. The political department has drawn the attention of the party buro and the chief of the fleet's trade directorate to the necessity for increasing exactingness toward personnel and improving their selection and training.

Earthquake-Proofing Rules Ignored

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 85 p 2

[Letter from A. Tereshchenko, chief project engineer, Pacific Fleet: "Connivance for Poor Workmen"]

[Text] At the end of last year construction was begun on a main sewage conduit, intended to serve several residences as well as a kindergarten and day nursery, at one of the remote garrisons of the Pacific Fleet. The work was set up by a military construction organization headed by Lt Col A. Sukhoplyas.

For some time at this project, I had to conduct an inspection of the course of construction. And what was discovered? In coupling the pipes with each other, the military construction workers had flagrantly violated operating procedure and a flexible conduit was turned into a rigid one; in a zone of increased seismic activity, this constituted a threat of dangerous cracks. In spite of the entry I made in the inspection journal prohibiting this, construction was continued at the same pace and with the same violations.

Then our planning organization sent a letter to the client with a proposal that the project's financing be discontinued. But they disregarded it. As a result, the dwelling was connected up to the conduit and occupied, despite the fact that they we did not sign the formal document of the state commission on its acceptance for operation.

And 2 months had not passed by when what we had warned about happened: the conduit broke down. But the construction workers, with the tacit acquiescence of the client, take the view that nothing had happened. Another two residences and the first section of a school are being readied to go into operation.

It must be said that the rules for carrying out operations which involve earthquake-proofing measures also are being violated at these projects: interior bulkheads of apartments are not being separated and welded couplings are made poorly.

This cannot be called anything else but connivance for poor workmen. After all, as strange as it may seem, the organization headed by Lt Col A. Sukhoplyas is among the leaders in socialist competition among the district's military construction workers.

Warehouse Construction Delay Scored

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jun 85 p 2

[Response to letter under rubric "After a Statement by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA":
"Let's Begin with Monday!"]

[Text] A critical letter from Col A. Drovosekov, published under this heading on 19 May 1985, concerned the prolonged construction of the military trading organization warehouse at the Gorkiy garrison.

Maj Gen Ye. Kulagin, deputy commander for construction and billeting of the Moscow Military District, informed the editorial staff that a case of "dolgostroy" [prolonged construction] is taking place. The newspaper's statement was discussed at a conference with supervisory personnel of the KEU [barrack services directorate], the Voenproyekt [expansion unknown], and the construction directorate of the district.

For the mismanagement and poor construction organization that was permitted, the former chief of the UNR [work supervisor's directorate], Col Ye. Mamontov, and the chief engineer, Lt Col V. Belyayev, have been made answerable for their financial and party responsibility. The chief of the UNR, Lt Col Yu. Belyayev, has been reprimanded. The poor supervision over the course of construction was pointed out to Col Yu. Belyayev, chief of the district's construction directorate, and Col Ye. Babenko, chief of Voenproekt.

At present, order has been brought about at the project, its protection has been organized, and a schedule of work production has been set up. It is planned to commission the warehouse, with a boiler house and approach routes, in 1986.

Youth Evades Conscription

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 85 p 3

[Article by Lt Col A. Ladin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent in the Central Asian Military District, under the rubric "Following the Trail of a Letter":
"The Evasion"]

[Text] Lt Col A. Prostel (Ret) sent KRASNAYA ZVEZDA a thoroughly amazing letter. He reported that a completely healthy youth lives in his neighborhood who is evading conscription for some reason. His name is Takhir Khianbarov.

I asked the Kalininskiy Rayvoenkomat [rayon military commissariat] in Alma-Ata for explanations. It turned out that they have no information available on a conscript with such a surname there. Now both the writer of the letter to the editorial staff and I were amazed. Is it really possible that a youth has not even registered when others his age are wearing a military uniform? A followup of the letter was persuasive: unfortunately, it is possible.

First about Takhir Khianbarov. Before I met him it appeared to me that he had accidentally slipped out of sight of the voyenkomat. But after looking into his way of life, into the climate of the family in which he had been raised, I realized that the young man was devoid of a feeling of responsibility to society and had been looking for easier and simpler ways for a long time.

When Takhir had reached the eighth grade with difficulty, his mother, Sofya Akhiyayevna (she works as a bookkeeper in the specialized association "Komissionnaya Torgovlya"), assumed responsibility for arranging her son's future. It was decided that he would continue his education at an industrial tekhnikum. Is it possible that Takhir wanted to devote his life to industry? No, he didn't even think about his future specialty as a mechanic-technician to repair and assemble industrial equipment. He simply needed a secondary specialized education diploma, and Sofya Akhiyayevna was able to enlist support in the tekhnikum.

I familiarized myself with the dictation written by school-dropout Khianbarov when he took the entrance examinations. Someone's thoughtful hand had painstakingly concealed many errors in it and provided the missing commas. Takhir received a grade of four, opening the way to an educational institution. Never before had Takhir received such high marks in dictation.

Khianbarov's class manager, Aleksandr Viktorovich Kuzmin, told how he had studied in the tekhnikum. In his words, Takhir had not studied, but harassed the instructors. He missed his lessons, did not complete school assignments, and violated discipline. The tekhnikum management had been forced to send letters to his mother's place of work and the rayon militia department.

Khianbarov completed his training, but with difficulty. He was assigned to work at one of the enterprises in Mangyshlak. But he did not go to the place where he was assigned--he avoided it. The mechanic-technician who had graduated set himself up under the same roof with his mother. He is mastering a new specialty--as a junior salesman of commission radio products--10 steps away from her work place.

I talked with him. I asked how he could remain calm, knowing that he is not registered in the voyenkomat. After all, persons of his age, his comrades at the tekhnikum, had passed the medical board, prepared themselves for conscription, and been called up. Why hadn't he gone to the voyenkomat to remind them and to find out about everything? His answer was silence.

In our conversation I recalled Takhir's grandfather, who was respected in the city. I asked Takhir if he knew that his grandfather had fought counterrevolutionary robbers in his time and had worked selflessly all his life. The youth, in jeans and a wide-brimmed cowboy hat (Khianbarov, they told me at the tekhnikum, had changed outfits every day), listened to all this distrustfully. "This is the first time I've heard about my grandfather," he confessed.

But in several minutes he was trying to explain to me which imported radios merit the most attention. It was apparent that he had extensive knowledge in this field.

This encounter had left bitter feelings. I saw before me a person trying to evade conscription in the army and consciously evading many other civic obligations.

Now about the person who consciously or carelessly had helped Takhir Khianbarov to conceal himself. In ZhEU [housing operations section] No 32 of Kalininskiy Rayon, I familiarized myself with information about who lives in which apartment and his status with regard to military service. There is also information about the Khianbarov family. As far back as 1980, a card was made on Takhir which should bear a notation of the rayon voyenkomat on the registration of a conscript. There is no notation on the card. When Takhir reached 17, he should have been entered on the list of conscripts. He was not. Twice a year ZhEU-32 sends the lists to the voyenkomat. Since 1981, Serik Abdrakhmanovich Abdrakhmanov, chief of the housing operations section, has been countersigning them. And the surname Khianbarov had not once gotten on the lists. This is strange. Many times the ZhEU employees have come across registration data on the youth and have not noticed that he did not serve in the army and has no deferment from conscription for health or other reasons.

But what do they say about the "lost" conscript in the rayon voyenkomat? Maj V. Dobrovolskiy, the one responsible for the work section mentioned, blames the ZhEU for everything. There, he says, they make up schedules for apartments within their jurisdiction and check all the necessary documents. Yes, the schedules are made out, but no one is carrying them out seriously. When I became interested in how Comrade Abdrakhmanov could not notice Takhir Khianbarov, he shrugged his shoulders: this happens, he says. And he hinted: we are not to blame, but the voyenkomat. Here is a shifting of responsibility, although the fault of voyenkomat employees who rely excessively on apartment organs, without exercising effective supervision, also is obvious.

Especially as Khianbarov once was compelled to visit the rayon voyenkomat, after all. He had completed studies in the tekhnikum. He was to receive a diploma and be sent to the place of future employment. Before the diploma is issued the voyenkomat crosses the graduates with a military obligation off the register.

Together with other graduates, Takhir Khianbarov showed subordinates of Maj V. Dobrovolskiy the assignment order and asked that an appropriate notation be made. One of the employees looked for the conscript's personal file, could not find it, and advised him to come in the next day. Khianbarov left and did not show up at the voyenkomat again. So they did not take an interest in him, either. The assignment order that was left was shifted from desk to desk until it was lost.

All the youths who had graduated from the tekhnikum informed the military instructor, Lt Col (Ret) V. Dranishnikov, and the training section that matters had been settled with the voyenkomat and that they could be sent to the work place. The military instructor made the necessary notations in the list. He could not help but see that one of the students had not brought the assignment order with the rayon voyenkomat notation. He didn't bring it, so he didn't bring it. It turned out that his ties with the voyenkomat were highly arbitrary. He had not visited there once in order to discuss his students' progress and their training for the service with the officers. The voyenkomat, in turn, has not checked for years to see how elementary military training is handled in the industrial tekhnikum, and has not tried to become acquainted with the conscripts at their place of training.

Events unfolded further as follows. They presented Khianbarov with a diploma. True, it was a month late, when his classmates had already been working where they were assigned. The diploma was presented by the tekhnikum director, Asker Makishevich Kasenov. He was not disturbed by the fact that there was no notation by the rayon voyenkomat on the graduate's certificate [obkhodnyy listok] that he had been crossed off the register. Meanwhile, it is unclear whether that certificate existed at all. It was not in the former student's personal file.

They have not explained to me at the tekhnikum why no steps were taken to ensure that Comrade Khianbarov left for his place of work. A letter received from the enterprise which was expecting the young specialist was not even recorded.

Takhir Khianbarov, as stated earlier, is now learning to be a junior salesman. Were they interested in his attitude toward military service when he was accepted for work? The conscript is obliged to inform the rayon voyenkomat where he intends to work, and the voyenkomat notation is obligatory on his statement of acceptance for work. Bizhamal Kopanovna Gazizova, the director of the "Komissionnaya Torgovlya" association, explained that this notation is of no importance for them.

And I am also wondering: would Takhir Khianbarov have come to the voyenkomat's attention but for the letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA from Lt Col (Ret) A. Prostel? I think that without the signal from this person who is not indifferent to matters of common concern to us, a youth who has lost his conscience would be continuing to evade service. I would think that legal organs will evaluate both his conduct and the attitude toward their official duties of all those who have connived for him.

Navigators Improperly Utilized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jun 85 p 2

[Letter from Lt S. Smorodin, Air Defense Forces: "Conscience Does Not Permit..."]

[Text] In 1984 my comrades, Lieutenants V. Chernovol, O. Tsekov and O. Valuyev, and I completed the Stavropol Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots and Navigators imeni Mar Avn V. A. Sudets in the tactical control navigator specialty. For 4 years we learned how to render assistance to interceptor pilots in air combat with "enemy" aircraft and dreamed about future service protecting the skies of the Motherland in a combat unit.

Unfortunately, our dreams were not destined to come true. In the unit in which officer N. Shumilin serves we very soon realized that only the blue of our shoulder boards relates us with aviation. We have turned out to be unneeded and incidental persons here. Both commanders and political workers tell us this frankly.

It has already been over 8 months that we haven't had a combat drill or guided interceptors to an aerial target. Was it really for the purpose of performing various secondary tasks that we had to study for 4 years and spend a great deal of money for it? Standing details six or seven times a month, acting for the commandant of a military post, being the commander of an official vehicle--this is, of course, simpler than operational readiness, calculating the line of interception of aerial targets and raising our skill level. Not to mention the fact that this runs counter to the interests of the work and does not make it possible for us to have conscience and a civic duty. I believe that I am acting immorally when I write in my socialist pledges: "To raise my level of skill by the end of the year," knowing that I will not keep my word, although it is not my fault. I tried to explain to the political worker, Lt Col V. Trubchenko: several hundred guidance drills should be done for this, but I did not encounter mutual understanding. I am obliged here to engage openly in bluffing.

Dear editorial staff! If in 2 or 3 years, as they promise us here, we are assigned as tactical control officers, will we be able to ensure effective performance in the air by interceptor pilots and increase the unit's combat readiness by our work? It is doubtful. Before very long I, as a specialist, will be disqualified. So will my comrades. But after all, I would not at all want to be deprived of my favorite work, to which I decided to devote my entire life.

Reinforced Discipline Needed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jun 85 p 2

[Response to press review under rubric "After a Statement by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "The Heart of Military Service"]

[Text] A press review was published under this heading in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 30 March which dealt with the interpretation by the Leningrad Military District newspaper NA STRAZHE RODINY and the Baltic Military District newspaper ZA RODINU of the questions of further reinforcement of discipline and the unity of military collectives.

Col V. Vlasevskiy, deputy editor in chief of the newspaper NA STRAZHE RODINY, reported that the press review "'The Heart of Military Service" was discussed at meetings of the editorial board and the party buro, as well as a short editorial meeting.

Taking into account the recommendations advanced in the review, the editorial staff demonstrates a principled approach in evaluating the condition of military discipline. Cases of mildness, complacency and lack of exactingness toward discipline violators are revealed in items on this topic.

Col V. Belyakov, editor in chief of the newspaper ZA RODINU, stated that the press review "The Heart of Military Service" was discussed at a meeting of the editorial board and a short editorial meeting. Themes for statements on the questions of reinforcing discipline and order were worked out in the spirit of the requirements of the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The newspaper printed a number of items from experience in political education work in the company and similar subunits, as well as items relating to implementation of the CPSU Central Committee decree "On steps to overcome drunkenness and alcoholism."

Taking into account the recommendations contained in the press review, more attention is being devoted in publications to the discipline of operational readiness and precise observance of the daily routine.

Recent Readers' Letters Generalized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 85 p 3

[Review of readers' letters under rubric "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA'S Mail"]

[Text] In June 1985 the editorial staff received 9,341 letters from readers; 503 of them were published in the newspaper. There were 419 responses to statements by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

This letter came from the Far East Military District. The writer, Lt A. Broshin, writes: "In the last training year our artillery subunit won the 'excellent' title. We gave our word to not only to retain it, but to take a new step in combat improvement as well. And we are keeping our word. In a recent exercise, artillerymen again demonstrated high combat training. The team of Sgt M. Gordeychuk distinguished itself in particular."

And these lines are from a letter by Lt V. Firzin, a political worker: "I hasten to share the good news. An examination for the best in one's occupation has just ended in the subunit of military construction workers. The bricklayers competed. The more experienced, Pfc G. Silinov and Pvt K. Ovchinnikov, won. Right at the project they were awarded the Komsomol Central Committee badge 'Master--Golden Hands' and certificates."

These and many other letters coming to the editorial staff attest to the fact that the first month in the summer training period in the army and the fleet

took place under conditions of a great political and labor upsurge stirred by the decisions of the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and by preparation for the 27th congress of our party. The flame of socialist competition is burning more and more brightly in units and on the ships. The participants in it are filled with the desire to make a worthy contribution to the implementation of training plans; they are demonstrating a proprietary interest in everything that takes place in the subunit and are evaluating their work and deeds from the position of the party's current requirements. For this reason, many of them, in turning to the newspaper, speak not only about the first results achieved in training, but also critically analyze what has been done and correctly believe that cases of oversimplification, a formal attitude toward organization of the training process, underestimation of the moral and educational aspects of socialist competition and a careless attitude toward the people's property cannot be tolerated. Warrant Officer N. Medvidenko, for example, doubts that the socialist pledges made by the subunit will be fulfilled. He writes bitterly: "In accordance with the schedule for exercises the company is arriving at the training center. And here it turns out that another subunit is to conduct an exercise at the very same time. The company commander receives a new command, to follow to the training ground, which is far from being nearby, incidentally. Similar cases of a careless attitude toward training time have taken place previously, and they are taking place now as well."

Many of our readers report that the materials of the conference in the CPSU Central Committee on the problems of accelerating scientific and technical progress are being studied with great interest in the army and the fleet. Thus, Warrant Officer S. Loyevskiy writes: "Having read the report by Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, 'The Fundamental Question of the Party's Economic Policy,' we, the innovators, have adjusted the plan for improving the training base of our unit. We have revised personal pledges; we will try to implement them in full."

A significant place in last month's mail is held by letters from frontline soldiers. And each one contains sincere, heartfelt gratitude and thankfulness to the Communist Party and the Soviet Government for the new concern for further improvement in the material and everyday conditions of participants in the Great Patriotic War and the readiness to continue tirelessly the military and patriotic education of the youth. But what the frontline soldiers are saying concerns not only material wealth. They write with deep feeling that the very atmosphere of respect which surrounds them in our country makes it possible for them to retain their health and vitality and prolong the joy of creative labor in society.

Army and navy servicemen, as well as all Soviet people, are preparing to greet the forthcoming 27th CPSU Congress in a worthy manner. The many letters coming to the editorial staff declare their unanimous support for the party's domestic and foreign policy and their fervent striving to achieve new successes in military work and in reinforcing the defense capabilities of our

beloved Motherland. Behind each such communication rises the image of the Soviet man--our contemporary, whose principal task has become the building of communism and protection of our great achievements.

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ARMED FORCES

OFFICER CORPS CALLED UPON TO ACCEPT INNOVATIVE APPROACH

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jul 85 p 1

[Editorial: "A Sense of the New"]

[Text] The party and the Soviet people are resolving complex and crucial tasks today. The April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee focuses personnel on decisive improvement in work and bringing it into conformity with requirements of the current stage in society's development. A sense of what is new should be a quality inherent in the party, soviet and economic leader. This requirement applies to military personnel in full measure.

As with no other field, perhaps, military affairs have been subjected to continuous change and improvement. In just the past decade, several generations of technical equipment and weapons have been replaced and methods for their tactical use have undergone significant changes. Means of automation and electronic computer technology have been widely introduced in the field of tactical control. This obliges commanders, political workers, and all officers to more thoroughly comprehend the new phenomena in the development of military affairs and to find more efficient ways of increasing combat readiness.

Initiative, daring, a creative approach to matters, and implacability toward everything that is old and obsolescent form the basis of a sense of what is new. Every commander, political worker and staff officer is obliged to strive persistently to utilize the methods and procedures of leadership that will ensure fulfillment of training plans and programs and pledges in competition with the most efficiency.

There cannot be a sense of the new if an officer does not possess high professional competence and rests timidly on the past achievements of science and technology. Indifference to what is new leads to waste in realizing the creative potentialities of an officer and this inevitably results in costs in the training and instruction of soldiers. Military councils, commanders, political organs and party organizations should concern themselves tirelessly with inculcating in officers a sense of what is new and the ability to assume responsibility and resolve to completion the tasks that have been set, demonstrating courage, initiative and a creative approach to work in the process.

There are quite a number officers trained in the armed forces who are notable for their genuinely innovative approach to solution of the tasks facing them. Lt Col T. Mayakov of missile unit X is one of them. His work style is a constant search for more efficient procedures and methods of training and instructing members of the missile detachment, creative courage, and the ability to inspire persons to successfully carry out what has been outlined. Thus, supported by his deputies and party and Komsomol organizations, Lt Col Mayakov introduced quite a number of methodical innovations which, in conjunction with training facilities developed in the unit, make it possible to reduce conditionality to a minimum in working out combat training tasks. Owing to this, the periods for putting young specialists into service and the time necessary to ensure high coordination in combat crews have been substantially reduced.

Unfortunately, there also are officers who rest on their laurels once they have reached a specified line, lose their taste for what is new and turn into lethargic performers. And even when something new knocks on the door, so to speak, they sometimes are in no hurry to take a step forward, to make adjustments in their style and practical activity. They set up individual training work with personnel without taking advanced experience into account and conduct drills and exercises unimaginatively, under simplified conditions, making it possible to gain easy victories over the "enemy." Instances of an uncritical attitude toward work methods and the results of their work, lack of objectivity, and at times even bluffing to which individual officers resort in attempting to embellish the state of affairs in a subunit or unit or on a ship deserve decisive condemnation. Senior officers, political organs and party organizations should evaluate such cases based on principle and hold the guilty persons strictly responsible.

Inculcating in officers a sense of what is new is an active, purposeful process. One of its principal directions should be the continuous regeneration and expansion of the arsenal of scientifically sound forms and methods of training work which have been proved well in practice. We must struggle against all manifestations of stagnation, sluggish thinking and impractical use of training time. Giving soldiers the maximum knowledge and skill for each unit of training time--this is how each instructor should proceed. A reliable way to achieve this is through introduction of modern training and technical instruction facilities which ensure mastery of weapons in brief periods of time with a minimum expenditure of material resources. Effective use of the experience of those commanders and political workers who courageously put methodical procedures into practice which respond to the basic principle of training and instruction to the greatest extent--teaching troops what is necessary for victory in combat--also is very important.

In working to shape a sense of what is new for military personnel, the officers who are recent graduates of military educational institutions require the greatest attention. Their firm theoretical knowledge gained during training is not always reinforced by the ability to utilize everything that is valuable and advanced which military experience provides. For this reason it is necessary to strive to ensure that young officers take full advantage of the favorable opportunities being made available now, at the height of summer

combat training, in the course of exercises, cruises, flights and missile launches, as well as in the conduct of periodic maintenance and other forms of servicing technical equipment. Greater independence has to be given to young officers to more actively involve them in the completion of difficult problem-solving tasks which require an approach that is not stereotyped and initiative. This contributes to development of their creative thinking, to the polishing of those professional qualities which determine their work style and shape the manner of a commander.

Forming officers' sense of what is new is a subject of particular concern for party and Komsomol organizations. They should support in every possible way the persons who are creative and seeking and subject to sharp criticism those who have become accustomed to working in the old way. Systematic discussion of problems connected with increasing the creative activity of communists and Komsomol members, hearing their accounts, propaganda of the experience of the best methodologists and organizers of the training process and competition--all these are important forms of party influence on the process of molding officers.

An important role in inculcating in officers a sense of what is new belongs to the headquarters. They have been called upon to be effective propagandists for the advanced, more efficient procedures and methods of training personnel and organizers of research and experiments. The commanders of arms and services, the flag officer specialists, must become their active assistants in this important work.

Our armed forces have well-trained military personnel at their disposal who are devoted to the work of communism. Further improvement in their work style will make it possible to raise military discipline, the quality of organization and the combat readiness of subunits, units and ships to a still higher level.

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ARMED FORCES

MAJ GEN OVCHINNIKOV ON FLAWS IN ORGANIZATION OF CADET TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sep 85 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen A. Ovchinnikov, first deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "To Indoctrinate the Indoctrinator"]

[Text] Our talk with the communists from the officer candidate company under the command of Capt L. Saltykov happened on the eve of the report-election meeting in the party group and had, as they say, an unofficial nature. I was interested in the mood of the officer candidates who had begun a new training year and their impressions of the recent tour in the troops. The mood of all of them was optimistic, that could be felt, but their impressions were different.... Officer Candidates V. Melnik and V. Selyuk shared the good news that they had received letters from the subunits where they had been on duty. The soldiers gave them the most recent news and told about their successes in service. So much for the good impressions. For the rest they were rather lamentable. The tour of duty, as it became clear, was poorly organized. Before the officer candidates made the trip to the unit, the officers from the training section of the Tashkent Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni V. I. Lenin [TVOKU] and the company commander Capt Saltykov had no idea even where to phone and coordinate certain elementary details. When the officer candidates to make the tour arrived at their destination, it turned out that the motorized rifle troops were in the mountains at a firing range. The company commander had to "adapt" his subordinates to the combat engineer and antiaircraft subunits. As a result one-half of the time allocated for practical troop training was wasted.

They also recalled their individual talks. Certain officer candidates tried to conduct these with the soldiers. Few were left with a feeling of satisfaction. It turned out that it is not so easy to cause a person to talk frankly. The officer candidates shared their conclusions at the school but heard in return the calming reminder that political indoctrination is not part of the troop tour program in the third course. Its turn will come in the fourth course.

One of the officer candidates in our talk on the eve of the meeting noted with perplexity:

"We begin developing the actual driving of an infantry combat vehicle in the first course but the skills of practical work with the men only are learned in the last. Something is wrong here...."

The comrades supported him and stated that it was not so easy to gain the experience of an indoctrinator and it seemed to me that the meeting had started even before its official opening. A painful point had been touched upon and a serious problem disclosed.

"In the course of troop practice we conducted with the soldiers exercises on physical training, the study of rifle weapons but none of us conducted political indoctrination and we were unable to speak to the personnel."

This was a phrase from the report of the party group organizer, Sgt A. Babayev. He had sent this to spark debate over a crucial area in the life of the company officer candidates. And not only for the company but for the entire graduating course and the entire school. Having become acquainted with individual responses from the troops on the service of our graduates, I noted that the unit and subunit commanders were rather unanimous on the point of their recommendations which describe the lieutenants as indoctrinators.

"Poorly trained for working with the Komsomol aktiv. He does not always show sensitivity and attention to the men and does not respond to their needs and concerns" was the description of Lt Ye. Tselenko. "He possesses poor skills in training and indoctrinating his subordinates," was the description of Lt V. Nikiforov. Lt Col V. Matushkin wrote that Lt G. Strelnikov "works little with his subordinates and does not rely on the Komsomol aktiv." "The future officers," the report goes on to state, "must be given greater skills in working individually with the personnel."

It must not be said that they do not heed such urgent appeals particularly as there are many of them. The school council has analyzed the responses from the troops and has worked out recommendations considering them. In particular, they plan to study how the commander of the training process support battalion works with his men. In principle, one could agree with this point. Possibly the experience of the battalion commander is actually worthy of a close examination. But we wondered whether it would be more logical for the officer candidates, to put it figuratively, to measure themselves against the experience of the leading platoon commanders from the troops. Incidentally, it must be pointed out that those points which were set out by the school council have remained only on paper, they are far from realization and are not aimed even now at enriching the indoctrinational skills of the officer candidates or establishing vital contact with their men. Obviously, it is understood that this will come only during the tour of duty in the fourth course as its program envisages the conducting of political indoctrination measures.

But what actually is provided? There are to be five or six individual talks, two political information sessions and two or three talks with the subunit personnel or the same number of reports at meetings. The figures reflecting not only the tour of duty in the graduating course but, in essence, all 4

years of instruction are so eloquent that it is even awkward to speak seriously about actually mastering the art of dealing with the personnel.

At the report-election meeting mention was made of a blue file which is kept at the school staff. The contents of the documents kept in it has been known in general terms to the company officer candidates. It would be hard to assign a value to these documents which are the reports about the school graduates who are carrying out their international duty in Afghanistan in terms of their indoctrinational impact. Here there are excellent examples of the exemplary execution of service and party duty by the winners of the Order of the Red Star, the platoon commanders, Officers O. Bodrov, Ye. Panin and other school graduates. But for some reason the blue file is kept "secret" from those who, possibly, will have to replace Bodrov and Panin at their combat post.

Nor have they put into effect the reserve which was mentioned by the communist V. Popok in his report: "Political information sessions, as a rule, are given by our company commanders but this matter could be turned over to us, the officer candidates. Certainly we should make it a rule that the men in the senior courses regularly give political information sessions to the junior courses."

One other important question was touched upon in the debates, namely the indoctrinational effect of the personal example set by the commanders of the officer candidate subunits, and more precisely the pernicious, negative example. This has long been an acute problem, that is, recruiting personnel for the schools and recruiting persons who can indoctrinate the indoctrinators. After completing school, Lt V. Golkin commanded a reconnaissance platoon in one of the units, he made it an outstanding one and was given the honor of then taking over a officer candidate platoon. I repeat, he was given the honor. And Golkin justified this trust. Now he is a captain and successfully commands a company in his home school. Communist Ye. Fander became the commander of an officer candidate platoon after successfully carrying out his international duty in Afghanistan and for this he was awarded the Order of the Red Star. At present, Capt Fander also commands a company. Maj O. Niyazov was also tested in the position of platoon commander in the troops and he is now one of the leading political workers at the school.

One can also see many deviations from this rule. Due to the insistence of the district personnel directorate, a certain tradition has been established of sending to the school officers who cannot handle their duties in the units or lieutenants who are just beginning their officer career. Thus, when the graduates of one of the schools N. Serdyuk, V. Chernobrovkin and N. Semikin arrived in the district, the personnel directorate immediately assigned them to vacant positions in the TVOKU. Soon thereafter Lt Serdyuk was removed from indoctrinating the officer candidates because of disciplinary infractions. His fellow classmates were also not up to their job.

The officer candidate subunit is the point where the future of our Armed Forces clearly assumes its embodiment. Of course, this cannot be a place for risky personnel experiments. This was seriously pointed out to the chief of

the district personnel directorate, Maj Gen A. Pivovarov, however so far it cannot be said that proper conclusions have been drawn.

In concluding the discussion of the meeting, seemingly one could note with satisfaction that problems were aired in a principled manner and these problems are important not only for this officer candidate company and its party group. But with good reason I wrote above "mention was made of a blue file which is kept at the school staff." The urgent question of the indoctrination of indoctrinators which had evoked a strong discussion before the meeting was only touched upon by the communists in the course of it. Hence, the main meeting of the year left a sensation of being manipulated. And this sensation was not deceptive....

Having learned that the company was expecting a superior representative, the senior instructor from the school's political section, Lt Col A. Volobuyev, summoned Sgt Babayev, criticized his report and...dictated his own version from the first to the last line. Then the speakers were assigned as well as strictly designated questions. One would have thought that the chief of the school political section, Col F. Semenov who attended the meeting, would have made corrections in the "senario," but this did not happen and the painful points in the debates were only slightly touched upon. Thus, tomorrow's lieutenants received a clear example of how things can be organized in the wrong sense.

We then spoke with the workers from the political section and other school officers. I feel that the conclusions will be drawn and that the work of developing the qualities and skills of future propagandists and indoctrinators in the officer candidates will be seriously analyzed at the coming meetings of the communists on all levels and at the school party conference, and most importantly, an end will be put to the underestimating of this important question.

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CSO: 1801/24

ARMED FORCES

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITORIAL COLLEGIUM INVITES COMMENTARY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Sept 85 p 6

[Text] To the Readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA:

Respected comrades:

The year 1986 is approaching. It will be a special, an important year in the life of the nation and of its Armed Forces. During the year of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which will approve a new version of the CPSU Program and outline the main paths of national economic and social development for the 12th Five-Year Plan and extending to the year 2000, during that first year of the five-year plan the Soviet people and the fightingmen of the army and navy will have to perform an enormous amount of work to fulfill its historic decisions. The editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA are also determining the newspaper's place in that work and planning to reflect in the newspaper all that is most important, that which the party is presently defining as foremost.

On the eve of extremely important events in the nation's life, we always count on advice from you, the readers. And today, by established tradition, the editorial collegium is asking you to express your opinions on the newspaper's content and format and tell us what you want it to be like. Inviting you to take part in an important readers' council, we ask you specifically to answer the following questions:

On what main problems put forth by the party on the eve of the 27th CPSU Congress would you like to express your opinion and read explanations from the specialists, scientists and practical workers, and what specific experience in accomplishing the party's aims would you like to learn about?

What subjects would you like to suggest pertaining to what you consider to be urgent problems involved in enhancing the effectiveness of the combat training, the ideological and the party-political work and socialist competition, and improving the training process?

We await advice about how best to handle the subjects of military indoctrination, ethics and morality and [military] life. What facets of the work in this area has the newspaper not yet covered? Could you name specific addresses for the preparation of pertinent articles?

Which prominent military leaders, scientists, workers in literature and art and prominent people in the nation would you like to read about in the newspaper? What would you like to have discussed with them?

What events and heroes from the Great Patriotic War would you like to read about?

How would you like to have international life covered in the newspaper?

What are the subjects which you consider to be important and interesting but which have not yet been covered in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA?

Which of the present columns should be retained, in your opinion, and which ones should be replaced? How do you envisage the newspaper in the new year?

We await your suggestions, advice and critical comments. Send them to the following address: 123826, GSP, Moscow, D-317, Khoroshevskoye Highway, 38. Please indicate "Readers' Council-86" on the envelope.

Editorial Collegium

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CSO: 1801/31

ARMED FORCES

EDITORIAL: QUESTIONING COMPETENCE OF UNIT COMMANDERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Oct 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The Commander's Competence"]

[Text] Preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress are giving greater purposefulness to the work of the military cadres with each passing day. The practical tasks stemming from decisions of the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee make it essential to resolutely improve the work and bring it into conformity with the demands of the time. It is becoming increasingly important today for the workers to demonstrate serious initiative and activeness, to be able to accomplish the assigned tasks on their own, without prompting or reminders from above. And this is giving new urgency to the matter of the professional competence of the cadres, particularly command personnel.

A commander's competence is an organic combination of ideological conviction, good professional qualities and overall level of refinement. In order for a commander to be competent he must also have a thorough knowledge of the state of affairs in the unit, the ship, the military educational institution or the subunit entrusted to him, understand his subordinates and know their weak and strong points, which makes it possible to better organize the work, to motivate the personnel to successfully accomplish their missions and to enhance the human factor.

All of these features are clearly manifested in the work of outstanding officers in the army and navy. Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. Grigorash, commander of Guards Tank Unit "X," Guards Colonel A. Tsarkov, commander of Guards Bomber Regiment "X," and Captain 2nd Rank S. Lebedev, commander of the nuclear-powered missile cruiser "Kirov," serve under different conditions, for example. All of them have a thorough understanding of their job, however, know how to implement the regulations and to achieve progress in the acquisition of skill during each class and each day of combat training, and are able to foresee sudden changes in the situation. The competence of these officers is something like a synonym for dependability.

There are many such examples. Nonetheless, the level of command of certain subunits, units and ships and the return from the classes conducted in the course of the combat training do not fully measure up to the demands of the

day. Certain commanders and chiefs engage more in calling for work to be done than in performing the work; others look around as they work, waiting for instruction from above on every matter; and yet others are not able to concentrate the effort on the main areas, find themselves overwhelmed by routine daily matters, acknowledging their own incompetence, as it were. None of this can be tolerated.

Today, the commander's competence must meet new and higher criteria, reflect the increased demands made of the field, air and naval training and serve the quest for ways to further intensify the military work and achieve good results in the combat training with minimal outlays of energy and means. It must be manifested in particular measure today, in the final phase of the training year, when the commander's competence will be judged not by words but by achievements, by the specific results obtained by the subunits, units and ships in the training and the socialist competition.

Success is taking shape primarily where the level of the commanders' thinking and their attitude toward the job conform most fully to the tasks of the day. Why, for example, during the current summer training, is the tank battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Adakhovskiy constantly searching for ways to make more effective use of the fire power and the maneuver capabilities of the tanks? Because the battalion commander himself is a searching individual, in love with the equipment, prepared to accomplish missions at the level of modern demands and capable of doing so. He fires with excellence and is an expert at operating a tank in any weather conditions, day or night. And he has the highest skill rating, that of master.

At the present time, there is a lot of room for creative work in all areas of the commanders' functioning. The force of inertia, conservatism and the inability and sometimes, simply a disinclination to change traditional, established work forms and methods can still be felt in the performance of certain individuals in charge, however. And this is understandable. It is far easier to travel the beaten path, to conduct exercises in an area in which every hill is familiar, let us say, to conduct firing exercises in a target situation which the soldiers know in advance. But is there any great benefit or specific return when exercises are conducted not guided by the tactical situation but with concern that the decision coincides with the chief's opinion, when the classes mostly resemble cramming, when it is not necessary to do any particular thinking, not necessary to be creative and bold or to take risks.

Indifference and formalism are particularly intolerable when working with the personnel. Everyone entrusted to command must be respectful of the men, possess restraint and tact and be equipped with the recommendations of military pedagogics and psychology. His demandingness must be even and systematic, not impulsive, and must be imbued with concern for the men.

Lenin's demand that one in charge be close to the people is still valid today. Commanders of all ranks are increasingly visiting the companies, batteries and equivalent subunits, where the military skill of the soldiers and sailors is forged, and actively influencing the state of affairs. There are also

cases in which officers isolate themselves in the office, however, cutting themselves off from the soldiers and NCOs as it were. Not long ago Captain V. Tkachev, company commander and communist, was brought to strict party accountability. An unhealthy moral climate had developed in the company. There had been instances of nonregulation relations. The officer first tried to justify himself by saying that he knew nothing about it. He did not think about the fact that incompetence in the subunit's affairs does not mitigate, but increases the guilt. It is a matter of honor for every commander to know his subordinates, to be among them as much as possible, to exert a good influence upon them, to share with them the hardships and deprivations of the military service. It is no disgrace for a young officer to compete with his subordinates on the volleyball court, to go with them to the stadium race track on their day off. The spiritual contact essential to the job is produced in precisely this kind of relaxed atmosphere.

In order to be competent in all matters pertaining to the service, one must constantly increase his knowledge and experience, perfect himself and master the Lenin workstyle. The senior chiefs, political organs, party committees and party bureaus are expected to provide the commanders with a great deal of assistance by improving the Marxist-Leninist training and the classes for commanders, providing the necessary conditions for their independent training, enriching them with methods in working with people, developing in them a sense of responsibility and a feeling for new things, and by holding strictly accountable those who do not want to reorganize themselves, those who are inclined to be conceited and arrogant and who avoid indoctrinational work with subordinates. All of this must be discussed at the report-and-election party meetings.

The period of preparations for the party congress is a time for important deeds and bold decisions, a time for improving the work methods at all levels, from top to bottom. It demands a high level of competence, creativity and responsibility from the commanders in order to do an even better job of accomplishing the tasks involved in further strengthening the combat readiness of our Armed Forces.

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CSO: 1801/31

ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

INCONSIDERATE INSPECTION CHARGED--Shakhty, Rostov Oblast--Dear editors! I've been hesitating to write this letter. A very unusual incident. Here is what happened... On the day that we were transferred to the reserve and left the unit, they congratulated us before a personnel formation on completing our service and noted the honest work performed by many. But then the command by officer Khristenko was suddenly heard: "Everyone open their trunks." This was the explanation: he said that a part had been unscrewed from one of the vehicles. The holiday mood was lost. Several of my comrades and I regarded this inspection with understanding. Anything could happen, and evidently there was nothing dishonorable in the examination itself. But this is what was offensive. Why was our mood ruined on such an unusual day? After all, the inspection could have been arranged the day before, after explaining its purpose and the need for it. But they didn't think about it. [Letter to editors from Sr Sgt (Res) A. Mostovoy] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jun 85 p 4] 8936

HOUSING ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS--A letter from from Col V. Bogdanovskiy was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the heading "Bitter Berries." It dealt with the unwholesome situation in one of the organizations of the KEU [Housing Operation Administration] of the Carpathian Military District, and the abuses by an employee of the Soviet Army, I. Kolyadenko. As Maj Gen A. Levchenko, chief of the political division of the staff and directorate of the Carpathian Military District, informed the editorial staff, the cases cited in the letter took place. The criticism of the district's KEU was acknowledged to be correct. Criminal proceedings have been instituted against I. Kolyadenko. Party proceedings have been instituted against Capt B. Gerasimov, a CPSU member, who issued an unobjective reference for Kolyadenko. A plan of measures has been drawn up to improve the work of organizations and subunits of the district KEU. They have now been reinforced with trained personnel. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 85] 8936

1801/263

GROUND FORCES

LT GEN BOBROV COMMENTS ON PROBLEMS OF MOUNTAIN COMBAT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by Col G. Ivanov: "Battle in a Canyon"]

[Text] Colonel Gennadiy Petrovich Ivanov has been appointed senior permanent KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent for the Red Banner Turkestan Military District. We are publishing a report by him with commentary by the deputy district commander for combat training.

The echo of a gun salvo rolled through the mountain canyons.

The positions of a reinforced motorized rifle battalion, preparing for an attack, were clearly visible from the command post of the exercise director. When Lieutenant Colonel V. Dmitriyev had reconnoitered, he had seen that the entrance to the canyon had been thoroughly fortified by the "enemy." Experience told the officer that the more of the defenders' fire points suppressed before the attack was begun, the greater would be the probability of success.

Exploding shells had already broken up the rock on the cliffs covering the entrance to the canyon. The artillery battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel G. Martynov was carrying out strikes against reconnoitered targets. Missile-carriers of the squadron led by Major I. Sinitsyn, military pilot 1st class, then appeared in the sky. The strike by the missile-carriers was completed by combat helicopters which flew by just above ground. The slopes of the canyon were covered with the flashes of numerous explosions.

Everything seemed to be going the way it should. Lieutenant General I. Bobrov, deputy district commander for combat training and director of the exercise, who was at the command post, had a different opinion, however. These were his comments on the beginning of the battle:

"Front line experience and exercises have shown that mountain combat is one of the most complex types of combat operations. Particularly when it is a battle for a canyon occupied and fortified by the enemy. In this case, the "enemy" has occupied tactically advantageous positions. Particularly precise interaction among all personnel and equipment--namely, motorized rifle, tank

and engineer subunits, the artillery and aviation--will be essential in order to deprive him of the advantage and to impose our will upon him. Up to now the interaction has not been very precise. The artillery paused too long when transferring fire to the depth. Tactically, the aviation performed irreproachably and made the strike at the right time. It was not entirely accurate, however. The shells from one pair of combat helicopters fell a long way from the target, for example. We shall therefore have to devote particular attention to training the specialists in all branches of troops to conduct fire while maneuvering."

The attack began. Armored personnel carriers and extended lines of motorized rifleman rushed forward behind the tanks in the company commanded by Captain A. Litvinov. Upon reaching the canyon, the armored vehicles immediately burst into it, destroying numerous targets on the slopes with fire. The motorized riflemen were simultaneously attacking positions covering the entrance to the canyon.

Combat engineers had to be sent ahead of the tanks and armored personnel carriers. Covered by the motorized riflemen and tankmen, they vigorously cleared away obstructions and obstacles. The column soon disappeared behind a crag.

"Overall, the attackers have accomplished their mission in this phase," Lieutenant General Bobrov stated. "Even here, however, not everything went as we would like it to go. In the first place, the pace of the attack dropped considerably just in front of the canyon, as you saw. But that was not so very serious. Worse than that was the fact that the tanks began to enter the canyon before the motorized rifle subunits had occupied the dominant heights. In a real battle this could have cost the battalion a great deal of equipment. Nor can we ignore the fact that the subunit commanders permitted the vehicles to bunch up at the entrance to the canyon. This also played into the hands of the "enemy." In addition, it should be pointed out that the motorized riflemen were inadequately prepared psychologically. Specifically, they clearly opened fire with the small arms too early. Except for using up extra ammunition, this produced nothing."

As though to confirm what he had said, alarming reports began to arrive from inside the canyon that the "enemy" had set up an ambush there. It consisted of the following: the battalion had to negotiate more than 10 firing lines, at each of which targets were raised when the attackers approached. In addition, the kind of targets depended upon hypothetical situations about which the attackers, of course, knew nothing.

"'Enemy' counterattack!" came a new report from a battalion commander over the radio. Then there was a request for air support.

This meant that the attackers had been counterattacked by considerable forces. On another radio frequency one could hear Lieutenant Colonel V. Yarkin, air support controller, summoning aircraft and directing the approaching flights of planes and helicopters. One could feel the situation in the canyon heating up. The airmen were first directed against the counterattacking subunits

and then, apparently because the situation had changed, they were redirected against the "enemy's" artillery positions. The hollow explosions of bombs could be heard in the mountains. The peaks became shrouded in clouds of dust and smoke.

"They moved on!" the battalion commander reported in nonregulation manner. His happiness was understandable: things were better for the motorized riflemen with this kind of air support.

Movement did slow somewhat once again on the approaches to a pass where the "enemy" had erected an obstruction, as he had at the entrance to the canyon. However, one sensed that the attackers now felt perceptibly more at ease in the canyon. They were now operating with greater confidence than at the beginning of the battle. Putting on a burst of speed, the motorized rifle subunits occupied the dominant heights, from which they could support effective operations by the tanks both for repelling a counterattack and when negotiating an obstruction. A battle broke out for the pass. The hollow sounds of exploding bombs and shells could be heard from there. At last, the battalion commander reported:

"I am at the designated line."

This meant that the battalion had completed its mission.

"Well, despite the difficulties, the attackers managed to keep up the prescribed pace," Lieutenant General Bobrov said in conclusion. "This is convincing evidence of the personnel's good training. I have sometimes heard people say that motorized riflemen trained in combat operations on level terrain and in the desert can successfully accomplish a mission in the mountains as well. I do not share this opinion. Experience with exercises, including this one, has shown that successful operations in mountains are inconceivable without serious training, without practice in mountain terrain. After all, in order to successfully engage in combat in mountains the personnel must have good special training, physical and psychological conditioning and good mountain training. They have to be prepared to operate as small subunits separated from the main forces. The microclimate in the group particularly affects the results of a mountain battle. Among other things, a great deal depends upon the ability of the commanders and political workers to encourage the men, to create a situation in which each individual can clearly demonstrate his abilities."

The exercise ended. Its lessons will undoubtedly be taken into account in subsequent work performed by the officers to improve the mountain training of the personnel. And a great deal will depend upon how efficiently they do this.

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GROUND FORCES

CRITIQUE OF OFFICERS, TRAINING ON ECONOMIC USE OF POL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col S. Donaurov, commander of a combat engineer battalion, Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District, under the rubric "For Conservation and Thrift": "Epilogue to an Exercise"]

[Text] We were returning to our military post after completing a tactical exercise. The column of motor vehicles and tractors, powerful engines rumbling, had picked up speed. I was taking it over the shortest route, and my thoughts were returning to the just completed exercise. They evoked dual feelings. I was happy with the good rating we had received, and it was nice that the senior chief had spoken well of my subordinates' performance when he summed up the results. I was not comfortable, however, when I thought about the extra economic losses we had been unable to avoid.

We took a considerable amount of engineering equipment to the field: an excavator, a route clearer, a bulldozer-type artillery prime mover, a high-speed trench-digger, truck-mounted cranes.... Not all of this equipment was employed thriftily, and not all of it was used in the exercise. The bulldozer-type artillery prime mover even had to be returned halfway there. As the situation developed, it became clear that it would simply not be needed. When we consider the fact that most of our equipment has deisel engines, which use a considerable amount of fuel, it becomes clear what the good rating cost the battalion. The incident involving the artillery prime mover alone cost us 300 liters of deisel fuel.

When we prepared for the exercise, we did not ignore the question of conservation. Why did all of the work, which seemed to have been performed with great thoroughness, not pass the practical test? There can only be one answer: Apparently, we did not succeed in considering everything, in calculating everything and accurately and unerringly. We lacked the ability and the economic expertise.

It was not so very difficult to arrive at this conclusion in general. More than once prior to that, when I had thought about ways to increase the results from the work to achieve conservation and thrift, reflections and analysis had drawn me to conclude that the effectiveness of our struggle was being lowered by a poor knowledge of economics on the part of the battalion officers

(myself included). This was confirmed also by one of the drills conducted not long before the exercise, in which we made calculations on the use of the equipment for performing a number of complex combat training missions. Many of the officers, particularly the young ones, could not handle the assignment. They demonstrated a poor knowledge of the capabilities of the different models of equipment and were unable to determine the economically optimal plans for using them.

A considerable amount of work is done in the battalion toward the economical and thrifty use of fuel and lubricants, electric energy and MT resources. From the standpoint of thorough conservation, however, it must be admitted that in all of this work we deal mainly with that which lies on the surface, so to speak, that which does not require in-depth analysis or a scientific approach. When we determine the best routes of movement for the motor transport, for example, we see to it that not a drop of fuel is spilled and that not a single electric light bulb burns unnecessarily. This is also good, of course. Any kind of zeal begins with small things. The source of truly great economy lies in something else, however. It is there where the combat training takes place, where a lot of equipment and weapons is used and a large number of people are involved. And who among us commanders and military engineers can say with certainty that he is capable of making the precise and scientifically based calculations for logistical support for combat? I am confident that not very many of us can. We mainly count on our experience and intuition. With respect to economic calculations and substantiation, we ordinarily do not avail ourselves of these. This is because there are significant gaps in the expertise of many of us in this area. And we had them even when we left the military schools, where we were provided only with a knowledge of the general laws of economy but were not taught how to use them on the practical level, in military affairs. Everything indicates that this is still not being taught, despite the fact that life itself demands this.

We became convinced of this, for example, when we talked with Cadets G. Trofimov and A. Ovchinnikov from the Kaliningrad Higher Engineering School of Engineer Troops imeni A.A. Zhdanov, when they were undergoing practical training in our battalion. They possessed only the most generalized, inexperienced knowledge of economic matters. And the young officers are entrusted with expensive equipment. They arrange its use and organize the training process for subordinates. Experience has shown us that it is precisely in the platoon and the crew, during the day-to-day training on the equipment, that the main effort should be concentrated in the struggle for conservation and thrift, where the practical results should be achieved. And there are considerable possibilities. This requires that the work be arranged not by estimate, however, but with a knowledge of the matter and on a scientific basis.

During an exercise Lieutenant Yu. Yefremov was sent to a motorized rifle unit to provide the electric power for its training missions. Two electric power plants with different capacities were placed at his disposal for this purpose. Instead of determining how much power was needed in accordance with the developing situation and the time of day, and using one or the other plant accordingly, Yefremov came up with nothing better than to "run" the high-powered plant for days at a time. Expensive resources and dozens of liters of fuel went for nothing, so to speak.

One cannot accuse the officer of incompetence, however. He has a good knowledge of the equipment and is capable of rapidly finding and eliminating a complex malfunction. He was taught how to do this at the school. He does not know how to use the equipment economically, however, or which operating modes give it the longest service life and use the smallest amount of fuel, however. Nor do the other young officers, incidentally.

Soon after the exercise, we made the calculations again, this time taking into account all of the circumstances which actually arose. We compared them with our former calculations. There was a significant difference. Much had not been considered, and many of the plans had been based on the use of more equipment and specialists than needed. We also discovered another disturbing detail. Even after the personnel and equipment had been specified for the exercise, certain subunit commanders had adjusted the figures upward. A desire to play it safe, to take something extra to the field as a reserve, just in case, proved to be stronger than calculations which, although not made with adequate precision or thoroughness nonetheless came close to the actual figures.

When the results of the exercise were summed up, there was also discussion about the economic losses which had occurred, about their causes and about how to make up for the losses and prevent such things from occurring in the future. The demanding discussion based on principle was a good lesson for everyone. Many sensible suggestions were made, the implementation of which, I am confident, will make our work to achieve economy and thrift more productive. Another important thing is that many officers became convinced that we need to learn how to organize the training process and operate the equipment economically. They also became convinced of how important it is to understand economics.

To understand economics.... What are we to use for studying economics, however? We have no shortage of all sorts of textbooks, of course. But where are we to find one which covers economic issues pertaining directly to our equipment and the organization of the combat training, taking the specific nature of our service into account, one which contains specific recommendations and reference figures for the calculations?

I believe that the VUZ's which train specialists in our field could do a great deal in this area. For example, they could develop aids and recommendations which could be a great help in our work and provide the graduates with them. But the main thing, of course, is to provide the graduates with thorough knowledge.

We hope that these lieutenants, graduates of the military schools, will infuse their own fresh spirit into the organization of the training and indoctrinational process and the competition and will make this process as effective and economical as possible.

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GROUND FORCES

'KAVKAZ-85' EXERCISE ANNOUNCED

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 27 Jun 85 p 2

[Announcement of "Kavkaz-85" Training Exercise]

[Text] As previously reported, the Transcaucasus Military District is conducting a training exercise named Kavkaz-85 in the Rustav, Akstaf, Tsitel-Tskaro, Sagaredzho area from 15 to 21 July, 1985. There will be a total of approximately 25,000 troops participating in this exercise.

In accordance with the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on 24 June the Soviets sent the appropriate notifications to participating states of the Helsinki conference.

Invitations to send observers were sent to the following: the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Rumania, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Spain, the Republic of Crete, the Republic of Malta, Portugal and Turkey.

12511

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA ON CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 85 pp 47-48

[Article by Colonel L. Migunov, Candidate of Technical Sciences: "Cruise Missiles"]

[Text] Despite protests from the entire planet's peace-loving community, militaristic circles in the U.S. are persistently developing plans to use first-strike nuclear weapons to gain a decisive advantage over the USSR and its allies. In line with these aggressive designs, the U.S. is developing first-strike strategic systems and long-range cruise missiles belong in this category (along with MX and Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles and the ballistic missiles of the Trident-2 submarine).

And what is a cruise missile (KR)? It is a pilotless, guided flying machine with aerodynamic planes. Its flight trajectory is determined by three basic components: the thrust of its jet engine, the aerodynamic lift of its wings and its weight (the usual missile trajectory is determined by the thrust of its motor and by its weight). Cruise missiles are subdivided according to their basing method into land- and sea-based and air-launched missiles. They all have the same basic construction: an airframe with aerodynamic planes, an engine mounting, a warhead and a guidance system.

The KR airframe has a circular or trapezoidal (on the air-based version) cross section and is made from a light metal. Aerodynamic planes -- the wings, vertical rudder and horizontal stabilizers -- are inside the airframe in the initial stage but are put into their operating position by the control mechanisms after launch.

The engine mount consists of a booster (land- and sea-based KR are equipped with these) and a sustainer engine. The solid fuel booster pushes the missile out of its container after which the booster is jettisoned. A one-time use turbofan engine is used for the sustainer engine and conventional aviation fuel is used. KR speeds reach 800 kilometers per hour and a flight may last several hours.

The warhead (BCh) carries either a nuclear or a conventional round. The nuclear warhead yield is 200 kt for all missile basing configurations.

The KR is equipped with a an independent inertial guidance system. This measures the speed of the cruise missile and uses that to compute the flight speed, the route already covered and the coordinates. Its advantage (as compared with radio controlled systems, for example) is that it is impossible to detect and jam. Its disadvantages are that errors unavoidably appear when calculating KR flight parameters and the size of this error increases with the length of flight.

A correction system is needed to keep errors from increasing and to increase KR accuracy. A correction system based on terrain relief is the most promising. According to foreign press reports, this system works in the following way. The rocket track to the target, an irregular line of various configurations, is laid out on a map ahead of time. Since the missile flies at low altitudes, local features and terrain relief are taken into account and when possible the missile must avoid known areas of enemy PVO [air defense] deployment. The probability of KR destruction is thus reduced. At times its flight is planned close to several important objectives so as to delude the enemy as to the real target.

Several correction areas are selected along the planned track so that KR flight times from one area to another are approximately the same. The correction area is broken down into squares and the average altitude of that terrain section is computed. The values of these altitudes are put into the on-board EVM [computer] and as the missile flies over each successive correction area, the radio altimeter is turned on and data from it is fed into the EVM. The latter compares information on the actual track with the computed track. When they differ, the on-board EVM develops commands to correct flight trajectory.

Land-based cruise missiles are deployed in containers and launched from transport-launcher (one launcher carries two containers with two missiles in each). In the opinion of foreign military experts, all KR complexes, which consist of four transport-launchers and two (a primary and a secondary) control points, should be located in covered areas and moved to previously selected positions when they are to be employed.

Three versions of the sea-based cruise missile are being developed. They are those carrying nuclear and conventional warheads for attacking land targets and those with conventional BCh for destroying targets on the ocean's surface. KR armed with nuclear warheads are similar to land-based missiles in construction. They have a launch weight of 1225 kilograms, a length of 6.4 meters with booster, a wing span of 2.54 meters and an airframe diameter of 0.53 meters. Their maximum range is 2500 kilometers and minimum altitude is 30 meters. Their target circular error probability is 100 meters.

The U.S. is planning a program to equip 150 nuclear submarines and surface ships with KR.

Cruise missiles with 500-kilogram conventional warheads are to be used to destroy various shore targets, including airports, air defense complexes and so forth, to a range of 500 kilometers. Either a single warhead or a cluster bomb warhead is emplaced on the KR depending on the nature of target to be

destroyed. The cluster bomb warhead specifically designed to destroy airfield runways is armed with several dozen combined-action concrete-piercing bombs. The shape charge on the nose allows the bomb to pierce the concrete cover and then the main charge explodes, creating a deep crater. BCh with fragmentation bombs can be used to destroy personnel and equipment in the open.

Surface ships, submarines and naval aircraft are to be armed with intermediate-range missiles with conventional warheads.

Anti-ship cruise missiles with ranges up to 500 kilometers are planned to be used from surface ships, submarines, airplanes and shore batteries. These will have a combined guidance system which will include an inertial guidance system, a radio altimeter, an active radar target seeker and a "friend-or-foe" recognition system.

Cruise missiles will be launched from submarines at depths of 15-20 meters. A container with the KR is placed in the torpedo tube which is then filled with water. The missile is pushed out of the container with a hydraulic system and the solid-fuel booster is ignited after the 12-meter cable connecting the KR with the submarine has been extended. The booster fires for about 10 seconds (half the time under water and half above it) and then the sustainer engine is ignited. The booster is jettisoned.

The missile flies at low altitudes for some time. Then the altitude increases somewhat, the radar target seeker is turned on and it begins to search for a target. During this time the KR follows a twisting flight trajectory. After a target is detected, the recognition system is engaged. If the ship is friendly, the missile continues to search. If it is an enemy ship, the missile makes an anti-air defense maneuver and attacks.

Missiles emplaced on surface ships and naval aircraft operate along this same principle.

The use of an over-the-horizon automated target designation system is planned to increase target detection effectiveness. This system may include airplanes and helicopters.

Just like sea-based missiles, air-launched cruise missiles may be equipped with nuclear or conventional warheads. Unlike land- and sea-based missiles as was mentioned above, air-launched missiles have no booster.

The ALCM-B strategic air-launched cruise missile equipped with a nuclear BCh is designed to make highly accurate strikes against land targets. This missile has a range of 2600 kilometers and is to be carried by the B-52C strategic bomber which will carry up to 20 missiles. The U.S. plans to have 195 such aircraft by 1989. According to foreign press reports, the new B-1B production model strategic bomber (with a flight range of 12,000 kilometers and a maximum combat load of 56.7 tons) will also be armed with 30 ALCM-B KR's.

To the indescribable joy of the military-industrial complex, the U.S. is already planning to produce the second generation air-launched cruise missile,

the ACM. These will have an increased flight range compared to the ALCM-B and will use "Stealth" (the "invisible" airplane) technology. Missiles produced with this technology will supposedly be impossible to detect with current PVO [air defense] equipment and will therefore be a means for making a surprise attack.

Air-launched KR with conventional warheads are able to destroy targets at ranges up to 600 kilometers. American specialists feel that by equipping the missile with a more improved engine the maximum range can be increased to 1300 kilometers. And KR designed to destroy airport runways are to be put on both B-52 bombers and F-16 tactical fighters. The missile is equipped with a terrain-relief correction guidance system and an optical guidance system for the final leg of the trajectory.

In the opinion of foreign press, this combination allows the KR to achieve great accuracy (a circular probable error of less than 10 meters). A thermal guidance system is planned for those air-launched missiles whose primary role is attacking ships and land targets.

A KR with a conventional warhead weighs 1320 kilograms and is 5.9 meters long. The warhead weighs 450 kilograms. It is supposed that cruise missiles with somewhat smaller characteristics (a weight on the order of 1000 kilograms and a length of about 4.9 meters) will be used to arm naval aviation.

The U.S. is betting on achieving military superiority by developing and improving cruise missiles. The Soviet Union has more than once offered to ban KR production and to stop this new, dangerous spiral in the arms race. However the White House has not listened to this appeal, clearly overestimating its capabilities and underestimating the capabilities of the other side.

The USSR Ministry of Defense has reported cruise missile deployment on airplanes and ships and also successful testing of long-range land-based cruise missiles. As CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Comrade K. U. Chernenko stressed, our economic potential, new technical means and increasing defensive effectiveness reliably guarantee the security of the Soviet State and its allies.

12511

CSO: 1801/243

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

LT GEN RUSANOV ON FLIGHT SAFETY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 May 85 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant General Ye. Rusanov, commander of the Red Banner Central Asian Air Force Military District and Honored Military Pilot of the USSR: "Personal Responsibility"]

[Text] Regardless of the mission assigned to the crew of a military aircraft, whether it is simple or difficult, all the aviators associated with completing the given combat mission are obligated to carry out a series of measures designed to guarantee the safety of their work in the air. These are flight procedures which are the same for all flight soldiers, independent of their rank and duty. And the more conscientiously the aviators carry out their responsibilities while preparing for a flight and during it, the more effective and safe it will be.

There are many aviator activities aimed at guaranteeing flight safety. But there is a core in this difficult, multi-level work which is the cornerstone of the end result. This core is every specialist's, and especially the commander's feeling of personal responsibility for the timely and qualitative completion of safety measures. And this means every specialist. If only one specialist digresses from flight procedure requirements, the situation can become very difficult and other aviators may have to operate in extreme conditions.

I will give you an example. Flights commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel G. Sytnik were flying through severe meteorological conditions and conditions gradually worsened. Knowing this, Sytnik should have analyzed the situation and made a sound decision, ie, he should have directed those aircraft in the air to a secondary airfield. However the flight commander did not do this, but instead gave the command to land at "home". His erroneous decision immediately made pilot operations more difficult and increased concern. And not all pilots were able to cope successfully with this increased stress. Guards Major A. Tityanin in particular was unable to accurately hold the assigned course, came in to the landing strip at an angle and was unable to level his plane at landing. As a result, the landing was not successful and qualified as a near flight accident.

Here one sees an instructive aspect of the theme "showing responsibility often means totally and decisively using one's authority". If officer Sytnik had done this in the given situation, the near flight accident would not have happened. However the flight commander, a man with a lot of authority, did not fully use it in the given situation. And the right to command had been given to him because people believed in his knowledge, experience and ability to immediately make the correct decision.

But one can also refer to other type examples as well. For many years the aviation regiment which until recently was commanded by military pilot first class Colonel Yu. Zatolokin has flown well, without any near flight accidents. When one looks deeply into the life of the foremost regiment, one becomes convinced that the primary secret of its successes are each specialist's timely completion of both his service obligations and the requirements of source documents. And the officers and commanders set an example of fundamentals and good punctiliousness in observing flight procedures.

Every time a question arises about how to act in one situation or another and what decision should be made, one can hear the words, "Look it up in the source documents."

This isn't as easy as it appears to collate your every step with instructions and manuals because at times one gets the impression that a slight deviation from the letter of the document would make the task easier. But as a rule the imaginary gain soon results in various costs -- waste of aviation equipment resources, a reduction in pilot training, etc. At the same time punctuality in observing flight procedures saves you from such costs and from the necessity of compromising with your conscience and promotes the development of a healthy moral atmosphere in the collective.

Worrying about reliably guaranteeing flight safety eliminates the temporary affects of success in a regiment. Unit officers recall one incident. One day while checking the planned flight schedule in the squadron, Colonel Zatolokin noticed that flights were planned for a young pilot in the flight area, along a path and in aerial reconnaissance.

"Isn't this a lot of solo work for a pilot with skills that have not really been reinforced?" noted the commander. "He should make some flights with an instructor first."

"In that case he will not be able to fly on the aerial reconnaissance," objected the squadron commander.

"Plan an aerial reconnaissance for him during the next flight session."

After this incident the regimental commander insisted that the unit methodological council work out recommendations in accordance with which young pilots had to fly with instructors for the first six or seven flight sessions before they soloed. To some this would seem like an unnecessary precaution which would hinder officers' progress in the training program. However, reality proved otherwise.

This seeming "trampling" of young officers when developing their initial flight exercises was later repaid a hundredfold by their conscious training and by the entire unit's clear flight rhythm. And the results of summer combat training had the regiment in one of the top spots in the district VVS [Air Force].

The commander's feeling of personal responsibility for excellent final results in squadron and regimental combat training helped formulate a strict atmosphere which had all aviators complete the requirements of the source documents in a timely manner. This feeling was manifested in the improvement of personal methodological and flight skills, well thought-out, skillful planning of the training process, a clear flight organization, strict control over the quality of work and the observance of safety measures in the air.

Since the frontal years one has gotten used to the commander being the best pilot in the unit or subunit and this rule that was born in of front line experience has not lost its timeliness today. A commander indoctrinates his subordinates with internal discipline, high performance and responsibility for observing flight procedures by setting the example, completing his mission in a model way and by displaying discipline in the air. Our foremost unit and subunit commanders, the ones who have planned new limits of combat improvement for themselves in the summer training period, always remember this.

It is no secret that a pilot takes liberties in the air only when he is confident of keeping his misdemeanor secret. Therefore it has become a hard and fast rule in the district's foremost VVS units and subunits that an officer is sent out on a repeat mission only after his work during the preceding flight has been carefully analyzed using data from his on-board monitoring equipment.

Experienced commanders keep strict account of the at first seemly insignificant rough edges that subordinates show in the air. This allows them to detect in time those undesirable tendencies in their trainees' piloting skills and their inclinations to violate safety, thus creating an atmosphere in the collective where not a single aviator thinks about violating flight procedures. If this atmosphere does not exist in the collective, any surprise is possible.

Once a group of helicopter pilots led by squadron commander Lieutenant Colonel V. Zagorodskiy was making a flight along a set course. One would think that the presence of the squadron commander would be a reliable guarantee that every aerial warrior would surely comply with safety measures. But alas, the final helicopter piloted by Captain A. Parshukovoy dropped down to an altitude that was too low. An analysis showed that the subunit commander frequently shut his eyes to "minor" flight discipline violations by his subordinates.

Unfortunately there are also cases where the commander himself consciously allows flight procedures to be violated. Squadron commander Lieutenant Colonel N. Lapshin once planned flights for a pilot who was on detail. The squadron commander was well aware of the fact that source documents forbid an officer to participate in a flight unless he is prepared to participate in the entire flight session and has shown he is trained. The commander acted in

spite of flight rules, setting an example of an irresponsible attitude toward work for his subordinates, in his words "acting with the best motivation" so that a subordinate could get back into the formation after a long break. But the experienced officer did not think about what the consequences of his alleged concern for increasing his subordinate's training could have been. And he did not think about the fact that the provisions of the source documents contained the concentrated experience of many generations of aviators. Violating them even with "the best motivation" is a repeat of old errors for which people paid dearly in their own time.

In guaranteeing crew safety, a lot depends on the flight command group and the level of professional training, moral-psychological tempering, initiative and decisiveness of every one of its members. Flight commanders and their assistants are constantly ready to act in difficult situations and to make an immediate, but thoroughly thought-out decision. This readiness is reached by a thorough study of planned flight schedules, of individual pilot capabilities and of the development of every possible variation of action in special situations as worked out in trainers and by "step-by-step flying". It is this careful training that allowed flight commander Lieutenant Colonel V. Maslov in just scant seconds to carefully evaluate the very difficult situation that arose during a pilot's flight and make the only correct decision.

Flight intensity and flight stress are constantly increasing. As practice shows, purposeful, harmonious actions by commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations in indoctrinating aerial soldiers with a high level of responsibility and also the active struggle against those who violate flight procedures are helping us achieve success in guaranteeing reliable crew safety. And as was stressed at the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum, we must first and foremost make commanders who bear personal responsibility for discipline more responsible. Only this approach will guarantee success in this matter.

12511

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

PROBLEMS IN USE OF AUTOMATED NAVIGATION, TARGETING SYSTEMS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 85 p 2

[Article by Major General of Aviation A. Shabunin, chief navigator for the Air Force and honored military navigator of the USSR: "Integrated Use"]

[Text] During tactical flight training Major N. Proskuryakov's crew (the navigator was Major V. Kargopolov) was assigned the mission of detecting a target against the backdrop of the terrain so that other crews could attack it. Proskuryakov and Kargopolov carefully prepared for the flight, worked up several possible situational variations and worked through using various aircraft systems. Therefore when the inspector from higher headquarters stated in his exercise introduction that the targeting and navigation system was not operational, the crew was not caught by surprise. The commander and navigator quickly oriented themselves, evaluated the situation correctly and were able to complete the mission using back-up equipment.

The supersonic speed of modern aircraft, their capability to fly at altitudes from the stratosphere to low-level, the long flight ranges, the necessity of overcoming heavy air defense and other condition put enormous stress on crews, require that they be extremely professional and that they have good moral-psychological training. But man's abilities are not boundless and automation has come to his aid. The equipment of modern airplanes is integrated in targeting-navigational complexes and on-board computers help resolve navigational and combat tasks on the basis of information fed in from a number of monitors, to include electrical, astronomical, barometric and others. Of course, in order to use this equipment correctly the pilot must have in-depth knowledge of mathematics, physics, electronics, automation and aerodynamics.

If crew members don't have enough theoretical training and they also lack the necessary practical skills and the ability to work through the inertia of habit, then automated navigation and combat systems in modern aviation complexes are used at a significantly reduced level. Poor pilot and navigator training makes them uncertain about their equipment and causes them to lose confidence in its reliability and they therefore negate the capabilities that scientists, designers and engineers have designed into equipment. For example, a bomber navigator at one maneuver airfield did not adjust his navigational system and the on-board computer set the airplane on a course that was the opposite of the one that had been computed. The error was corrected through prompting from the ground.

There are often purely psychological obstacles to mastering modern aircraft equipment. Some pilots and navigators have a difficult time overcoming the configured stereotypes in using navigation and targeting equipment and are inclined to use only part of the capabilities of the navigational-targeting system, operating in the old way. This is a harmful tendency and must be overcome. One method of doing this is to expand and deepen knowledge, improve skills and instill trust in automation without forgetting to monitor its operation.

The experience of flight crew navigational training shows that comprehensive knowledge of targeting-navigational systems and hard skills in their use allow pilots not only to carry out all tasks in the air but also to find a way to increase the precise characteristics of aircraft equipment and improve the tactical methods of using them in combat.

In the aviation units where officers A. Lysenko and V. Pavlov serve, the creative attitude toward using modern targeting-navigational systems allowed them to increase strike accuracy on invisible targets, to reduce combat formation depths for various tactical groups and to improve the methods used in group attacks on targets and those used in landing at airfields without special electronics systems. This shows a desire to get the most out of the "smart" machines in on-board airplane equipment.

However, we must also not forget about redundant instrumentation and traditional navigational methods. The example of Major N. Proskuryakov's crew proves convincingly that these are not superficial. And daily combat training contains numerous example to confirm this truism.

Automation is good and necessary, but under modern battle conditions one must be intrinsically ready in case automation goes out of action because of the effects of enemy weapons. Therefore the capability of making flights in an automated mode must not hide the need for pilot navigational training in the traditional sense, ie. using visual reference points, dead reckoning with a course, speed and flight time and doing other navigational tasks without using automation. In short, while respecting automation, we must not reject the "classical" navigational methods.

Captain A. Shabalov's crew (with Captain L. Shemanovskiy as navigator) was assigned the mission of going along a route using automated navigational systems. While still on the ground the navigator noticed that the compass needle was fluctuating but he did not attach any significance to this. However, once in the air he was unable to maintain the correct heading with his secondary instruments, as a result of which he allowed a significant deviation from the assigned course and the crew in actuality did not complete its assignment.

From time to time some commanders and navigators combine navigating one-man aircraft by controlling them from a command point. This leads to pilots developing a passive, dependent frame of mind when developing aerial navigation methods. They say that the radar sees everything and the command post gives them promptings on how to go into the airfield for a landing. And

if the person at the radar screen is poorly trained or simply lets an error slip past, this can lead to the assigned mission not being completed. For example, senior pilot Lieutenant A. Kiselev lost his bearing in normal meteorological conditions. As was explained later, he had relied on the "all-seeing" command post and had not monitored his position in the air. Personnel at the command point meanwhile felt that because of his straightforward mission the pilot could maintain his bearings himself and they temporarily stopped monitoring him. The error was detected and corrected in time and Lieutenant A. Kiselev landed at his own airfield all right, but things could have turned out otherwise.

As is known, crew flight training includes three elements -- flight equipment, navigation and tactical use of aviation weapons systems. The theory and practice of navigation and tactical equipment use is the foundation for flight personnel navigational training.

In the majority of Air Force aviation units, navigational training for flight personnel is set up in full compliance with the requirements of time and the source documents and this to a significant degree expands the combat capabilities of aviation systems. For example, in the unit where officers N. Kolmakov and V. Yegorov serve and in many others as well people are constantly searching for ways to improve tactical methods for crew operations, to enhance flight personnel knowledge and increase the skills in using automated systems. Enough attention is being given both to developing methods for combat operations when there is no radio and radar contact with the ground and when automated systems have been disrupted and to psychologically training flight personnel to operate under these conditions.

At the same time targeting-navigational systems are not being used enough, especially for the difficult types of tactical use, in the aviation units where officers V. Grachev and V. Dragunov are serving and in several others as well. The superfluous accent on traditional forms of navigational training has led to the fact that the capabilities of modern equipment are not being fully utilized and consequently progress is being slowed or stopped in its tracks.

When organizing navigation work, besides training crews for flights, we must give the necessary attention to training crews to operate special equipment in the air, to develop flight plans and to deal with topographical-geodetic support problems. This is really necessary because targeting-navigational systems can provide high navigational and tactical accuracy only when they have been carefully prepared for a flight: when the initially data has been calculated exactly and correctly fed into the computer and equipment has been carefully monitored to insure it is operating correctly.

Training shows that targeting-navigational systems work reliably and accurately and flight missions are successful when crews and equipment are totally and carefully prepared for a flight, all crew members have conscientiously completed their duties, have paid enough attention (especially when working with navigational systems before taking off) and have constantly monitored and corrected instrument readings in a timely manner.

In long-range aviation the navigator controls on-board weapons and targeting systems. He guarantees that the missile carrier arrives on target and makes the proper maneuvers for a strike. Even the aircraft commander cannot supervise and correct his actions. This makes navigators personally responsible for the special and moral-psychological preparations to carry out combat operations, for the know-how and readiness to complete the mission assigned to the crew under any tactical and navigational conditions, even when the navigational equipment is out of operation, by using back-up systems. Commanders, political workers and navigator controllers must constantly show their concern for both the professional training of flight personnel and for their moral-psychological preparations for modern battle. When forming crews for multi-seat aircraft the commander must consider such factors as the interaction, primarily between the commander and the navigator, but also between the commander and his other crew members. We must support crew teamwork, when a commander and his subordinates can understand one another with half a word under the most difficult conditions. Very high demands are made on teamwork under contemporary conditions because the capabilities of a single aircraft, its fire power, accuracy and speed of attack have grown immeasurably and therefore so has the dependence on the end result of clear actions by each member of the crew and on teamwork by the crew as a whole.

The crew which includes Guards Major V. Bandyukov and Guards Captain N. Demakov had the critical mission of attacking targets during tactical flight training, but the crew did not work together during the flight and was unable to utilize the fully capabilities of the equipment. The mission was done in a poor manner because of a lack of mutual support and teamwork.

The party and the people have equipped our Air Force with the most modern aviation equipment. Unit personnel have everything they need to set up combat training. The mission of aviators is to do things in such a way that they fully realize the capabilities of combat equipment. Constant progress and searching for and mastering new things are as important as fully using those things which are known and have been mastered. This can and must help achieve new heights in military skills.

12511

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

COMMAND CHARACTER, OPERATIONS OF SAM UNIT DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jul 85 p 3

[Article under the rubric "The Commander and Modern Combat" by Col V. Nagornyy and Col A. Pimenov, special KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents: "The Responsibility of the One Who Fires"]

[Text] A stiff, gusty wind stretched the red warning flag out at full length. A small warning sign stood out distinctly on the doors of a small inconspicuous building: "Target control point. Do not enter! Combat operation in progress." And all around, as far as the eye could see, lay a desolate, lifeless desert. And at first the obvious reality was not perceived that here the air defense missile firing range had spread out its objectives for hundreds of square kilometers, and that one of the subunits was just about to begin the most complex and most important test of combat maturity--real firing at air targets.

"The first launch went normally," reports the officer in charge over the loudspeaker.

The "first" was a radio-controlled pilotless target aircraft, for the flight parameters of which the range officers installed a most complex program. After all, it was very important now to enable the persons with the missiles to feel the stress of modern combat.

It was distinctly noticeable to us how the silvery missile, after singeing the launch pad with the hot engine exhaust, took off abruptly and drew a heavy, fading roar behind it into the sky. But then something apparently happened with the guidance. The visible trajectory curved toward the earth in a white trail, and it appeared that no one would save the situation now, preventing the inevitable miss. However, some force easily took the missile nearly to the zenith, and after calculated seconds more there, as if detonation had made an impression in the dark blue of the horizon with its sharp flash, the target was destroyed.

But what had happened at the launch pad?

Soon after the launch, artificially introduced interference resulted in a malfunction in one of the radar systems. Simply stated, the intercept

controller was deprived of an opportunity to control the flight of his missile in the customary manner. For only a few moments, the rectangle of the indicator was not shining with a greenish glow. This was quite enough for the "enemy" aircraft to appear outside the "field of view" of the electronic device. The launch officer, communist Maj N. Salakhov, proved his worth in the best manner precisely in such a critical, nonstandard situation. Later one of the range officers, Lt Col V. Gamov, who had taken part many times in tactical exercises and knows the value of the launch crews' high skill, will say:

"The subunit was put in a situation which, I believe, cannot happen often in real combat, either. Thanks to Salakhov, in the final analysis the firing was carried out successfully..."

Yes, despite the fact that missiles unquestionably are a collective weapon, the role of one specialist remains important, too. Sometimes, as in the case mentioned, it is decisive. Especially if this specialist is the launch officer, who is assigned a special role in the combat team of a surface-to-air missile subunit, stemming from the specific nature of modern air defense combat.

Of the specific characteristics of this combat, the principal one is the short duration. A modern aerial target of supersonic speed is in the impact zone of a missile complex for only a number of seconds, as a rule. Moreover, the enemy attempts to execute electronic countermeasures, to apply sophisticated interference, and to maneuver in every way possible. And here under such conditions, in extremely limited time, the launch officer must be able to analyze the enemy's actions and make a decision to launch the missile. The only correct solution--otherwise, the mission will not be carried out, for the launch officer has no time to correct an error.

We had occasion to observe quite a few missile launches at the range. They all differed from each other, depending on the different nature of the targets, the direction of flight toward the attack objective, the different tactical situations, and other characteristics. In observing the actions of launch officers in these situations, we reflected on the high demands being made of missile officers today.

Col Gen A. Khyupenen, commander of surface-to-air missile troops, was here at the range observing the course of the tactical exercises with field firing. Having been in nearly all command positions in the air defense forces from commander of a subunit to commander of surface-to-air missile troops, he is thoroughly acquainted with the specific nature of the launch officer's work, and we asked him to share his opinion of this individual in the combat team of a missile subunit.

"Today exceptionally high demands are made upon the professional training of the launch officer. Competence, initiative, courage in making decisions, willpower, and the ability to not lose his head in the most complex combat situation--this is far from a complete list of the qualities which a launch officer must possess."

Illustrating the compulsory nature and necessity of the qualities enumerated, the commander expressed in conclusion a very curious opinion, in our view, which apparently relates not only to a launch officer. The point is that in the well-known triad of knowledge-ability-practice which form the basis of skill, in combat, under conditions when there is an acute shortage of time, practice assumes more and more importance. This has been taken into consideration in the training of launch officers in the surface-to-air missile troops.

But regardless of how perfected the system of training specialists may be, the results obtained depend to a large extent on the trainees themselves, their diligence and sense of responsibility, just the same. And when this is lacking, the results are not slow in having an effect.

Objective from "enemy" air forces. The situation in the exercise proved to be very complex, but the potentialities of the missile crew also enabled them to repel the attack of the opposing side. At the most tense moment, when the speeding target was already on an attack heading, Skoropletov calculated that it would not be particularly difficult to destroy it: the straight-line flight of the target did not foreshadow any surprises. The manual tracking operators were directing the target reliably.

The drone, as if going out of control, maneuvered sharply and rapidly gained altitude. Skoropletov, who was performing the duty of launch officer, simply lost his head. An insufficiently high personal level of specialized training redoubled the confusion. Despite the fact that the officer had automatic control facilities at his disposal, he did not take advantage of them. Further search for the "errant" target led to the conclusion that another one after it had been picked up and fired at. As a result, there was a low evaluation for the tactical exercise as a whole...

The high standard of the launch officer's personal training, as already stated, represents a combination of the officer's extensive knowledge, skill and psychological qualities. The ability to orient himself without error in a tense, often contradictory and rapidly changing situation of modern combat, irreproachable handling of the entire arsenal of a combat drill, psychological preparation and capability of resolving the tasks of destroying enemy air forces creatively--these also are essential qualities which every launch officer must possess, in the opinion of experienced missilemen who have gone through the good school at the range. The daily training without oversimplification and indulgences opens up unlimited opportunities for this person.

We became acquainted at the range with Capt V. Karpov, commander of a subunit. At first we had occasion to see the firing which, judging by the excellent result, he had supervised confidently and efficiently.

The officer completed the Gorkiy Higher Antiaircraft Missile Command School of PVO 10 years ago. He subsequently held several command positions, accumulating in each one the varied skills of a master of missile combat. He acquired such science not just in accordance with the manuals: he constantly watched the operational performance of others closely. A distinct impression

in understanding the secrets of the launch officer's training was left by his service with Maj V. Sazonov, commander of a surface-to-air missile battalion, who now holds a higher position.

Karpov adopted the qualities of his highly experienced superior which a launch officer cannot do without during launches or on readiness duty--complete confidence in the equipment's high capabilities, decisiveness, self-control, and the ability to foresee a turn of events.

"In my view," Karpov says, "the launch officer must have equal confidence in himself and in the thorough training of his subunit."

By keeping this constantly in mind, communist Karpov and other officers of the subunit are persistently improving the training process, achieving high efficiency each minute. For example, a group of innovators under the supervision of Sr Lt N. Smirnov developed a unique device for training manual tracking operators. With the aid of the "Smirnov simulator," a complex air situation filled with unexpected and nonstandard events may be set up without any expenditure in the service life of combat equipment. The intercept controller. Sr Lt A. Loginov, has developed several methods which have been widely applied in training a series of specialists. Incidentally, at the end of the last training year, Sr Lt Loginov was recognized as the best intercept controller in results of competition in the Moscow Air Defense District.

Sr Lt V. Gryazev and Capt A. Chistopol also are notable for their high specialized training in the subunit. The officers of the combat crew are specialists first class. And the party organization, by providing the commander with tangible assistance in organizing socialist competition, has strived to ensure that all the communists have a higher ranking. The advanced subunit is preparing to greet the 27th CPSU Congress with fitting performances.

Missiles are being launched at the range. Each launch and each target destroyed involves the collective labor of the combat team, in which the launch officer plays a leading role.

8936
1801/265

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATION BETWEEN PILOT, GROUND CONTROLLER

Moscow KRSNAYA Zvezda in Russian 10 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by Major V. Belyayev, Military Pilot first class, Carpathian Military District: "Duel in the Clouds"]

[Text] Twilight was fast approaching over the airfield. Only the dark horizon was visible in the west. A MIG came to a stop at the end of the runway. Sitting in the cockpit of the missile carrier was military pilot first class Captain A. Ishkov.

The afterburner exhaust in the form of a bright flame issuing from the engine nozzle pierced the air. The pencil flame flashed comet-like and died in the mist.

"I am located in the grid", the pilot's voice was heard to say at the command post. This meant that Ishkov had commenced to search for the target. There were two marks on the plan position indicator screen. They were being followed by tactical control officer Lieutenant Colonel A. Tychina. He had known Ishkov for some time. Even as a lieutenant Ishkov was remarkable for his industriousness and love of work. It is true that at first the going was not as easy for him as he would have liked. But he did not give up when he would fall short of success. His comrades rendered him a high honor by selecting him to be party organization secretary.

The outcome of aerial combat depends largely upon close coordination between the interceptor and the tactical control officer. A personal relationship is beneficial in this regard. Of course the tactical control officer has at his disposal modern technical resources which make it possible to gather and analyze large amounts of data relative to the air situation and make decisions. However, it is also necessary to have a clear idea of how a particular man will perform in a particular situation.

The "enemy" had just attacked our fighter from the direction of mountains, under the cover of strong interference. Ishkov used the fighter's capabilities to quickly determine the "enemy's" direction of attack and execute a deep descending spiral to leave the "enemy's" field of view.

Since I had taken to the air a number of times to accomplish similar missions, I was able to have a clear mental picture of Ishkov's job. He riveted his

attention on the instruments. He gathered his mental and physical forces to launch a decisive attack.

I recalled an instructive incident from training days. At that time Captain Ishkov was flying in close combat formation with the leader over a large forest area. Tactical control officer Captain V. Samokhin started to vector the fighters. Suddenly a doubt crossed his mind: Will the pilots execute the abrupt maneuver as required? He radioed "smooth" commands.

The fighters started to close with the approaching aircraft of the "enemy" bomber group. However the simplified vectoring approach issued by the tactical control officer adversely affected the effectiveness of target scan and lock-on with the radar sight. Swiftess and surprise of attack were lost.

Another error came to mind, when practice flights were being made to develop intercepts and aerial combat. Pilots from the regiment took on the role of targets. Not in every case did they attempt to break off the attack by maneuvering in the manner taught in the combat training course. Their reasoning was: I'll help you today, tomorrow you'll help me.

We decided to stamp out short cuts and simplifications. This was more than a case of prohibiting the execution of incorrect procedures. More complex actions require greater professional competence. We performed many drills on the ground and in the air together with tactical control officers. We carefully studied tactical diagrams and additional literature and performed the necessary computations. We also gathered in a specially-equipped area and used the "dismounted soldier against aircraft" method to determine the initial position of fighters before the attack and devise tactical combat procedures. The best unit tacticians explained in detail how to effectively employ fighter sighting devices and utilize the combat capabilities of missiles. The joint exercises rewarded us with new knowledge and made it possible to set up closer operational ties with the command post. Having had that experience, while observing Ishkov's actions on the indicator screen, I was concerned: How will everything turn out in a situation which approximates combat?

The aerial engagement continued. Supersonic speeds carried the "enemy" far into the distance in the night sky. Ishkov executed a vigorous chandelle to gain altitude. I can imagine how the ground, with its lights flickering, shifted to the side and how the overload forced the pilot's body against the seat. At the specified altitude Ishkov put the MIG on a horizontal flight path.

The mark on the screen representing the "enemy" aircraft seemed to jump in altitude and course. The "enemy" did not see Ishkov, and the intense interference denied him accurate data. Ishkov reported target lock-on and missile launch.

"What is this? Another target?", asked the tactical control officer as he glanced at the green radar screen. The entire landing strip was taken up by bright illumination, which could mean fog in that season.

"Who is in the air?", anxiously asked the regimental commander, who had just arrived at the command post.

"Number 34", answered the officer in charge of flights.

"How much fuel does he have left"?

The pilot answered: "Sufficient to return to base.

A thick shroud of mist hid the landing ground.

"Number 34, you will make a straight landing approach. Watch your descent", was the next command.

Powerful searchlights were turned on to penetrate the night mist. Their rays revealed the fighter. Ishkov executed a faultless landing. That is how a difficult engagement was won. And I am more convinced than ever that the making of bold no-compromise decisions in the air requires a firm base of knowledge and skills and ceaseless efforts to attain victory.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

COMMAND INITIATIVE: PVO TRACKING UNIT DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Col Ye. Bolotin, Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District, under the rubric "The Commander and Modern Combat": "Boldness of Decision-Making"]

[Text] It happened during the fourth drill in the radio technical subunit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Randin. A multiple target rapidly approaching the defended facility suddenly altered its course and began moving out of coverage. The crew commanders were troubled: What had the "enemy" thought up now? Had it given up on the attack or decided to approach the facility from another direction? Such situations occur frequently, but the single most correct decision has to be made.

"Search!" Randin ordered firmly and to the surprise of some, gave a grid square on the target's previous course.

And indeed the blip from the target soon flickered on the screen and tracking was resumed.

"Didn't you take too big a risk in making such a bold decision?" a unit staff officer present during the drill later asked Randin.

The subunit commander would answer that one cannot avoid taking a risk in modern combat.

That is true. The main thing, however, is to use well-founded foresight and eliminate the likelihood of error. In this specific instance the commander concluded from a study of the training battle's development that the "enemy" had a minimum amount of time to complete his mission. This meant that he would not give up the attack, although he would carry out some sort of deceptive maneuver. He would most probably do this during the dive at the target. And this is what actually happened. One aircraft dropped sharply and rushed to the attack (the blip from it disappeared at that instant), while the second attempted to divert the radar operators with a vigorous turn of almost 180°. Thanks to the decisiveness and calmness demonstrated by the commander of the radio technical subunit and to the skillful actions of his subordinates, the "enemy's" plan was figured out.

We usually associate the sight of a rhythmically rotating radar antenna with the service of those who guard the air borders. Searching for, detecting and tracking targets, supporting the air defense weapons with constant and reliable information on the air situation--such is the general pattern of action of the military radarmen. Today, however, when the tactical and technical capabilities of air attack means have increased drastically, new elements have been added to this pattern in many respects. Among other things, the importance of the time factor has increased. We might say that modern combat by air defense subunits against an air enemy consists primarily in an acute battle for seconds. And in this situation of rigidly limited time, the commander of the radio technical subunit must make a competent decision promptly and efficiently, without hesitating. The way Lieutenant Colonel V. Randin did. The way many other officers-and-radarmen do.

But permit me to cite another example. When asked what an officer needs in order to operate decisively and with initiative in combat, many commanders in one of the radio technical subunits began confidently listing the things: he needs to have detailed information on the enemy, to know the capabilities of his own personnel and equipment and the situation in the zones of adjacent subunits.... In general, these were correct answers. Then the combat training work began. Major A. Kirdyashkin, who knew and was able to do everything mentioned above, confidently supervised his subordinates in the beginning. It appeared that the radarmen would be successful to the end. At that point, however, the commander of a crew manning one of the radar stations sent a report on a new target on a course which "friendly" aircraft were supposed to be flying that day. Precisely because of this Kirdyashkin did not attach any special significance to the target. He did not realize its importance until the aircraft failed to respond to a challenge, maneuvered sharply and swept toward the positions of an adjacent subunit. Once again, however, instead of taking decisive steps, Kirdyashkin began vacillating and requesting additional information on the aircraft. As a result, there was a delay in getting information on one section of the target's flight to the higher command post.

It was explained during the critique of the exercise that the air "enemy" had skillfully taken advantage of a break in flights by "our" aircraft, and this had mixed up all the cards, so to speak, of Major Kirdyashkin and his subordinates. What caused this was the fact that when the officer had studied the situation which had developed at the beginning of the training battle, he had given only superficial thought to possible changes. He did not demonstrate tactical farsightedness or the ability to foresee the possible course of events, to think for himself and for his "enemy." This gave rise to confusion at the critical moment.

We know that modern combat is not just a confrontation of personnel, technical means and weapons, but also a confrontation of mind and will. Boldness and activeness of tactical thinking and the determination to take a thoroughly justified risk and accept responsibility do not come about by themselves, of course. They are acquired in the process of day-to-day training. Two different approaches to the development of such qualities were reflected, as it were, in the two examples cited above.

Lieutenant Colonel Randin takes advantage of every hour, every minute of training time to improve his own skill and the training of crew and platoon commanders subordinate to him. The tactical situation in the drills conducted in this subunit are always highly dynamic and filled with hypothetical problems which require thorough and diversified knowledge, skill, psychological and physical strength on the part of the commanders and all of the personnel. Among other things, regular drills are arranged for the officers, in which they learn how to rapidly and accurately "read" an air situation depicted on a plotting board or a radar screen. Great importance is attached to determining the kind of air attack means being used, to figuring out to the end maneuvers begun by the targets, to drawing conclusions from the situation and making decisions. Tactical daring, initiative and bold maneuvering of personnel and equipment are rewarded. It is not easy to earn this from the commander, to be sure. The drills involve a powerful, intelligent and resourceful enemy, whose plans are not easy to figure out.

Major Kirdyashkin and his colleagues do not have to strain themselves very much in many exercises and drills, however. The training battles are conducted according to simplified, thoroughly familiar patterns, in which the men know in advance that the "enemy" is doomed to failure. Where is there any room for daring or boldness, any possibility of feeling real responsibility for decision-making in this situation? It was precisely the habituation to routine and lack of initiative which let Major Kirdyashkin down in that drill.

Experience has taught us that a search for the correct decision is inconceivable without initiative, without creative comprehension of events in the zone of operations of the subunits, the unit, the formation.... The strange thing is that some officers reason: What sort of creativity is possible, when the actions are written up precisely and unequivocally for the commanders in the pertinent documents? And there are mandatory versions of the combat training work. This is not a new idea. Nor, incidentally, are the arguments against it new. I have to mention them, however. Even the detailed instructions and manuals cannot cover all the diverse possible formations of an air enemy's groupings, for example, the diversity of his battle formations, the type and intensity of interference, the flight directions of the aircraft, weather conditions.... The commander must himself assess all of the details and the interaction of all this and take it into account at the time he makes his decision.

In a tactical exercise Major G. Mechenko's men were the first to detect targets at maximum range. They tracked the targets, despite intensive interference. Nor did they lose their heads when "enemy" aircraft made a massive raid. They successfully repelled an attack against the position of some "saboteurs." The commander had this in mind in advance and arranged his men accordingly. Privade I. Safargalin, a young operator, issued information (which later proved to be erroneous) on a target which appeared and suddenly disappeared in the immediate area of the defended facility, however. Menchenko concentrated on that grid square, was overly cautious and lost sight of the other targets for a certain period of time. There was a breakdown in the operation.

"You know, he is cautious by nature," Major Mechenko's chief explained during the critique.

It later came out that it was not a matter of his nature. When he received the information on the "unexpected" target, Mechenko decided that the "enemy" had probably redeployed secretly to an area closer to the defended facility. The configuration of the ground and weather conditions had helped. Mechenko, however, had not provided for responding to this kind of scenerio. This is what produced the uncertainty and the breakdown in the rhythm of the work. This is what it means to fail to consider even a single element in the situation or its possible influence upon the course of combat operations.

Electronic computers and means of automation are the commander's proven assistants in his work. One can sometimes see an officer racking his brain over some sort of task, while the intelligent equipment stands idle. Why is this? Because the officer "does not trust" it. And a deeper look will show that he does not know how to use it properly.

The professional training and readiness for combat of the modern commander in the radio technical troops are reflected in the boldness of his decision-making. These are troops who perform combat missions also in peacetime.

11499

CSO: 1801/32

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

PILOT GROUNDED: VIOLATION OF FLIGHT REGULATIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Col A. Andryushkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Principle... In Reserve: Follow-Up on a Letter"]

[Text] Captain V. Grikhutik, tall and well-built, walked with the light, springy step of an athlete. A group of officers stood near the entrance to regimental headquarters. They were engaged in a lively conversation. They all suddenly fell silent. It was as though there was an unspoken word in the air. The officers had spotted Grikhutik.

He slowed down as though intending to approach the airmen. Upon seeing their backs, covered with their close-fitting leather jackets, however, he passed by in silence.

The conversation was not revived among the officers. Exchanging another two or three words, the airmen rushed off, each on his own business....

Captain Grikhutik arrived in the squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Melekhov to serve as a flight instructor in 1980. The officer's old dream of flying modern, supersonic equipment had come true. "I successfully re-trained," Grikhutik told me.

The squadron commander and the other commanders and chiefs were pleased at the officer's attempt to master a new combat machine as rapidly as possible and begin training the cadets. However, the intensity of the workdays prevented them from noticing that Captain Grikhutik kept apart in the classrooms and on the flights, that it was difficult for him to accept any kind of advice from the flight instructors. "I flew as well as the others..." Grikhutik announced, and it was clear from the officer's tone of voice that he considered it beneath his dignity to listen to recommendations from anyone.

Then Grikhutik committed a number of gross errors in the piloting, and Lieutenant Colonel Melekhov issued him a reprimand for a deterioration in his personal preparations for flights. The penalty was fair and timely. Grikhutik should have accepted it as a warning. The sky does not forgive conceit, after all. But the officer felt that he had already learned everything--he had the rating of military pilot 1st class--and reacted in a peculiar way to the penalty.

He became angry at the squadron commander. In our discussions, he did not conceal anything: "...I will fight for the truth. I will complain about Melekhov wherever I need to"!

Neither Major R. Lopatin, the flight commander, Major N. Bavinov, secretary of the squadron party organization, nor any of the flight instructors straightened Grikhutik out. They did not tell him that his exaggerated self-esteem and inappropriate arrogance were harming both him and our cause. Why not?

"Grikhutik did not want to listen to anyone," Major Lopatin told me. I was surprised at the indifference of the squadron officers, who patiently tolerated the conceited officer's worthless "principles." They thereby permitted him to set himself against the entire collective, after all. Was it not because things were more peaceful that way?

Grikhutik picked up on that climate of indifference, and the position taken by his colleagues that "this is not my business" became that kind of nourishing medium in which personal arrogance takes on such dimensions that it pushes everything else into the background.

"Lieutenant Colonel Melekhov has no prestige with me," he wrote to a party commission in the political section of the district air forces.

The fact must be inserted here that the regimental commander, Major Lopatin, the flight commander who taught him to fly, Major Bavinov and many other colleagues also "lost" their prestige in Grikhutik's eyes. "They are all in this together...", Grikhutik stubbornly asserts.

Nor does the captain want to admit that he clearly exaggerated his initial successes in mastering the new machine or that the lack of demandingness of his colleagues, who forgave him his first errors, contributed to the development of his unhealthy high opinion of himself. Here is an example.

Major Lopatin once scheduled for Grikhutik a flight for which he was not certified. Whether it was simply an error or a lack of knowledge of the subordinate's real training level is beside the point. The consequences were unexpected, however. Captain Grikhutik committed an infraction when planning the exercise but did not report it. It was noticed by the squadron commander, and he forbade the officer to depart. The captain reported this to the school inspector, with whom he was supposed to fly. "Let's fly a different exercise," Lieutenant Colonel N. Adonin made the decision, without going into the details. "Are you prepared for it"? Grikhutik answered in the affirmative, although he had not prepared the day before.

The inspector did in fact have the right to simplify the assignment, but only after becoming convinced that the pilot had prepared for it in advance. Adonin did not do this. In a conversation with me, Grikhutik justified his actions by saying that the senior chief had ordered him to fly. Did the captain feel that he was at fault? No. He considered his personal infraction of the flight laws to be a minor matter, but he was extremely quick-tempered when he talked about the actions of the commanders: They can do it, but I can't?

We shall not talk about how well the assignment was performed at this point. What occurred involves something else. The senior chief showed his subordinate that it was permissible for him to violate the flight rules and fail to carry out orders, because he could count on protection in case "misunderstandings should arise."

"Who is your squadron commander?" Melekhov asked Grikhutik following those flights.

"Lieutenant Colonel Melekhov," the latter answered.

"Well, I am grounding you"!

The squadron officers watched to see just how this incident, into which two senior officers had been drawn, would end. The regimental commander and the party committee also took a position of bystanders. They felt that this was an "internal squadron" affair. Captain Grikhutik was not frankly told even in the squadron, however, that he had committed a gross violation of flight laws and had been dishonest. As a result of this lack of principle, the officer became convinced that he could get by with anything.

The captain was soon walking around like a hero. He was permitted (contrary to the squadron commander's decision!) to train cadets. "You see," Grikhutik said, "I was right"! The flight instructor was not giving his all to the work, however. From my talks with him I understood that he had something else on his mind during that period--how to "expose" the squadron commander and get even with the latter for his wounded pride. The officer assured everyone that the commander was biased against him, that he was just looking for an excuse to impose a penalty.

It became even more difficult to avoid errors in the training in this frame of mind. Within a short time Captain Grikhutik had had several near-misses in flight. One of them was among the most dangerous: During a landing he took his attention off a cadet, and the missile-carrier landed at great vertical speed. Lieutenant Colonel Melekhov grounded the officer once again.

Notice the fact that each time only the squadron commander took disciplinary steps. Major Lopatin, the flight commander, admits that he did not punish Grikhutik himself, although he should have. The subunit communists also lacked the time to consider the officer's conduct. "Our commander is a demanding one. He always manages to take steps himself...", the deputy squadron commander for political affairs added. He did explain that Melekhov's demandingness was sometimes accompanied by a lack of restraint, which did not influence the indoctrination of subordinates in the best possible manner.

As in the past, Grikhutik did not agree with the measure of punishment for his near-miss. In order to "establish" Lieutenant Colonel Melekhov's prejudice, he began secretly "monitoring" the work of the other pilots and collecting gossip which compromised the commander. This was noticed in the squadron, but the attitude of Grikhutik's colleagues remained the same--noninterference in the affairs "of others." This does not pertain to us,

they said. The squadron commander has stirred up the trouble. Let him straighten it out. The airmen did not know that Grikhutik's notebook contained entries on "transgressions" by each of them.

The secrets came out, however. And the squadron was disturbed. Many individuals hesitated to openly express their opinion for fear it would be interpreted the wrong way. The officers began avoiding contact with Grikhutik. Having grounded the captain for his error, the squadron commander put the airfield and headquarters off limits to him. Melekhov clearly exceeded his disciplinary authority. Grikhutik immediately took advantage of this. He began writing....

The senior chiefs, who had previously not noticed the growing conflict, were now disturbed. And how could they fail to be: Colonel N. Kharlashkin, commander of the training air regiment, was drawn into the matter in one of the letters.

After that the unit commander decided unconditionally to remove the complainant from the regiment. And Colonel Kharlashkin instructed the squadron commander to send Grikhutik to the hospital and to indicate in his reference: "Not advisable to use him on flight duty."

Colonel Kharlashkin understood that the conflict in the subunit would not be settled rapidly. They themselves had given Grikhutik the freedom and permitted him to disgrace the collective. He reasoned that it would be a long and painstaking job to indoctrinate the officer, that it would be simpler to get him out of there. The chief of the school did not agree with the decision, however. That same day Colonel Kharlashkin signed a new reference for Captain Grikhutik. It stated: "It is not recommended that he be used on this type of aircraft." I will get it done by hook or by crook, was his attitude, but the captain is not going to serve in our regiment!

They then remembered that there was a party organization in the regiment. The unit party committee hastily considered the personal case of the communist and resolved to expel him from the party. The party commission under the school's political section did not approve the decision, however, "...because of the incompetent manner in which the case was written up." Captain Grikhutik was issued a reprimand "...for undermining the squadron commander's authority," however, which went into his record. Such "ups-and-downs" made the "offended" officer begin doubting the correctness of the punishment again, and he wrote an appeal to the party commission under the political section of the district air forces. He wrote another complaint to Moscow at the same time.

"We felt sorry for him!" Colonel V. Derevyanko, political worker, exclaimed when he learned the purpose of the correspondent's visit. "We let him stay in the party, but he has complained about us. No, Grikhutik must be expelled from the CPSU immediately and discharged from the army. No one wants to fly with him! Listen to what the communists have to say...."

Colonel V. Bozhenko, secretary of the party commission under the Political Section of the Air Forces of the North Caucasus Military District, attended the subunit party meeting. He had come to the garrison to get to the bottom of the situation. Pilots, technicians and other aviation specialists took the floor. They spoke with passion, as though in a hurry to ease their conscience with belated frankness and principle. In their talks they underscored the fact that they did not want to serve with Grikhutik. There were those in the room who did not ask to speak, however. They sat in silence. It was as though they did not care.

As I listened to the communists, I found myself thinking: Most of them believe that they only have to get rid of Grikhutik, and the squadron will begin improving. No one pointed out that it was not just the captain's complaints or his collection of "facts," which were not confirmed, which had contributed to the exacerbation of relations, but also the low level of indoctrinational work in the subunit and inadequate principle in the position of the regimental commander, his deputy for political affairs and the other commanders and chiefs. And if they close their eyes to this, if they do not improve the moral climate in the collective, no one can guarantee that a new conflict will not arise in the regiment, even if Captain Grikhutik is transferred to another location.

11499.

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NAVAL FORCES

PRESTIGE OF NAVAL ENGINEERS SAID TO BE LOW

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sep 85 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Leyshis: "The Prestige of a Naval Engineer"]

[Text] The naval mechanical engineer, Sr Lt I. Yurshin, had set the task for himself and his subordinates of reducing the time required to prepare the engineer department for combat and setting to sea. A rather simple solution was found: they began to start the main diesel without cooling fluid and began to deliver it to the system as the unit heated up. Initially the result surpassed all expectations as the norm for bringing the diesel to an operating mode was surpassed by almost double. But not so much time passed when the equipment failed. As it turned out, the shaft bearings had fused. The malfunction was eliminated, however soon thereafter the bearings again fused. Only then did they carefully study what had happened. The reason for the failure of the equipment was determined by those physical processes which occurred in it in operating without cooling fluid. This had not been considered by Sr Lt Yurshin in introducing his "innovation." As a result, the good intention ended up damaging the combat readiness of the ship.

At approximately the same time, on an adjacent ship, the analogous task was carried out in a completely different manner. The chemical engineer, Capt 3d Rank M. Burikov, with his subordinates conducted a careful study of the diesel's operation under various operating conditions. Graphs were drawn up for the heating up and cooling off of the equipment. Their plotting provided a point for the optimum temperature state of the diesel where putting it into an operating mode required minimum time. After consultation with representatives of the manufacturing plant, they adjusted the instructions for inspecting and turning over the equipment.

Both the given examples are indicative in their own way. As is known, the evermore complicated tasks which our ships must carry out have introduced serious adjustments not only in the design but also in the processes of operating the combat equipment and have demanded the search for new procedures making it possible to maximize its tactical and technical capabilities. This would be impossible without scientifically sound engineer calculations. Here an enormous role is given to the naval engineers. High professional competence, a broad technical viewpoint, a feeling for the new and a desire for search and innovation -- these are the qualities without which the

engineers are unable to successfully meet their duties under the conditions of the constant acceleration in scientific and technical progress.

In our formation there are many engineers who by constant self-education and by increasing the demands placed on themselves are endeavoring to meet as much as possible the tasks of today. In this regard, instructive experience has been gained by the commander of the engineer department of one of the ships, Capt Lt V. Balaban. He has an excellent knowledge of the equipment of not only his own but also adjacent ships and he constantly analyzes the experience of its operation. For several years now he has kept tables and graphs of all the assemblies and mechanisms of the engineer department for operating them under various conditions. What does this provide in practice? In the first place, in the department under his charge there has never been any failures or malfunctions. Secondly, he sees to it that all the equipment of the BCh-5 [engineer department] operates above the established service life.

Here is a characteristic example. Not so long ago the ship's main engine had operated its service life, but Capt Lt V. Balaban, in having an analysis of its parameters over an extended time and having compared these with the parameters of an analogous new engine, calculated the capabilities of various parts. Some of them were replaced. Then a study was run on the operating of the engine in the given state. From its results they adjusted the operating instructions and now the unit is operating dependably for a second period and this has provided a tangible economic effect.

Unfortunately, a different attitude is also encountered by naval engineers to their duties. It does sometimes happen that a certain mechanism fails. The commander of the engineer department must take measures to eliminate the malfunction. However, there is also an easier solution: the telephone is nearby and repair specialists are summoned. When they perform the job, it is merely a matter of inspecting the equipment to make certain that the parameters are within the norm. There is no need to think or seek out any engineer solutions....

This is approximately how the commander of the BCh-5 of one of the ships, Sr Lt A. Larionov, operates. His ignorance of the physical processes occurring in operating the equipment and the inability to carry out engineer calculations have led to a situation where the equipment under the officer's charge frequently breaks down. And often Larionov does not even attempt to understand the reasons by himself and coolly waits for outside help, for he knows that the command does not tolerate the combat capabilities of a ship to drop, and it will send in knowledgeable specialists who make everything better.

The only name that one can give to such an approach to one's duties is parasitical. Nevertheless, at times they do not truly hold people such as Larionov to account. This happens, in my view, due to the reason that clear criteria do not exist everywhere for evaluating the labor of a naval engineer. The alarm is sounded only in the event that some major accident occurs with the equipment. But if a negligent mechanical engineer who is an engineer in name only gets by and there are only minor failures, then he can rest calmly.

We do not always truly delve deeply into on what level the equipment is being serviced, that is, on a modern level corresponding to the requirements of scientific and technical progress and ensuring maximum efficient use of the ship's combat capabilities or on a primitive one designed merely for the notorious "off-chance." For this reason instances are encountered when even intelligent, skilled specialists lose their taste for creativity and evidence passivity and indifference in performing their duties.

The April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee spoke with concern about the decline in the prestige of engineer labor. The party has outlined and is implementing measures which should raise the role and authority of the engineers as well as increase the material and moral incentives for their activities. These problems are fully characteristic also for the Navy. Increasing the activity of the naval engineers is a major reserve for the quality of combat training and an indispensable condition for the dependable mastery of the modern weapons and equipment.

How can this be increased? Here a great deal depends upon the attitude toward engineer labor on the part of the commanders and chiefs and primarily the ship commanders. Farsighted commanders always endeavor to somehow emphasize the role of the mechanical engineers in their crew, they encourage their initiative and rely on them for many questions. Characteristic in this regard is the approach of Capt 3d Rank V. Burenin. This ship commander never takes any major decision without consulting with the commander of the BCh-5. Here the search on tactical questions and in the work to surpass the established combat standards are always based on careful engineer calculations. All of this increases the prestige of the mechanical engineer and helps him develop.

But, unfortunately, there are also commanders who do not even consider it their duty to delve into the affairs of the engineer department as supposedly this is not the concern of the commander and let the mechanical engineer solve his own problems as he is an engineer. Such, may we be permitted to say, style is characteristic of the young ship commander, Sr Lt A. Antipov. It is not surprising that this year he has had more than one unpleasantness related to the failing of the equipment.

In speaking about the prestige of naval engineers, one cannot help but consider certain aspects, so to speak, of a psychological sort. It is no secret that there are fewer opportunities for their service growth than for other specialists. A missile officer, a mine officer or navigator, particularly if his service develops, as they say, along command lines, grows rather dynamically in his position. But the mechanical engineer, in assuming command of the department as one of the first among his fellow classmates, later on falls far behind them in service growth. Here there are objective factors which cannot be disregarded. But obviously there must be some forms of moral compensation so that the protracted stay of the officers in the same position does not tell on their attitude.

The labor of a naval mechanical engineer at times is not very apparent. But it is very important that it still be noticed and commended. At times, let us say frankly, the moral incentives and competition do not "work" very effectively to increase the activity of engineer thought. On the ships, in

truth, they do take obligations for questions of economics and innovative work and precisely here the mechanical engineer, as a rule, sets the tone. But these are only individual elements in their activities. Possibly the time has come to take a new look at the participation of the naval engineers in the competition. Why, for instance, not establish the best mechanical engineer of the unit, formation and even the fleet for the year's results, taking into account here how dependably and economically the equipment assigned to the officers operated, what original and bold innovations had been introduced by them and what role they had played in military-technical propaganda on their ship and in social life?

One last thing which we would particularly like to mention. It is no secret that on certain ships we still have mechanical engineers who close themselves off in a narrow circle of purely technical problems. They do not work with the men, and they do not assume social burdens, referring to how busy they are. The ship engineers are truly very busy as modern equipment requires enormous dedication. However, it must not be permitted that an officer, so to speak, does not see beyond the "bits and pieces" of life.

No, a modern naval engineer is not merely a "technician." He is a person of broad view who in a well-rounded manner develops his creative individuality. When a person himself works for this, when conditions are created for him for this, then both his authority is higher and his satisfaction from service greater.

10272

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REAR SERVICES/DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

PROCESS OF INNOVATION DURING WORLD WAR II

Moscow PROMYSHLENNOYE STROITELSTVO in Russian No 4, Apr 85 pp 9-10

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences Ya. M. Khorozhanskiy from the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for the Construction Industry: "Innovators of the War Years"]

[Text] From the Editors: The leading collectives of innovators in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Armenia and Belorussia, Novosibirsk, Chelyabinsk and other oblasts have provided at least one-third of the above-planned increase in labor productivity as a result of inventions and innovative proposals. In Moscow alone, this initiative has been supported by more than 400 enterprises and associations.

The experience of innovators in the terrible war years shows the inexhaustible possibilities in this area as well as the heroic labor of our people. The article offered here for the readers by Candidate of Historical Sciences Ya. M. Khorozhanskiy entitled "Innovators of the War Years" reminds the older generation of its labor heroism which marched hand in hand with the heroism on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and for the younger generation will serve as an example of a responsible attitude toward labor and an incentive for its further improvement.

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" has pointed out: "The workers, kolkhoz members, scientists, engineers and designers by their unstinting labor won an unprecedented battle for metal and grain, fuel and raw materials, for creating mighty Soviet weapons." Innovators from the construction projects of ferrous metallurgy were active participants in the "unprecedented battle for metal." Their contribution to victory was most apparent in the most difficult and dramatic periods in the development of the sector and the life of the nation.

The Soviet national economy suffered exceptionally great harm as a consequence of the temporary occupation of a number of the nation's regions. Their territory prior to the war included 40 percent of the population, it produced

42 percent of the electric power, it mined 63 percent of the coal and harvested 38 percent of the gross grain product. Losses in ferrous metallurgy were also significant. The number of production units at the end of 1941, in comparison with June, had declined by 58 percent for blast furnaces, 49 percent for open hearth furnaces, 100 percent for converters, 52 percent for electric smelting and electric ferro-alloy furnaces, as an average by 66 percent for rolling and pipe-making mills and by 98 percent for coking batteries. The nation was deprived of 61 blast furnaces, 204 open hearth furnaces, 150 rolling mills and 14 pipe mills and 204 coking batteries. Hundreds of production buildings of the metallurgical plants and ore sources were destroyed. To some degree these losses could be made up for by new construction and by starting up the metallurgical units which had been evacuated to the eastern regions of the nation.

All of this focused attention on the questions of capital construction in ferrous metallurgy. They were given particular urgency by the fact that with each wartime month in the second half of 1941, the industrial production of metal declined. While in October 1941, 34 percent of the iron of the June level, 45 percent of the steel and 42 percent of the rolled metal were produced, in December, the figures were already, respectively, 23, 36 and 32 percent. In December, the Narkomchermet [People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy] was able to provide the defense industry with only 469,000 tons of metal. The production of tanks, aircraft, aviation motors and ammunition was sharply curtailed. With such a situation it was essential to quickly put into operation the equipment from the evacuated metallurgical plants. And the construction workers honorably carried out this task. By April-May 1942, production areas had been built providing for the output of approximately 80 percent of the equipment evacuated to the east from the metallurgical enterprises.

One of the factors which determined the accelerated pace of opening up the evacuated equipment from the enterprises of the Narkomchermet was the extensive development of innovation in construction and here the principles for this had been worked out in the Decree of the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] "On the Construction of Industrial Enterprises Under Wartime Conditions" of 11 September 1941 [1] which was a directive document for the design and scientific research institutes of the Narkomstroy [People's Commissariat of Construction] and for the innovators and inventors.

The specific features in locating the installations of the Narkomchermet and the Narkomstroy during the war years contributed to the broad dissemination of advanced production methods at the construction sites. After evacuation the management of the Narkomchermet was located in Sverdlovsk and the Narkomstroy in Chelyabinsk [2, 3].

A large portion of the design institutes of the Narkomstroy and Narkomchermet was also located in these cities or in direct proximity to them, and as was necessary they developed work of their divisions directly at the construction sites. All of this helped to establish direct contacts between the leadership of the people's commissariats, the design and scientific research organizations with the ferrous metallurgy construction projects. As a result, all the complex questions which took months and years here were settled at the

construction sites with participation of leaders from the people's commissariats and with assistance from the local party and soviet organizations.

As an example, one might give the construction of the Chebarkul Metallurgical Plant (Chelyabinsk Oblast) using evacuated equipment from the Elektrostal [Electric Steel] Plant (Moscow Oblast). The construction was headed by the People's Commissar for Construction S. Z. Ginzburg. A brigade of designers from the Giprostal [State Design Institute for the Construction of Metallurgical Enterprises] under the leadership of the Chief Project Engineer M. I. Tarnopolskiy, designed the shops at the site. The construction workers simultaneously laid the foundations of the buildings and installed the equipment. To help the party organization of the contractor, the OSMCh Zaporozhstroy [Special Construction-Installation Unit for Zaporozhye Construction], the Chelyabinsk Party Obkom sent a brigade of 10 men. Chebarkul received a visiting editorial group from the oblast newspaper CHELYABINSKIY RABOCHIY. The first stage of the plant went into operation 2.5 months after the start of construction [3, 4].

Innovative procedures and methods of construction were worked out both in the scientific research institutes as well as by individual innovators and inventors. A major contribution to rationalizing refractory lining during the first months of the war was made by Giprokoks [State Design Institute for Coke Enterprises] of the Narkomstroy. Its engineers proposed the standard laying of refractories for the coke furnaces of the leading metallurgical combines including Magnitogorsk, Novokuznetsk, Novyy Tagil and the coke byproduct plants. As a result, the number of grades of brick as an average declined by 1.5-fold and the weight of one brick was reduced by 1-1.2 kg. But the number of refractories manufactured increased.

The construction workers of the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine knew well the name of the innovator engineer A. I. Zabrodin. He made three innovation proposals which made it possible to save 74,700 rubles. From parts found at a scrap lot, he assembled an excavator. A mechanic from the OSMCh Sverdlovskpromstroy [Sverdlovsk Industrial Construction] L. Ye. Lopatin made three innovation proposals with an economic effect of 44,000 rubles while the five innovation proposals of Engr Z. M. Boguslavskiy from Sevkavkazstroy [Northern Caucasus Construction Administration] provided 174,000 rubles of savings.

The popularizing of technical achievements by the construction workers was aided by competitions for inventors and innovators held by the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Construction Workers at Industrial Enterprises of the Urals and Western Siberia [2] and by articles on the pages of the journal STROITELNAYA PROMYSHLENNOST (organ of the USSR Narkomstroy) [3]. In addition to periodicals the Narkomstroy also issued various technical collections. The trusts Magnitostroy [Magnitogorsk Construction], Chelyametallurgstroy [Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Construction], Kuznetskpromstroy [Kuznetsk Industrial Construction] and others during the war years put out technical bulletins with a description of individual achievements from construction practice.

In the first half of 1942, the Narkomstroy held a series of conferences on exchanging construction experience under wartime conditions with representatives from Zaporozhstroy [Zaporozhye Construction] and Uraltyzhstroy [Urals Heavy Construction] [3], where the questions were discussed of introducing express construction methods and utilizing local materials. At subsequent conferences the questions were raised of saving metal and the ways for lightening structural elements were examined. All these measures contributed to the further development of innovation and inventions. While in the second half of 1941, these trusts carried out 85 rationalization proposals with a savings of 2,859,000 rubles, during the first half of 1942, the number had risen to 109 and savings to 3,075,000 rubles. The total number of implemented proposals in one war year for all the heavy metallurgy construction organizations was 3,200 with a savings of 60,679,000 rubles. The growth dynamics of innovation and invention for the most important construction organizations of the nation (Magnitostroy, Kuznetskpromstroy, Tagilstroy [Tagil Construction], Amurstalstroy [Amur Steel Construction], Petrovskpromstroy [Petrovsk Industrial Construction], Trugstroy [Pipe Construction], and OSMCh-22) which assumed a significant amount of work in the first war years can be traced from such data.

In 1941, the number of received and introduced innovation proposals for the construction organizations, in relation to 1940, was, respectively, 164 and 157 percent. The savings from the introduction of the proposals was 135 percent of the level of that year. In 1942, the number of received and implemented proposals was 265 and 276 percent in terms of 1940. The savings from the introduction was 232 percent.

The creative enthusiasm of the ferrous metallurgical construction workers, in being expressed in a mass innovative movement, to a large degree helped to return a predominant portion of the evacuated equipment to use in a record short time, from October 1941 through May 1942. By February 1942 the drop in the production of ferrous metals had been halted and from March a gradual rise commenced. In May 1942, the production of ferrous metals surpassed the December 1941 level by 1.2-fold and February 1942 by 1.5-fold. The increased output of metal provided a significant increase in the production of defense products in the second quarter of 1942.

The return of a larger portion of the evacuated metallurgical equipment to use by the summer of 1942 largely improved the situation on the "steel front," however the problem of producing ferrous metals in the nation could not be fully resolved. By mid-1942, 3-fold less of these metals were still being cast than on the eve of the war. For increasing metal production it was essential to widely develop the construction of new ferrous metallurgy projects (blast furnaces, open hearth furnaces and rolling mills) and rebuild metallurgical enterprises in the liberated areas.

In building new large projects and restoring the ferrous metallurgy enterprises, innovation and invention underwent further development. Along with the forms of popularizing the technical achievements of the first year of the war, from the end of 1942, a major role began to be played by the public reviews of the organization of labor held at many construction projects. Just after one such review organized by the party committee of the Magnitostroy

Trust and held in its construction administrations and sections, in the first quarter of 1944, 115 innovation proposals were received. At the construction sites talks were often held on innovations and great attention was given to visual agitation, to organizing photographic exhibits and so forth. Also effective were the competitions for the best innovator and inventor. In the summer of 1944, such contests were held, for example, in the Magnitostroy and Kuznetskpromstroy and produced a total of 117 innovation proposals with an economic effect of 2,520,000 rubles. As a total from the summer of 1942 until June 1944, the sector's construction projects provided 8,000 innovation proposals and their introduction provided a savings of 182,038,000 rubles. Over the 2 war years, 2.5-fold more proposals were submitted than in the first year of the war and the savings from their implementation increased by more than 3-fold.

The increased number of innovation proposals and their greater economic effectiveness can be clearly traced from the example of the construction trusts Magnitostroy, Kuznetskpromstroy, Chelyametallurgstroy, Tagilstroy, and OSMCh-63 and Yuzhtyazhstroy [Southern Heavy Construction] [2].

The number of proposals received for the designated construction organizations in 1943 was 162 percent of the 1942 level and the number introduced into production was 144 percent. The savings from the introduced proposals was 147 percent of 1942. In the first half of 1944, respectively, 185 and 171 percent of 1942. The savings from implementation was 167 percent.

The broad scope of invention and innovation helped significantly to increase labor productivity. At a majority of the ferrous metallurgy construction projects by June 1944, high labor productivity had been reached and this was expressed in increased average output per man per day. The actual output rate per worker per day by June 1944, in comparison with 1942, had increased by 33 percent as an average for the construction organizations and surpassed the planned.

The struggle to shorten construction times in ferrous metallurgy and which was significantly aided by innovation and invention and the growth of labor productivity was ultimately a struggle for victory in the war. Suffice it to say that as a result of starting up the evacuated equipment and putting into operation new metallurgical capacity, metal production in the nation over just the 2 years of the war (from June 1942 through June 1944) increased by 1.3-fold.

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YEGOROV REVIEWS RESULTS OF DEFENSE SOCIETIES' CONFERENCE

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 30 Jun 85 p 1

[Report on proceedings of bloc defense societies conference in Moscow presided over by Flt Adm SU G. M. Yegorov; date unspecified: "Under the Badge of Friendship"]

[Text] A conference of leaders of defense and sports societies and organizations of socialist countries has ended in Moscow. By common consent, Flt Adm SU G. M. Yegorov, chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, presided over the conference.

The conference reviewed questions on the status of multifaceted collaboration and implementation of the friendship and collaboration agreement of the defense and sports organizations of the socialist countries for 1981-1985, the collaboration agreement of the socialist countries' defense organizations for 1986-1990, the plans for basic multilateral measures and the combined and preparatory competitions of the socialist countries' defense organizations for 1986-1990, the status of the combined competitions under the motto "For friendship and brotherhood" for 1986-1990, and the joint activity of socialist countries' defense organizations in international sports federations and steps for its further reinforcement; the concluding document of the international conference of representatives of socialist countries' defense organizations held in the USSR in 1984 on the questions of military and patriotic education of the youth, the minutes of the conference of delegations of defense organizations on material and technical security held in Hungary in 1985, and information on films of the socialist countries' defense organizations were approved.

In discussing questions on the agenda, the socialist countries' delegations of defense and sports organizations noted that the conference was held in a constructive, businesslike spirit under conditions of complete mutual understanding and unity. It confirmed the common character of evaluations of key problems related to the life and activity of fraternal organizations.

The conference stressed that under conditions in which imperialism's aggressive nature is more active, defense organizations have an increased role in preparing the people, especially youth, to defend socialist gains.

A powerful new impetus to overall efforts to improve military-patriotic and international education of the people of socialist countries was provided by the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the great victory over Hitlerite fascism and Japanese militarism, to which the Soviet Union made a decisive contribution. Other countries in the anti-Hitlerite coalition and all participants in the struggle against fascism also made a substantial contribution to victory. The worldwide historic importance of the great victory, which established conditions for formation of the world socialist system and successful development of the community of socialist countries, was emphasized.

In taking into account the experience accumulated in collaboration and the mutual exchange of views on the agenda, the conference participants arrived at a unanimous decision: the agreement on friendship and collaboration of the socialist countries' defense and sports organizations for 1981-1985 has been basically fulfilled; to continue the comprehensive development and improvement of relations among the socialist countries' defense organizations based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism and the unbreakable fraternal union among our communist and workers parties, peoples and states; and to ratify the "Agreement on collaboration of the socialist countries' defense organizations for 1986-1990."

The defense organizations of the socialist countries, under the leadership of their communist and workers parties, consider their high responsibility to improve the forms and methods of patriotic and international education of the working people, especially the youth, and their preparation for defense of socialism's accomplishments. In expressing the desire to improve collaboration in this field, the conference participants approved a plan of basic comprehensive measures for the socialist countries' defense organizations for the 1986-1990 period.

An important place in international sports meetings is held by the combined competitions for youth, which are conducted as measures of an applied military nature and contribute to a large extent to the training of youth before conscription to carry out their patriotic duty--for service in the army and their training in the spirit of internationalism and the friendship and brotherhood of the peoples of the socialist countries. The conference participants approved the plan for combined competitions in applied military forms of sport under the motto "For friendship and brotherhood" for the 1986-1990 period.

At present, the sportsmen of the socialist countries' defense organizations have captured firm positions in the international arena. Our sportsmen are achieving great successes in forms of sport involving aircraft, parachuting, motorized water sports, underwater speed swimming, underwater orientation, motoball [motobol], and modeling aircraft, ships, vehicles and rockets. The conference participants approved the plan for preparatory competitions among teams of the socialist countries for the 1986-1990 period.

In the present complex foreign policy situation, under the conditions of acute exacerbation of the ideological and political hostility of the two opposing

world sociopolitical systems, when imperialism is pouring out torrents of disinformation and slander against the socialist countries and their political and social system, we have to make use of all our opportunities to propagandize socialist reality, the great advantages of socialism, and our countries' achievements in developing technical forms of sport and the accessibility to all citizens for broad participation in them. For coordination of efforts in information and propaganda work, the conference participants decided to review this problem at the next conference on matters of military and patriotic education for the youth.

As a result of planned work, representatives of the socialist countries have made a definite contribution to democratization of the international sports federations and improvement and change in sports, technical, judging and medical rules.

The conference participants decided to improve the traditional ties of defense organizations among republics, krays, oblasts, okrugs, aymaks and cities.

The concluding document "Agreement on collaboration of the socialist countries' defense organizations for the 1986-1990 period" was signed at the end of the conference.

It emphasizes that the defense and sports organizations of the socialist states, guided by the decisions of their Marxist-Leninist parties and the principles of proletarian internationalism, will continue to consolidate relations of unbreakable friendship and fraternal collaboration.

* * *

Leaders of the delegations were received by Mar SU V. I. Petrov, USSR minister of defense.

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MILITARY HISTORY

REAR SUPPORT: KAZAKH ECONOMY IN WAR YEARS

Alma-Ata NARODNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO KAZAKHSTANA in Russian No 5, May 85 pp 10-16

[Article by Zh. Abutalipov, deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Gosplan: "The Economy Of Soviet Kazakhstan During The Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] The creation of huge industrial centers in the eastern regions of the country through the will of the party played an enormous role. During the years of socialist industrialization a diversified industry based on a modern technological foundation was developed with fraternal help in many republics, including Kazakhstan. From 1926 to 1939 the basic funds of our republic's large-scale industry increased 22.9-fold and by 1940 there were 2,580 large-scale industrial enterprises in the republic.

This industry was also extremely important from a defensive standpoint. The capitalist countries had not abandoned their hope of destroying socialism through military efforts and this had to be considered.

It is typical that on the eve of the war the tempo of industrial development in Kazakhstan was greater than it was in the country as a whole. The annual growth rate of gross industrial output in the USSR in 1938-1940 was 13.2 percent, whereas it reached 16.5 percent in Kazakh SSR. The republic became one of the Soviet Union's important bases for the production of lead, copper and rare metals and for the output of coal and oil.

And the following information shows the importance of the social-economic transformations. The socialist sector's share of the republic's total gross industrial production as early as 1932 was 98.8 percent and 60 percent of the national economy was industrialized, as opposed to 6.3 percent in 1920.

By 1940 the percentage of collectivization in Kazakh SSR by the number of peasant households had reached 99.3. By the end of that same year there were 334 MTS's [machine and tractor stations] and 110 major- and routine-machine and tractor workshops operating in Kazakhstan. They serviced 74.6 percent of the selkhozartel [agricultural associations] and 90 percent of the land under cultivation, which then totaled 5.1 million hectares. The year before the war there were 194 sovkhoses and 6911 kolkhoses in the entire country with 6,808,600 hectares of cultivated land, 30,800 tractors, 11,800 combines and 15,200 cargo vehicles.

Kolkhozes, MTS's and sovkhoses already had the necessary cadre. There were 20,000 tractor drivers, 8300 combine drivers, 7730 truck drivers and more than 2000 mechanics working on them. All categories of farming had 3,300,000 head of cattle, 8,100,000 head of sheep and goats and 900,000 horses.

By the start of 1940 the republic's population had reached 6,148,000 of which 30 percent lived in cities. The literacy rate (ages 9 to 49) was 83.6 percent versus 25.2 percent in 1926 and 99 out of every 1000 people working in the national economy had an secondary or higher education.

In 1940 the volume of industrial production rose by 835 percent as compared to 1928 and naturally the volume of transportation also increased. This required that a railroad net be developed and the republic's rail system reached a total length of 217,000 kilometers.

From 1920 to 1940 nine new cities and 31 village type workmen's settlements were built in Kazakhstan. By 1940 the republic had 917,000 workers and employees versus 217,000 in 1928.

The year before the war the republic's national economy had 52,300 specialists, including 16,800 with higher educations. There were 10,000 students studying in the 20 higher educational institutes and 30,000 students in the 118 technical schools. The 7971 general education schools had 1,158,000 students. There was an operational Kazakh affiliate of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a Kazakh branch of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Science imeni V. I. Lenin. 1727 scientific workers were employed in scientific institution.

In summing up the results of the path of socio-economic development that the republic followed while the national economy, industrialization and collectivization were being restored, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee Comrade D. A. Kunayev wrote in his book "Soviet Kazakhstan", "In the early 40's Kazakhstan came very close to the developed areas of the country in its economic level and had developed a social-class structure that was identical to theirs. The new socialist life form which elevates a man of labor to unprecedented heights became firmly established everywhere¹.

All of this prepared the Kazakh SSR so that it became a powerful arsenal for the Socialist Motherland during the Great Patriotic War, a time of severe trials, and one of the blacksmiths of Great Victory.

The war was a severe test for the entire country. In order to develop a coordinated military economy, the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee and the Soviet government developed a basic military economic plan for the fourth quarter of 1941 and for 1942. This plan covered Povolzhye, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

Guided by VKP(b) Central Committee and Soviet government program documents, the Kazakh Communist Party headed the reconstruction of the republic's national economy and put it on a wartime footing. The Kazakhstan Communist

Party (b)'s 5th Plenum which took place on 25-26 June 1941 resolutely required that all of the republic's party, Komsomol and soviet organizations "immediately restructure all their work so that it is subordinated to the most important task of our Motherland -- victory over our enemy²".

Nearly 200 enterprises were evacuated into Kazakhstan during the war and 107 of them went became operational at their new location. Some of them were again evacuated during the war.

Workers and collective farmers who had declared themselves to be mobilized stood defensive watch. Work, which had taken on a new manner, a military style, produced appreciable results as early as the first weeks of the war. Industrial production in the Kazakh SSR rose 25.8 percent in the third quarter of 1941 as compared to the second quarter of the same year. The miners of the Karagandaugol Combine completed 109.4 percent of their June 1941 monthly production plan in just 20 days and metallurgists at a copper smelting plant completed 102.4 percent of their June monthly plan in just 24 days. Miners at the Achisay mines overfulfilled their third quarter ore extraction plan for 1941 by 30 percent. During the second half of 1941 oil output from the Embaneft Combine exceeded the first half's production by 21.3 percent.

The thrust of capital investment also changed radically. It was aimed primarily at the development of non-ferrous metallurgy, coal and oil production and the energetics industry.

During the period from 1 June 1941 to 1 January 1946 981 million rubles were invested in Kazakhstan's national economy. This is almost as much as was invested during the first and second five-year plans. This allowed the country to increase industrial production by 140 percent during the war, to include a 190 percent increase in group "A". The share of this group's production rose to 66 percent in 1945, vice 51.1 percent in 1940.

And an entire series of industries that were new to the country appeared during the war. These included ferrous metallurgy, the engineering industry, oil processing, instrument making, the production of rare metals and chemical fertilizer and also spinning, knitting and stocking production. On the whole, the number of industrial enterprises increased by 460 in 1944 as compared to 1940.

One can truly consider the increased output of high-quality rolled metal, alloyed and special grades of steel, super-hard alloys and aviation fuel as a major achievement by Kazakh workers. And the republic's economy was founded on expanded reproduction.

The volume of industrial production increased. Basic production funds grew, quantity increased and worker qualifications improved. A significant share of social production during these very harsh war conditions was used for the needs of socialist accumulation and capital construction. These enormous advances in the structure, quality and distribution of enterprises became an important factor in the later forced development of the republic's industrial forces.

During the war the work of prospecting primarily for strategic types of raw materials increased in the republic. Their selfless work allowed geologists to detect a significant supply of a number of needed metals and to set up their delivery for the country's defense industry.

In 1944 copper ore output and blister copper smelting increased significantly in the republic. Molybdenum output was expanded and made up two-thirds of the country's total output. Workers at Balkhash increased copper production 10-fold, molybdenum production 20-fold and doubled the production of ferrous rolled metal for aircraft construction and cartridges³.

The collective at the Chimkent order of Lenin Lead Factory imeni M. I. Kalinin increased its labor productivity almost daily and it constantly overfulfilled production tasks.

Eastern Kazakhstan was also transformed into a military arsenal for the power that had joined the battle. A new industry was developed in the republic based on equipment from the evacuated Kolchugino and Podolsk factories and copper and lead rolled metal was produced there.

Construction of the Tekeli lead and zinc and the Ust-Kamenogorsk lead combines was started. The Akchatau tungsten-molybdenum combine, Balkhash non-ferrous rolled metal factory and the Dzhezdinsk manganic and Eastern Kounradskiy molybdenum mines were built in just short months. Miners in the Eastern Kounradskiy and Dzhezkazgan mines produced much of the molybdenum and manganese extracted in the country during the war.

Dozens of new mines, shafts, quarries and enrichment factories were built during the war. They included the Eastern Kounradskiy, Mirgalimaysk and Berez mines and the first stage of the Belousovka and Berezovo enriching factories.

The percentage of higher grade metals, tungsten, molybdenum, metallic antimony, bismuth and thallium in the assortment of products produced increased sharply. Those items that were needed at the front were produced.

A letter from the Kazakh people published in PRAVDA on 6 February 1943 and addressed to front-line soldiers stated, "The rare metals mined in Kazakhstan can now be found in the armor of tanks, in the barrels of artillery pieces, in rifles and in the hulls of combat ships and aircraft".

A decision by the USSR Council of People's Commissars in 1943 started the construction of the Kazakhstan Metallurgical Factory. The collective of the specially organized Kazmetallurgstroy Combine worked selflessly and by late 1944 the new enterprise produced its first tons of steel. And what steel it was! During the initial period fascist military equipment that Soviet soldiers had captured on the battlefields served as its primary raw material. It was smelted to become a terrible weapon against the enemy.

Putting the Dzhezdinsk mine into operation increased the volume of manganese ore mined in the eastern regions from 13.7 to 84.6 percent.

The Aktyubinsk ferroalloy factory which was built using equipment from a factory that had been in Zaporozhye produced Kazakhstan's first ferrochromium and later other ferro-alloys needed by the metallurgical industry.

The Aktyubinsk and Kuznets factories became not only a new, but also a powerful base for ferroalloy production and in 1943 the production of these materials exceeded the country's pre-war level.

The Alma-Ata heavy engineering factory which in 1942 completed its plan at a 186.7 percent level was built from equipment that came from the Luga engine-building factory in the republic's capital. The Voronye engineering factory that was evacuated to Chimkent began producing 25 days after its arrival and 317 Voronites became the skeleton around which a new worker collective was formed.

The party and the people believed in victory during those days that were so difficult for the country and it was not by accident that construction for an agricultural machine-building factory began in Akmolinsk in 1942. And this factory produced its first product in 1944.

During the war a rolled metal workshop from one of the Podolsk factories, the chemical-pharmaceutical factory imeni Ya. M. Sverdlov, a Moscow alkaloid factory and a number of others were set up in Chimkent and acquired a gained life.

The Aktyubrentgen Factory arose from the foundation of a Moscow radiological equipment factory.

Equipment from the Ukrainian Petroleum Equipment Factory imeni Petrovskiy was set up in Guryev. The Luga Coal Engineering Factory imeni Parkhomenko was displaced to Karaganda. And because of this an enormous engineering industry was created in the republic in a very short time and the industry increased its production during the war years by 240 percent.

It is clear that a corresponding energy base was needed to supply the sharply increased industrial activity. And this was developed in a timely manner. Whereas electrical energy development in the whole country increased 9.7-fold from 1928 to 1940, it increased 90-fold in Kazakhstan during that same timeframe. Thus by the start of the war Soviet Kazakhstan already had sufficiently powerful energetics base. However the rapid growth of industrial production, the expansion of operating enterprises and the start-up of factories and plants that had been evacuated required that new energetics capacities be put into operation. And this task was also completed.

In 1942 Karaganda GRES-1 [state regional electric power plant], Kazakhstan's first regional power plant, produced its first current. Its start-up made it possible to double coal output. That same year the Aktyubinsk TETs [heat and electric power plant] became operational and this allowed the start of ferroalloy production that was critical to the production of high-quality metals and therefore to the production of modern armaments.

During the war energetics capacities that were double that of pre-war years were put into operation every year in Kazakhstan. In 1943 Petropavlovsk TETS-1 was activated, in 1944 Tekeli TETS-1 and Chimkent TETS-1. During those same years a stage of the Alma-Ata GES [thermal electric power plant] was under construction. The first two GES were put into operation in 1944 and in 1945 another two. As a result of this intense work the capacity of electric power plants in the republic increased 1.8 fold and exceeded 382.5 mvt [megawatts]. The production of electric energy increased 1.83-fold and reached one million kilowatt hours.

Before the war Kazakhstan was in third place among union republics in the exploration of oil resources, but the war assigned Emba oilmen an economic and military-political task of primary importance -- to take the daily oil output from 2500 tons in August 1942 to 4500 tons by October 1943.

A special USSR Academy of Sciences "oil group" was sent to Guryev to solve this important task and the Kazakhstannefterazvedka geological-survey combine was created. In a very short time deposits were opened in Zholdybay, Southern Koshkar, Tenteksor and Komsomolsk. Nearly 400 specialists and qualified workers from Azerbaijan and equipment came to Emba. Measures were taken to improve the living conditions and food supplies for the oilmen.

Two new oil fields were put into operation during the war. The Guryev oil refining factory began producing during those terrible days when the enemy held the Caucasus area and was threatening Baku. The liquid fuel that had been extracted from the core of Kazakhstan and refined by Guryev oilmen primed tanks and airplanes, trucks and tractors, the prime movers for weapons.

The front demanded that rear area workers increase their output of modern types of armaments and that factories increase their energy and coal. And miners worked like front-liners.

Before the war Karaganda's annual coal output was 6,300,000 tons. But wartime conditions demanded that coal miners of the third all-union stokehold use heroic labor to at least partially compensate for the temporary loss of the Don Basin. A large group of scientists and engineers developed measures which allowed them to increase coal output in a very short time. As early as 1943 the fuel output increased 150 percent as compared to the pre-war level and Karaganda produced 10.3 percent of the all-union coal output as opposed to 3.8 percent in 1940.

During the war 23 shafts and three open pit coal mines with a total capacity of seven million tons of coal a year were put into operation. In 1945 Kazakhstan gave the country more than 12 million tons of coal. By the way, the first domestic coal combine which was the beginning of mechanized solid fuel extraction was developed right in Karaganda in 1945.

And other industries also gained strength. A chemical fiber factory in Kustanai and a synthetic rubber factory in Temirtau went into operation. Phosphate deposits that were discovered in southern Kazakhstan became a base for the development of mineral fertilizer production. In 1943 construction of

the Karatau mining and chemical combine began and the first stage became operational in 1946.

20 light industry and nine textile enterprises were evacuated to Kazakhstan during the war. These served as a foundation for the development of spinning and knitting, stocking, cotton-spinning and other industries.

The war required that the tanning and shoe, sewing, textile, milk and meat, fish processing and other light industry and food industry enterprises expand significantly. Using Iventeyvka equipment, Alma-Ata developed its own knitting industry. The Kharkov stocking and mirror factories were set up in Chimkent. In 1941 the Semipalatinsk stocking factory went into operation and in 1942 the Semipalatinsk cloth combine and cotton-spinning factory did also. In 1944 the Chimkent cotton-spinning factory became operational. Kazakhstan Narkomlegprom's [peoples light industrial production] share of the total production for the front reached 47 percent that same year.

In 1945 the republic's light and textile industry had 65 enterprises (as opposed to 32 in 1940). They were located in 11 of the 14 oblasts whereas before the war their "geography" was limited to only five oblast centers.

Kazakhstan's local industry which had 82 large enterprises and 489 cooperatives was immediately transformed onto a war footing. The Shveytnik cooperative in Dzhambul began to sew military uniforms. The Trudpishchevsk cooperative produced packaged food concentrates for the army. The Krasnyy Khimik cooperative mastered the production of filters for gas masks and the Osakarovka Musical Combine was transformed into a huge tailor shop which produced clothing for soldiers.

The following data show the magnitude of this work. During the war Kazakhstan's industrial enterprises prepared summer uniforms for 487 divisions, underwear for 451, overcoats for 70, felt boots for 67, quilted uniforms for 59, leather boots for 53, sheepskin coats for 25, harnesses for 245 divisions and 20,000 sets of transport harnesses.

The Alma-Ata and Karaganda confectionary factories, Petropavlovsk tobacco and Turkestan churning factories, Chimkent oil extraction factory, Pavlodarsk condensed milk, four bakeries and five fisheries and fish processing factories on the Balkhash, Ili and the Aralsk Sea were put into operation using equipment from evacuated enterprises.

Collectives at Semipalatinsk, Petropavlovsk and Ural meat-packing combines worked relentlessly during the war. In 1945 the production of meat, meat-and-vegetable and fish preserves in the republic was 1.7 times the 1940 production level.

Sugarbeet production and processing had started in Kazakhstan before the war and this made efforts to increase the output of sugar during the war easier. The Alma-Ata sugar factory and the first stage of the Dzhambul refinery were constructed during this same timeframe.

Nearly half of the total volume of the republic's food production went directly to the front.

Kazakhstan's railroads which were increased by 1,500 kilometers during the war ran constantly. Railroads were used to evacuate people and equipment and the steel rails were also used to transport Karaganda coal, Caspian oil, metal for defense factories and bread for the front to those locations where they were needed.

During those same years the Akmolinsk-Kartaly, Orsk-Kandagach-Guryev trunk lines and a number of narrow-gage branch lines were built in the republic. Moreover, the Narmundalak-Makat oil pipeline and the Guryev-Astrakhan highway were built in Western Kazakhstan. The construction of these transportation routes allowed close ties to be established between the Urals and Volga industrial centers, helped supply the European regions with coal, non-ferrous metals and food, reduced the transportation distance for Karaganda coal, opened direct access from the Urals to Emba oil, allowed the use of the water and rail net between the Caucasus region and the Urals via the Caspian Sea and normalized ties with Central Asia. The Akmolinsk-Kartaly road significantly relieved the main Siberian line.

During the war the Kazakh SSR became one of the important food centers for the country.

Farmers had a heavy burden during the war. In 1942 the plowed area in Kazakh SSR was increased by 842,000 hectares compared with 1941 and this was 30 percent of the total increase in the USSR. The winter crop sowed area was increased 1.5-fold. Millet planting was doubled in kolkhozes and sovkhozes and the republic was transformed into one of the country's beet growing areas.

Stock breeders also worked relentlessly. During the first year of the war the cattle population on Kazakh kolkhozes increased by 1.5 million head and Kazakhstan delivered more than 110,000 horses to the Red Army. Moreover, more than 500,000 head of productive cattle were sent to the liberated areas.

The republic's farming economy sold 5,839,000 tons of grain to the government during the war and this included 3,568,000 tons of wheat, 241,000 tons of potatoes, 174,000 tons of vegetables, 1,389,000 tons of sugar beets, 323,000 tons of cotton, 738,000 tons of cattle and chickens, 1,146,000 tons of milk and 64,000 tons of wool.

1218 tractors were sent from the republic to the liberated areas of the country in 1943. Following the example of Cuban grain growers, in 1942 53,000 hectares of summer wheat were sown as a supplemental reserve for the liberated areas.

"During the severe times the Soviet country and the Red Army suffered no serious shortage of food" noted PRAVDA on 12 May 1942. "This was due to the great service of Siberian and Kazakh collective farmers and party and soviet organizations."

With every fourth Kazak (a total of 1,200,000) at the front, the number one problem was trained specialists and this was successfully resolved. With the shortage of qualified workers throughout the country as a whole, their numbers in Kazakhstan increased from 158,000 in 1940 to 255,400 in 1945. Moreover the enterprises that were rebasing in the republic brought 30-40 percent of their qualified workers with them. Naturally they took on the role of tutors.

And FZO [factory training] schools did a lot to train worker cadres. From 1941 to 1945 they sent more than 70,000 young workers to industrial enterprises. And this is a lot when you consider that a 50,000-man army of cadre workers arrived in our area from the western and central regions. Nearly 300,000 workers with general qualifications were trained for agricultural work during the war.

Bringing women, housewives and youngsters into branches of the national economy played a major role. These people were trained in labor reserve schools, at general-skill courses and in Stakhanov schools. In 1943 the state labor reserve system had 99 schools and institutions versus 35 in 1940 and the number of students in them increased six-fold. They worked heroically and despite the fact that cadre were very rapidly replaced with novices, on the average the 1944 output per worker rose by 11.3 percent compared to 1940.

Whereas in 1940 on the average each working woman completed 176 workdays, in 1943 this rose to 259. The output for youth workdays in that same period rose from 61 to 131 workdays per year.

Women's share in the republic's major industry rose from 26.1 percent in 1940 to 53.2 percent in 1944. In ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy this reached 77.4 percent, railroad transportation -- 39.4 percent and sovkhoses and MTS's -- up to 53.8 percent. In 1942 the percentage of female labor in kolkhozes production reached 75 percent, vice 48 percent in 1940.

The republic's workers toiled tirelessly in all sectors. The dvukhsotnik [those who produce two hundred items], trekhsotnik [three hundred items] and tysyachnik [one thousand items] movement and also the movements to combine professions and for workers to operate several machines were widespread during the war. Many collectives strived to complete and over-fulfill their production plans ahead of schedule and to create a special Soviet Supreme Army Command fund through above-plan production. Balkhash metallurgists were awarded the State Defense Committee banner 23 times during the war, Dzhezkazgan miners won it 16 times, Emba oilmen -- 12 times, the republic's railroaders -- 6 times, Karaganda coal miners -- 4 times, geologists -- 9 times and wheat farmers 3 times.

More than 800,000 workers who distinguished themselves in the rear area were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union.

The people of Kazakhstan showed maximum concern for the people and labor collectives that were evacuated to their area and the republic became home for almost 1.5 million people.

"During the war Kazakhstan took in more than 20 USSR and UkSSR AN [Academy of Sciences] scientific institutes (including the Physicotechnical Institute, the Institute of Geography, the USSR AN Central Institute of Epidemiology and the USSR Academy of Architecture) and more than 30 VUZ's [institutions of higher education] (including Kiev and Kharkov Universities and the Moscow Institute of Aviation). In 1941 the Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages opened in Alma-Ata, in 1943 the Chimkent Technological Institute of Building Materials opened and in 1944 the Alma-Ata State Conservatory, the Women's Pedigogical Institute and the Institute of Physical Education opened. During these threatening years 14 new scientific-research institutes were created in the republic. In November 1945 the Soviet government responded to a request from Kazakh SSR's Soviet of People's Commissars and the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium and agreed to reorganize the Kazakh Affiliate of the USSR AN into the republic academy (which was opened in June 1946)⁴"

During the war many of our country's outstanding scientific, literary and artistic figures were located in the republic.

Distinguished Soviet scientific officials headed by USSR AN President V. L. Komarov worked fruitfully here. The academicians developed a complex program to mobilize the resources of the Urals, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan to meet the needs of the front.

The plan for the Resource Mobilization Commissions of the Urals, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan to work together was signed on 10 August 1942 by Kazakh SSR Sovnarkom [Soviet Peoples Commission] Chairman N. D. Undasynov and President of the USSR Academy of Sciences V. L. Komarov.

As with the entire USSR Academy of Sciences, the Kazakh affiliate worked during the war in three areas -- resolving defense problems, assisting industry to organize and improving production and mobilization of the republic's raw material resources for the needs of the front.

Kazakh Affiliate AN Presidium Chairman K. I. Satpayev noted that "the years of the Great Patriotic War, a time that demanded that Kazakhstan's very rich strategic resources be found as quickly as possible and used for defensive needs, were a period of very violent growth⁵".

During the four years of the war the Kazakh Affiliate of the USSR Academy of Sciences sent more than 160 recommendations with serious economic significance to governmental agencies and Union and Kazakhstan narkomats. 15 new scientific-research institutes encompassing all branches of science were created.

Planning played an important role in developing the Soviet military economy. The Soviet government began approving military-economic plans from the beginning of the war and quarterly planning had a leading role. Beginning with 1941 monthly production and transportation missions for the most important types of industrial products were also approved. These not only cover all industries but also combined industrial and territorial planning.

In addition to its primary functions, the republic Gosplan also covered urgent problems of defensive significance such as the deployment and planning for enterprises that had been evacuated, the conditions that had warranted their evacuation, problems with the industrial use of raw materials and industrial wastes and problems with supplying agriculture, transportation and other spheres with spare parts.

Producing and distributing resources in accordance with wartime needs raised new problems in strategic raw material output, in providing fuel distribution, improving operations of the energetics industry, the distribution of labor, transportation work, feeding the population, distributing material funds and so forth. The structure of planning agencies and their work style were altered under the new conditions.

The republic's Gosplan set up a mobilization sector, divisions for union industrial and territorial planning, fuel, materials and equipment accounting and distribution and a commission for work force recruitment. Special attention was given to improving the work of oblast planning commissions. Scientific-technical councils and permanent scientific-technical boards were organized in the Karaganda, Kustanay and Western Kazakhstan Oblasts⁶.

The Scientific-technical Council for the Kazakh SSR Gosplan played an important role in mobilizing the republic's economy to the needs of the country's defense. The council was created in October 1941 and in 1942 its 10 scientific-technical commissions developed 142 different recommendations on the development of individual branches. Many of them were sent to narkomats and economic organizations to be introduced into production. 42 topics, including those on producing hard Pobedit alloy and calcium carbide in the Kazakh SSR, refining kenderlyk schist and constructing a ferrous metallurgical conversion factory in Karaganda were sent to the Kazakh SSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] and the Kazakhstan CP(b) Central Committee for review.

During the Great Patriotic War workers in Kazakhstan as well as the rest of the Soviet people sent a significant portion of their earnings and savings to be used by the state.

The country's Central Association of Film Studios that was created from Mosfilm, Lenfilm and the Alma-Ata film studio and which produced up to 80 percent of all Soviet films during the war operated in Alma-Ata during the terrible years of the war. Among the films it produced were such outstanding film classics as "The Raykom Secretary", "The Russian People", "Wait For Me", "The Front", "The Rainbow", "Grigoriy Kotovskiy", "Georgiy Saakadze" and others.

In 1942 President of the USSR Academy of Sciences V. L. Komarov wrote in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA that "measures now being taken to maximize the development of Kazakhstan's industry are not temporary measures associated with wartime missions, but are fully in keeping with the Soviet government's extensive plan for industrial develop of the eastern regions of the USSR. This displacement to the east is the natural progression of the Soviet Union's economic development."

Time is solidly supporting the vigor of the party's course. The Great Patriotic War is over and Kazakhstan's economy has made an even greater leap forward. Dozens of new industrial cities and worker villages have sprung up in our republic's territory in the post-war years.

Kazakhstan is now rightfully called the flagship of the country's non-ferrous metallurgy. A significant part of the country's output and production of copper and zinc, lead and aluminum oxide, aluminum, magnesium and titanium and also rare metals comes from this republic.

Kazakhstan Magnitka and the republic's iron ore combines have become one of the huge bases for the country's ferrous metallurgy.

Kazakhstan's machine building today is represented by such giants as Pavlodarsk Tractor Factory, Kentau Excavator and Transformer factories and a number of agricultural machinery enterprises. The products from this industry are well known in many of the world's countries.

Powerful chemical fertilizer enterprises which provide a major part of the all-union output of phosphorus and nearly half of the nutrient phosphate production are supplied by Karatay phosphorous.

Today Kazakhstan gives the country more than 120 million tons of coal a year. Ekibastuz has the USSR's largest open pit energy coal development.

Our republic holds third place in the country in electrical energy production and has outstripped almost all the countries in Asia.

Industries that to the greatest extent define technical progress and those that produce goods for the people are developing at especially fast rates.

The conquest of virgin lands has radically transformed all of Kazakhstan's agriculture. The republic has become not only the largest producer of livestock products but also one of the country's most important granaries.

When discussing Kazakhstan's post-war economic development in his book "Soviet Kazakhstan", member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee Comrade D. A. Kunayev noted, "The scale of every year's socialist construction has been equal to ten years".

The rapid flight of our republic's economy is the natural result of the revolutionary transformation in our country as a whole, the result of the power of all nations and peoples of the country. This power survived the severe tests of the Great Patriotic War years with honor. And this power is now helping us to strengthen the power of our country and to strengthen the affairs of peace.

FOOTNOTES;

1. "Sovetskaya Kazakhstan" [Soviet Kazakhstan], Moscow, 1982, p. 25.
2. "Ocherki Istorii Kommunisticheskoy Partii Kazakhstana" [Essays from the History of Kazakhstan's Communist Party], Alma-Ata, 1984, p. 322.
3. "Sovetskaya Kazakhstan", D. A. Kunayev, Moscow, 1982, p 32.
4. Journal of the Kazakh SSR AN, No 1 for 1985, M. K. Kozybayev, pp 10-11.
5. Journal of the USSR AN, 1945, No 1-2, p 87.
6. Kazakh SSR State Archives, folio 1479, vol. 4, file 549, lines 149-150 and file 8641, lines 38-40

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MILITARY HISTORY

REAR SUPPORT: KAZAKH SSR GOSPLAN IN WW II

Alma-Ata NARODNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO KAZAKHSTANA in Russian No 5, May 85 pp 17-20

[Article: "The Gosplan: Mobilizing Resources To Fill The Needs Of The Front"]

[Excerpt] The Advantage Of The Soviet Economy. The Soviet Union not only withstood its unparalleled struggle against Fascist Germany, it inflicted a crushing defeat and forced Germany to unconditionally surrender before the power and force of Soviet weapons and the socialist economy.

Victory was possible thanks to the fact that during the pre-war years the new mechanisms for regulating the economy along a single plane had been strengthened and were operating in all production and distribution spheres. This guaranteed the rapid growth of industries in the national economy. The USSR became an industrial country whose industry had advance equipment and technology and whose agriculture was based on enormous state and cooperative enterprises.

The Soviet Union had come out in first place in Europe and second place in the world in the industrial developmental level of the basic types of products. The development of huge industrial centers, to include the coal and metallurgical bases of the Urals and Kuzbass [Kuznetsk coal fields], the coal center in Karaganda, the huge petroleum industry in Povolzhye, the powerful mines and non-ferrous metallurgy in Kazakhstan and the huge machine building enterprises in the Urals and in Siberia, had great defensive significance.

Planning played an enormous role in establishing the war economy during the Patriotic War and was the foundation for management of the country's powerful, coordinated economy.

The abrupt break in the national economic rate to provide both production growth and also the rapidly completion of territorial shifts of industrial distribution was accomplished after consideration of the situation that had developed. New forms of planning were established, the primary ones being annual and current plans, quarterly and monthly tasks for the production of the most important types of industrial products and also monthly transportation plans.

Planning times were reduced to efficiently and thoroughly resolve the tasks of centralizing and organizing product production and distribution and mobilizing labor reserves and raw materials to maximize supplying the Red Army with everything it needed.

The rapid completion of the measures outlined in the plans and the transformation of everything that had been created during the years of peaceful construction into real military power allowed the country's capabilities to outdo the economy of Fascist Germany. The following data show the level and effectiveness of a planned economy. In 1942 the USSR produced six times as many tanks per one million tons of smelted steel as did Germany and 4.3 times the airplanes and 6.6 times the tanks per one billion kilowatt hours as the Hitlerites.

Planning

The relatively small collective of experts at the Kazakh SSR Gosplan completed an enormous amount of work during the war. They subordinated all their activities to mobilizing all the republic's reserves for the needs of the front. The first crucial work began with the appearance of the Military-Economic Plan covering the fourth quarter of 1941 and for 1942 for the Povolzhye, Ural, Siberian, Kazakhstan and Central Asian regions. The party Central Committee and the USSR Sovnarkom [soviet of people's commissars] approved this plan on 16 August 1941.

The plan called for speeding up the development of the military industry, sharply increasing the output of fuel, strategic materials and agricultural production, rebasing enterprises in the western regions and so forth. This was designed to create a powerful military-industrial base in the eastern regions of the country.

The Gosplan collective thoroughly studied its tasks and immediately set out to complete them. The scientific-technical council and the permanent scientific-technical commissions (heavy industry, machine and instrument building, the light and food industries, construction and construction materials, acquisition and normalization, agricultural, transportation and others) that had been created under the Gosplan and all the Gosplan specialists developed economic plans for industries that were subordinated to the republic's sovnarkom and prepared and sent out to the government recommendations for the further development of industry and agriculture, the construction of enterprises and the priming and use of operational plants. They developed material and labor distribution and the distribution of fuel, electrical energy and other materials. Information on labor resources was used by governmental measures to develop a work cadre for evacuated enterprises and also for operational enterprises and those going into operation.

The Karaganda coal field took on special significance because of the temporary loss of the Don Basin. The VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee and the State Defense Committee sent out a special decree calling for a rapid increase in Karaganda coal output. The mission was established in a centralized manner, but despite this, none of the Gosplan

commissions or its experts stood on the sidelines during the miners' struggle for coal. They followed the completion of the planned tasks and the increased socialist commitments accepted by the miners of the brigades, sections and shifts. And the question of using mechanized equipment certainly received attention.

The republic's party organization sent thousands of communists into the mines and non-party members went with them. It became necessary to provide them with food products and the Gosplan took control of carrying out the plan to expand the subsidiary economy while managing the coal field. By the way, Gosplan specialists accomplished a major coup by formulating plans for developing subsidiary economies around towns and in the republic's enterprises and institutions.

Kazakhstan had a critical task during the war. This was to give the front as much food production and so forth as possible. And many Gosplan specialists actively participated in accomplishing this. Rayon and oblast plans provided them with critical assistance. By using their data and also that of other sources, specialists developed missions covering the production of grain, meat, milk and wool. An example of this was the well thought out plan for preparing spare parts for tractors, automobiles and agricultural machinery for the second, third and fourth quarters of 1943. The Gosplan formulated measures which defined republic narkomat and department participation in the spring planting program. Gosplan also established times for reporting information on what was being done in kolkhozes and sovkhozes and in the subsidiary economies.

Gosplan departments presented materials to the board on the course of the spring planting program and on completion of product delivery. They prepared questions on industrial enterprises and kolkhozes meeting their monthly, quarterly and annual plans.

We will give just one more fact from the Gosplan's everyday work life. This is that economists were busy with more than just planning. During the war Alma-Ata GES [state electric power station] output had to be increased and hundreds of workers and employees were mobilized for this construction. Four brigades were formed in Gosplan and they were assigned missions. On days (and there were many of them) when one of the brigades was at the construction site, their work in the department fell on their comrade's shoulders. Every brigade worked conscientiously and carried out its mission ahead of schedule. Instead of moving 270 cubic meters, each brigade moved 18-20 cubic meters more.

What Do The Documents Tell Us?

We repeat, how did the small Gosplan collective manage to successfully cope with the increased volume of economic planning work?

Numerous archive documents give us the answer to that question and this is what they say.

From the opening of the war the leadership and party organization created all the conditions for fruitful labor. They took effective measures to unite the collective, indoctrinated specialists with a feeling of mutual support and a fraternal attitude toward one another. They were concerned about the organization of work positions and worker lifestyles and were instrumental in the fact that many personnel who had distinguished themselves in formulating planning missions received personal pay raises, thanks from the party and prizes.

The duties of each department, every economist and planner were precisely defined and each of them was required to honorably complete their assigned task. Order was established so that errors and distortions could be avoided: specialists were required to know what was going on in the oblasts; could they on the whole and each enterprise individually cope with the missions and what untapped reserves did they have.

The concern that was shown during the war allowed workers to easily overcome difficulties, carry out the demands made on them with a high feeling of responsibility and develop high quality plans within the assigned timeframes. Every economist tried to be on top of things in the field entrusted to him. A number of sources were used to get the necessary information. These included excerpts from narkomats and republic departments, material from rayon, city, oblast and planning commissions, all of which were reliable aids for Gosplan workers, and data gathered at enterprises during official trips.

Clear, efficient planning demanded that specialists be familiar with affairs in the field and they therefore often went out on official trips. They visited kolkhozes and sovkhozes, factories and plants. And recommendations such as how to eliminate shortages, what reserves had been found and how they could best be drawn into production circulation, recommendations that were derived from their analysis, had a special place in the references and accounts on trips to enterprises. Moreover the departments had the responsibility of transmitting the analysis of monthly, quarterly and yearly report information and its results to the leadership.

Numerous Gosplan orders and other documents, yellowed from age, tell us about the people who took official trips and what they actually, the people who developed plans that were reviewed by the government and were approved and who received numerous moral and material incentives.

The documents present a narration on that uneasy period when fellow workers, department chiefs and rank-and-file specialists, left the Gosplan one after another for the front.

Specialists who had proven themselves, and primarily women, were assigned to those vacated positions and new specialists, also women, were brought in. One would think that the forced rearrangement and renovation of cadres would have a negative affect on the quality of planning, but they tried not to allow this. Worker training was organized: professors, candidates and doctors of sciences gave lectures and qualified specialists gave advice.

Workers studied so that they could review industrial and economic issues objectively, from a point of view of over-all economic interests.

Archive documents report on many glorious affairs. When you read them, you are involuntarily submerged into that now far distant situation. You run into interesting, clear facts, one after the other and you become convinced that these people who worked in the Gosplan did not shy away from problems, but endured the burdens and adversities and gave all their strength and knowledge to gaining victory over the enemy. You also become convinced that these people belong to a glorious generation, indoctrinated by the Communist Party with a spirit of devotion to our Motherland.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

ORMARA, PAKISTAN, SEEN AS POSSIBLE U.S. NAVAL BASE

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN Russian 12 Jul 85 p 3

[Article by V. Fedorov under the rubric "International Notes": Props for a Dictatorship"]

[Text] Talks are continuing between the United States and Pakistan to work out a new long-term program for American military assistance to the Islamabad regime. It is expected to be for 6 years, from 1986 to 1991.

The American 5-year program of military assistance to Pakistan expires this year. In accordance with it, Washington has turned over to the Islamabad regime a large number of the most modern offensive weapons--tanks and artillery pieces, warships and missiles of different types, and helicopters. The United States also is heating up the Pakistan regime's nuclear ambitions. Washington, in violation of international commitments, is financing Pakistan's nuclear program and has already supplied Islamabad with the means for delivering nuclear weapons--the newest F-16 fighter-bombers.

By letting Pakistan have the newest arms, the Reagan administration is heating up the militarist feelings of Pakistan's military leaders. And on their part, the latter have turned their country into a base from which an undeclared war is being waged against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. American weapons are being delivered to the Afghan counterrevolutionary bands through Pakistan. The Pentagonites are training bandits in Pakistan to hurl against the territory of the DRA. And subunits of the Pakistan army keep on turning out to be the instigators of armed incidents on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

The Pentagon is making use of Pakistan's territory to conduct its own aggressive policy in the Asian region. Detachments of separatists also are being formed in Pakistan--terrorists who, under the program of Western, primarily American, special services [spetssluzhby], are hurled against the territory of India to organize disorders in the state of Punjab.

It should be added that the Pakistani port of Ormara has been turned into a base for ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, which is operating continuously in the Arabian Sea. A large electronic tracking station aimed at the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and India has been built by the Pentagon in Gwadar. The

military airport in (Giwina), on the coast of the Arabian Sea, is being used by reconnaissance aircraft of the United States to make flights over the Indian Ocean region.

Such are the "results" of the 5-year deal, which cost a total of 3.2 billion dollars (640 million annually). Next in turn now is the 6-year program, which is estimated at 6 billion, that is, 1 million dollars a year.

Not only militarist aims are prompting Washington to step up assistance to its Islamabad ally. The Reagan administration cannot but understand that the position of the Zia-ul-Haq regime within the country is becoming weaker each day. Without American aid it is doubtful whether he could resist the popular movement for restoration of democracy, for the country's genuine independence, and for the conduct of a peaceful foreign policy which is widening from day to day.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

PAPER VIEWS U.S. CW PROGRAMS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by A. Golts, reviewer of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "The Binary Ploys of the Pentagon"]

[Text] "In the city of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, at the new chemical plant, the conveyor belts covered by protective polyethylene film are waiting to be started up. The boilers and gas scrubbers were tested in June. It has been announced that they are ready to go into production and now everything depends upon the final decision in Washington," announced the American newspaper, NEW YORK TIMES.

The world is well aware that this brand new equipment wrapped in polyethylene is not to be used to manufacture medicines or fertilizers. Here, in Pine Bluff, they will soon begin making a new monstrous weapon, binary chemical ammunition. As is known, the American Congress under pressure from the Pentagon and the administration has already voted to commence producing the "binary death." But tomorrow the legislators are to approve a resolution from the joint committee which eliminates even those essential formal stipulations which were raised by the House of Representatives.

The Pentagon achieved what it wanted. The implementation of the so-called chemical rearming program which was announced in 1982 has entered a new stage. Precisely by the binary ammunition the American military intends to further add to its arsenals of chemical weapons which now number 3 million artillery shells, bombs, mines and missile warheads and which they plan to bring up to 5 million units.

The question arises: why, already possessing such enormous potential for conducting chemical warfare, has the Pentagon with truly maniacal tenacity sought the allocating of new funds for the 1986 fiscal year for producing the binary ammunition? This can be explained only by a desire to achieve military supremacy and to materially support those aggressive military-strategic concepts which were worked out deep in the Defense Department in recent years. In particular, it is a question of the idea of the "air-land operation" introduced in the American Field Manual FM-100-5. This envisages that an attack deep in the defensive enemy orders will be launched "by an entire range of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons." Here a very noticeable place

has been given to chemical weapons. The widely publicized pentagon orders demand that the chemical weapons be employed in the earliest stage of the conflict. That is, along with nuclear-missile and space attack weapons, these weapons are viewed as a first-strike weapon.

But for carrying out these demands the Pentagon also needed chemical ammunition which could be covertly deployed in direct proximity to the frontiers of the socialist states as well as stored in the holds of aircraft carriers on duty in the waters off the European Continent. Thus, the binary ammunition was developed, that is, ammunition consisting of two relatively little-toxic components which, upon mixing, formed a highly toxic poison.

During the first stage, it has been proposed that they produce 155-mm artillery shells and bombs called the Big Eye. In the long run, American strategists plan to arm medium-range missiles with chemical warheads.

The binary ammunition is to be stockpiled primarily on the territory of the NATO allies. With good reason a wave of concern has been growing in Western Europe. The decision of the American Congress to produce binary ammunition, wrote the West German NEUE RUHRZEITUNG not long ago, makes it possible to deploy this weapon on the territory of the Western European countries, even without the approval of the governments of these states.

In endeavoring to justify the militaristic aspirations of the overseas patron, the FRG ruling circles have resorted to the aid...of an outright lie. The chairman of the CDU/CSU fraction in the Bundestag Dregger, for example, stated that the American Secretary of Defense Weinberger during a personal visit supposedly promised that binary ammunition would not be deployed in West Germany.

But even this was too much and Washington took slight. From the U.S. capital a disclaimer was voiced. In a special statement Weinberger not only rejected the words ascribed to him by Dregger, but almost as a joke, took it upon himself to praise the binary ammunition which, it turns out, "is more convenient to store, transport and use than any others." The Pentagon chief, thus, rather clearly indicated that the binary weapons can be expected by the Europeans on their land.

American generals have been even franker. In speaking before one of the Senate committees, the commander of the U.S. Ground Forces in Europe, Gen Otis, and the commander of the U.S. Air Force in Europe, Gen Donneley, with soldierly frankness emphasized that the binary ammunition is designed to be deployed and used directly in Europe. Judging from everything, the FRG ruling circles have already reconciled themselves to the deployment of binary weapons on their lands and even, as was announced in the press, have permitted the Americans to build storage facilities for them.

London decided to be original and invent its own method of deceiving the public. And we must say, it was not as primitive as in Bonn. The emphasis has been put on traditional British patriotism. Possibly, the British would be more willing to approve the deployment of not American ammunition but rather British-made, reasoned the authorities on the banks of the Thames. And

again according to British tradition, a committee was established under the prime minister and this was instructed to decide whether they should produce their own English poison or agree to the deployment of the American one.

In the event that the plans of Washington to deploy the binary weapons in Western Europe are carried out, the threat already hanging over this continent with the deployment of American nuclear missiles will increase even more. It has been turned not only into the Pentagon's nuclear hostage but also a chemical one. In the event of the outbreak of a nuclear-missile, chemical war precisely the Western European allies of Washington would come under the retaliatory strike. Here overseas they are in no way embarrassed by the fact that, according to the estimates of experts, primarily the civilian population would be the victims of chemical weapons. Its losses would be 20-30-fold greater than the losses in the troops.

This is the fate being readied for Europe. But the American generals are also plotting the symbols of chemical attack on the maps of other continents, too. Take Asia. Close to its eastern coast on the Pacific Johnston Atoll is located one of the largest American military-chemical installations. According to the data of the Japanese press, at present here they are hurriedly establishing a plant to repair chemical ammunition and new storage facilities are also being built. Precisely here will be stored the chemical bombs which the Americans at one time were forced to remove from Okinawa. And in the Indian Ocean, as has been announced by the Indian press, chemical weapons have been deployed at the base of Diego Garcia.

This has been done in order to maximally facilitate the interventionist operations of the American Rapid Deployment Forces. Chemical weapons are to be widely used precisely in their bandit actions.

The American military has already repeatedly employed this barbarous weapon: initially in Korea and later in Indochina. In the course of the "dirty war" against the peoples of Vietnam as well as Laos and Cambodia, the Americans scattered around 100,000 tons of various types of toxic substances. The use of the toxins did not save the aggressor from an infamous defeat. But the consequences of the barbarism were terrible. Around 2 million persons were the victims of chemical attacks. Terrible damage was also caused to nature.

Seemingly, after the Americans had seen with their own eyes what havoc their hands had wrought, they would have abandoned the chemical warfare plans once and for all. All the more as from the use of their own toxins, around 60,000 American servicemen fighting in Indochina were poisoned. But the Pentagon is not moved by human suffering. The experience of the war in Vietnam was taken into account primarily by specialists in the chemical warfare area. At present, the United States has developed other, more advanced types of toxins developed on the basis of those which were employed in Indochina. At present, some of these types of chemical weapons are being sent to the bands of Afghan counterrevolutionaries while the Pentagon is supplying others to the dictatorial regimes in Latin America.

The production of chemical weapons and the preparation for a war involving them in the eyes of any normal person would seem a criminal matter. But some

justification was demanded even for the Washington poisoners. But to find such justification was an impossible task. Then they released the rotten fabrication about the "Soviet chemical weapons" which supposedly had been employed in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.

The accusatory rubbish was repeatedly checked by international commissions of experts, including a UN commission. No proof was discovered of the use of Soviet chemical weapons. On the other hand, the documents of these commissions clearly show that American special services constantly tried to fool these experts by "tricks" fabricated by them and specially coached false witnesses. Moreover, the press has given convincing evidence that CIA agents had injected persons with horse doses of atropine so that they would look like the victims of "Soviet chemical attacks." The sentence to the Washington fraud was given in a report by the prominent American specialist in the area of toxicology, Prof M. Miselson. He convincingly showed that the notorious "yellow rain" (as Washington termed the mythical "Soviet chemical weapons") was nothing more than bee excrement.

However, in Washington they have followed the principle: "The fraud is dead. Long live the fraud!" The lies about the "yellow rain" were replaced by a new "chemical fabrication." It turns out, the State Department asserts, these "evil-intentioned Russians" are spraying poor American diplomats in Washington with health-hazardous powders. By such unsubstantiated fabrications, Washington is endeavoring to provide a cover for its own sinister plans in the area of chemical weapons.

Fewer and fewer people are being hooked by the American lie. The peoples have expressed serious anxiety and indignation over the American plans. Persons of different political views have come together in a desire to prevent a new crime against peace and mankind. Recently, for example, a work group from the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany prepared a draft for establishing a zone in Europe which would be free of chemical weapons. In the event of establishing such a zone in Central Europe, the USSR, in following its own fundamental foreign policy principles, would be ready to guarantee and respect its status. Such a guarantee would come into effect if the United States in turn would proceed analogously.

There should be no room for chemical death on our planet.

10272

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

USSR: FRG COOPERATION WITH U.S. on LRCM, P-2, CW, SDI

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Sept 85 p 3

[Article by Maj V. Nikanorov under the rubric "Military-Political Review":
"The FRG: On a Course of Militarization"]

[Text] Billions For Weapons; Preparing to Take Part in
"Star Wars"; Preserving Peace is the Main Issue of Today

"Telephones rang, teletypewriters clattered and officers and soldiers bustled about, delivering telegrams, drawing maps.... A large placard hung there, which stated: The Federal Chancellor's efforts to maintain peace have been fruitless, and as of yesterday we are in a state of war with the Warsaw Pact states"--this was the vivid scene painted in the pages of the magazine SPIEGEL by G. Leonhardt, member of a faction of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in the Bundestag, who took part in the NATO command-staff exercise "Wintex-85."

These exercises are regularly conducted in the FRG in a specially equipped, underground antinuclear bunker located near the West German town of Dernau in the valley of the Ahr River. The Government of the FRG plans to take shelter there on infamous "Day X" and direct the nation in a nuclear war. In the meantime, ministerial officials, Bundestag deputies and representatives of the Bundeswehr meet in the bunker every 2 years to rehearse the functioning of the "Government of the FRG in an emergency." "What I saw and heard in the bunker was terrible," Leonhardt told reporters. He was shocked at the levity with which questions pertaining to the employment of nuclear weapons were decided there.

Who benefits from running through terrible scenarios of nuclear catastrophe? This is not a difficult question. "That bunker," a recently published statement by West German supporters of peace states, "is needed by people who cannot live without war, who have lost all sense of reality." It must be said that these people have had and continue to have considerable influence in the FRG. They are the ones who resurrected militarism on German soil during the first postwar years and established a spirit of revenge in the Bundeswehr, advocating that the traditions of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht be continued in the West German army. They are the ones who now stress stepped-up militarization of the West German society and unrestrained build-up of the Bundeswehr's striking power. And it is planned to use that power against the socialist

states. This is borne out by repeated statements made by Bundeswehr leaders about "operations in the enemy's defensive depth." It is also indicated by the missions which have been assigned the Bundeswehr in numerous exercises.

Exercises by the Bundeswehr's 1st Army Corps, code-named "Trutzige Sachsen," were held this month in the West German Lander of Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-Westphalia as part of the fall NATO maneuvers "Autumn Forge-85." Around 60,000 servicemen took part in them, and more than 3,000 tracked combat vehicles and hundreds of helicopters were active. Subunits of the USA, Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands also took part in that latest demonstration of the military power of the Bundeswehr and NATO.

During the exercises West German servicemen operated actively in direct proximity to the state border of the GDR, practicing sending subunits across the Elbe River. Do these "assaults to the East" not confirm the growing aggressiveness of West German militarism?

The newspaper UNSERE ZEIT once called the Bundeswehr the "beloved offspring of the right-wing Bonn Government." There are numerous facts to confirm the correctness of this definition. Bonn is presently preparing a lavish celebration for the forthcoming 30th anniversary of the West German army. More than 500 activities are planned: weapons exhibits, "open-door days" in barracks, a formal oath-taking and so forth. This will be climaxed by live firings at a range located not far from the former fascist concentration camp of Bergen-Belsen, as well as a military parade which will be attended by the entire Bonn cabinet headed by the Federal Chancellor. All of these festivities will cost a pretty penny, of course. But Bonn does not begrudge money for its darlings. A total of 11 million marks has been allocated just for working with the public during the anniversary days, including more than 7 million for promotion of the Bundeswehr among the youth.

These amounts are extremely insignificant in comparison with those designated by Bonn for matters which are far from festive, however. Outlays by the FRG for militaristic purposes have grown more than 10-fold during the past 3 decades. The FRG's ruling liberal Christian coalition plans to continue building up military preparations. This is borne out by the draft state budget for 1986, which was submitted to the Bundestag for consideration at the end of this month. Military allocations are one of the largest items in the future budget. The FRG's direct military expenditures will exceed 50 billion marks for the first time in history. And when we consider amounts hidden in other items of the budget but actually going for militaristic purposes, actual military allocations will exceed 75 billion marks.

West Germany's active military preparations are viewed with approval in Washington. Nonetheless, the senior NATO partner does not intend to reduce its demands of the FRG but counts on binding the latter even more securely to its adventuristic course toward military superiority. American General B. Rogers, NATO's supreme allied commander, Europe, has stated that the Federal Republic "plays a prominent role within the alliance. I am glad," the general said, "that the Germans are doing so much. They should do even more, however." And these appeals are not the voice of one crying in the wilderness. The magazine SPIEGEL has stated, not without irony, that "the

chancellor is so obsessed with his desire to link the fate of the (West) Germans as closely as possible to the policy of the oversea superpower that the FRG seems more like the 51st state of the USA with each passing year." And one of that magazine's readers inquired with malice: "Just who are our soldiers in reality, defenders of the Federal Republic or of America's Landsknecht"?

Indeed, the Pentagon's situation is free and easy on West German territory. The deployment of American first-strike Pershing II nuclear missiles is in full swing with the blessing of ruling circles of the FRG. The press has reported that 72 mobile launchers for the Pershing II missiles had been deployed by the middle of this year. Two American battalions located in the areas of Mutlangen and Heilbronn have been totally rearmed with these missiles. One launching battery from each rearmed battalion is kept in a state of complete combat readiness round the clock (several minutes are required to launch the missiles after the order is received) at an equipped launching position. It is doubtful that citizens of the FRG sleep more soundly because of this.

Not long ago a member of command of the U.S. air forces in West Germany stated that the deployment of 96 cruise missiles in the FRG will begin in 1987. All of these American first-strike nuclear missiles will be deployed near the American Hasselbach Air Base at Wunschheim (in the Land of Rhineland-Pfalz). Preparatory work has been under way there for several months to erect the launching sites for these missiles.

A few days ago the heart-rending howl of sirens reminded residents of the FRG that not just nuclear, but also American chemical ammunition is being kept in their country. They were testing the warning signals which are to be activated in case of a war involving weapons of mass destruction. This is extremely ominous, stated the newspaper UNSERE ZEIT, particularly when one considers the fact that the Federal Government categorically declined a suggestion from the GDR and Czechoslovakia on the establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons in Central Europe. We remind you that enough toxic substances to destroy millions of people is already being stored at American depots in the FRG. The United States plans to build another five combat chemical depots with binary chemical weapons in the FRG. Through the will of the FRG's leaders, it has already become the Pentagon's main nuclear and chemical hostage in Europe.

Attempts by certain circles in the West to involve the FRG in the realization of the American "Star Wars" plans come what may also entails the threat of a new and even more dangerous round of the arms race. The West German press has recently had no scarcity of cartoons depicting official Bonn as an obedient student of the Washington teacher of astronomy or as the armorbearer of the oversea knight in an arms race in space. This assessment of the position of ruling circles in the FRG is perfectly valid. Judging from statements made by many influential figures in the coalition in power, they have nothing against Bonn being caught up in the implementation of Washington's space adventure.

West German Defense Minister M. Worner is among the ardent supporters of Reagan's so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI). Federal Chancellor Kohl has come out in favor of the SDI. Dregger, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union faction in the Bundestag, also advocates the FRG's joining the "Star Wars" program. Recently, during a talk with a delegation of Italian Christian Democrats in Bonn, he expressed the opinion that all of the USA's European NATO partners "should strive to conclude an agreement on conducting research within the framework of the American project. Such collaboration is most consistent with Europe's scientific, technological, economic and strategic interests."

A representative West German delegation led by H. Telchik, head of the foreign political section of the Federal Chancellor's office, visited the USA this month. Members of the delegation conducted talks in Washington and visited laboratories where the space weapons are being developed. When they return home, the newspaper STUTGARTER ZEITUNG believes, they intend to recommend to the government that it conclude with the USA an "agreement on collaboration within the framework of the SDI."

In preparing to take part in the realization of the American "Star Wars" plans, the Government of the FRG is acting against the will of most of the nation's population. The results of a survey conducted by advocates of peace from Hamburg are extremely revealing in this respect. Do you support the militarization of space? Do you believe that the militarization of space will prevent war? Do you support the FRG's participation in the accomplishment of the SDI program? These questions were asked of hundreds of the city's residents. A total of 76 percent of those surveyed answered no to the first question, 67 percent to the second and 84 percent to the third.

No, the way to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war does not lie in accumulating more and more mountains of weapons. The continuing deployment of American nuclear weapons in the FRG and its government's actual support of the USA's space plans, which are aimed at achieving military superiority, are in no way contributing to the achievement of European and international security. This policy course of the FRG cannot but have a negative effect also upon bilateral relations between the USSR and the FRG.

Peaceful initiatives proposed by the Soviet Union and other nations of the socialist commonwealth, aimed at curbing the military rivalry, are the lodestar in the matter of preventing war, halting the arms race and reducing weapons. It is now up to the West. And the FRG is not of least importance there. The answer to the main question for mankind, whether we are to live in peace or to perish in a nuclear war, also depends upon its position.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

BALTIC FLEET CAPTAIN NOTES 9 OCCASIONS OF NATO MOCK ATTACKS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent (submitted by radio): "In the Strait Zone"]

[Text] The morning twilight had painted the sky shades of dark lilac. Tiny light-blue sparks flashed in the water like momentary reflections of the now extinguished stars. These were microscopic marine organisms disturbed by the bow and propellers of our ship. Distant lights on shore, threaded onto the delicate line of the horizon, quivered intermittently ahead and to the right of our course. There where the thread parted, a floating beacon blinked like the orange eye of a rooster. It signaled the beginning of the strait zone--the maritime gate from the Baltic to the North Sea and on to the Atlantic Ocean.

The ship's main command post was inundated by such a dissonance of reports and commands as occurs only in a training battle. Dozens of floating craft--ferries, fishing schooners and sailboats--kept appearing in the travel zone of our escort vessel, and our signalmen, radar operators, navigators and watch officers had to provide the commander with information on each of them, information which was brief but at the same time adequately complete to assure navigational reliability and safety.

I have heard veteran seamen say more than once that the Baltic straits are the touchstone on which the real naval skills of ship commanders and crews are tested. This is due primarily to the very nature of the strait zone, which is unique in many respects. Navigation through it is complicated to a significant degree by numerous islands and rocks.

Preparations for passing through the strait zone were begun on the ship in advance. For ease and clarity in studying the area, Senior Lieutenant S. Polezhayev, navigator, prepared a chart, on which he indicated the most difficult sections and dangerous bearings and to which he affixed drawings, photographs and cutouts showing the kinds of beacons, markers, conspicuous reference points on the coast and floating navigational facilities. Captain 3rd Rank V. Apanovich, ship commander, identified for every watch officer the section of the route on which continuous watch would have to be stood while underway. The commander then went through a group test exercise with

them. Captain Lieutenant V. Litvinchuk, commander of the mine and torpedo division and secretary of the ship party organization, performed best in the exercise. This officer had passed through the strait zone more than 20 times in his career. He is probably familiar with every buoy, with every turn in the fairway.

Additional steps were taken on the ship upon entering the strait zone. Duplicate communication lines were set up with the GKP [primary control station] and the power and damage control station, and both anchors were prepared for dropping. And all of this was not just for the sake of playing it safe. When one reads the pilot directions for this region, one automatically notices that the most commonly used adjective is dangerous: dangerous bearing, dangerous depth, area of mine danger. Yes, even 40 years after the war, the "horned death" still makes its presence felt. Every now and then fascist mines, broken loose by storms and turbulence, will appear in the fairways.

Even such harmless plants as seaweed can pose a certain danger here. The pilot directions warn that underwater plants with leaves up to 2 meters long grow in some parts of the strait zone. If it ends up in the outside feed-water valves for the ship machinery, seaweed can cause a vessel's engines to come to an abrupt halt.

Soviet seamen counter the adjective "dangerous" with others--bold, vigilant, foresighted and skilled.

We had just begun passing through the straits, when a vessel traveling parallel suddenly changed course and began crossing the path of our ship. Our alert officer executed a graceful maneuver, the kind used by a ship to bypass an unexpected obstacle, and left the transgressor beyond our zone of movement. And one could tell what this easiness has cost the commander by the way his cheek-bones turned white.

A small fishing schooner soon appeared in our ship's path. Its situation was not an enviable one. Nets lowered behind the stern prevented it from abruptly changing its course or increasing its speed to any extent. And the fishermen did nothing. They apparently trusted in the skill and nobility of the Soviet ship's crew. Captain 3rd Rank V. Sukmanov, second in command, did not so much see the nets as sense intuitively that there was something beyond the stern of the vessel. He ordered the helmsman to turn sharply to the right.

When one travels through the strait zone, one sometimes has conflicting feelings. One looks at the meadows, plowed fields and forests on the coast, reads the familiar names of Swedish and Danish cities on the map and recalls kind Andresen, and one thinks about the fact that the concepts of good and evil, truth and falsehood are also the same and unchanging for all peoples and times. One sees the simple faces of the fishermen and the open and sincere smiles with which they greet our ship, and one wants to believe that we are good neighbors seeking only friendship and mutual understanding in our relationships. Unfortunately, however, one also sees and senses something else. The fact that the political climate in this region is influenced by

the cold winds of NATO's aggressive aspirations. Captain 3rd Rank V. Masyagin, deputy ship commander for political affairs, has reminded the crew of this more than once in special political briefings and in talks on vigilance. And there was more than enough direct grounds for this during our passage through the straits. A typical statistic: fighters from the NATO nations' air forces simulated attacks against our ship nine times in the strait zone, and several NATO warships and boats maneuvered there, relieving one another, and frequently complicated an already difficult navigational situation. The Baltic Fleet seamen demonstrated self-control, however, and emerged with honor from all the difficult situations.

Now the strait zone was behind us.

The ship headed for the Atlantic.

11499

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

SPECIAL OPERATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR USE AGAINST SHIPS IN BASES

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 6, 1985 pp 86-89

[Article by Capt 1st Rank G. Sizikov: "Special Operations Equipment For Use Against Ships in Bases"]

[Text] Preparing for a new world war and continuously participating in various armed conflicts, military circles of imperialist states do not disregard naval weapons tested by them such as special operations equipment. The experience of their combat employment is being carefully studied abroad.

Among the forces and equipment operating against ships in bases during World War II were midget submarines equipped with mines and torpedoes, saboteur-divers on individual underwater craft, exploding launches, human torpedoes, and combat divers.

The British had the most success in operating midget submarines equipped with mines. Six times they penetrated enemy ports and naval bases, damaged the battleship Tirpitz and a heavy cruiser, and sunk a floating dock and a transport. Six of twelve midget submarines taking part in the attack were lost, but only three were lost as a result of enemy action.¹

Ten submarines participated in three breakthroughs into naval bases by midget submarines equipped with torpedoes. They were all lost, damaging a heavy cruiser and sinking a tanker and a floating barracks.

Considerably wider use was made of saboteur divers on individual underwater craft (man-guided torpedoes) for operations in enemy bases: 14 acts of sabotage were carried out by the Italians, 5 by the British. Saboteur divers damaged and sunk 6 combatants and 16 transports. In so doing, 11 men were killed and 46 taken prisoner.

In the course of World War II, exploding launches (Italian) were used in attacks on naval bases three times. The first of them (Suda Naval Base) was concluded successfully (a heavy cruiser and a tanker were sunk, and two transports were damaged), the second ended with the loss of the entire party (Valletta), and the third was not carried to its conclusion because of surface ship opposition.

Human torpedoes ("kaiten")² were used only by the Japanese to attack ships in bases in the closing stage of the war. Ten submarines carrying 80 human torpedoes on board completed 18 runs. Two (by other accounts, three) transports were sunk. It was impossible to count the losses of drivers, since it was difficult to determine the number of unlaunched "kaiten" left aboard sunken submarine-carriers.

The combat divers of the navies of Great Britain (about 30 transports were destroyed by them) and Italy (8 transports destroyed) were the most effective with minimal losses compared to the damage inflicted.

The missions which were given to sabotage groups depended on the specific situation in a theater of military operations. For example, in October 1940, the following priority of target selection was established for Italian saboteurs during the attack on Gibraltar: battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, port installations. In December 1941, loaded tankers already appeared on this list after battleships and aircraft carriers. During the attack on the port of Diego-Suarez, the commander of the Japanese midget submarine preferred to launch the second torpedo against a tanker instead of a cruiser.

Twice the British sent midget submarines to destroy a floating dock at Bergen which was repairing German submarines operating in the Northern Atlantic and Arctic. The mission was carried out.

In selecting the targets and time of attack, the naval headquarters of the belligerent countries made it a rule to use saboteurs where other naval forces could not be used and at a time when the enemy was not expecting them.

Operations simultaneously at several bases was one of the basic principles of the combat employment of special operations equipment against naval bases and ports. As soon as the Italian Navy had two submarines outfitted to deliver saboteurs, its 10th Flotilla immediately tried to attack both Gibraltar and Alexandria simultaneously. The British planned to carry out acts of sabotage simultaneously at Palermo, Cagliari and Maddalena.

By virtue of the fact that most acts of sabotage were carried out in areas remote from home bases, interaction with other armed forces subunits (podrazdeleniya) practically was not planned, and the saboteurs operated independently without any support. Two attempts to plan a counter air strike (Anzio and Valletta) were unsuccessful. Only Japanese midget submarines at Pearl Harbor operated jointly with other arms of the navy, and then unsuccessfully.

Extensive and continuous use of various types of reconnaissance for support was typical of the special operations against naval bases and ports. As an example, the Japanese included two submarines with reconnaissance aircraft aboard in each of the task groups for reconnaissance of Diego-Suarez and Sydney before attacking with midget submarines. The attack on the battleship Tirpitz was preceded by a thorough aerial reconnaissance of Alten Fjord by Soviet and British aircraft operating from our airfield.³ Norwegian secret agents managed to ascertain the time that the sonar equipment of the Tirpitz

was shut down for routine inspection.⁴ The net of agents was used not only for shedding light on the situation at bases, but also for rendering direct assistance to the saboteurs.

In the general opinion of foreign experts, the strictest secrecy contributed to the successfulness of subversive operations. A veil of secrecy surrounded all the activities of special operations subunits. Everything possible was done to conceal not only the operation plans of the saboteurs from the enemy, but also the very fact of their existence.

Considerable attention was given to technical support equipment. Beginning in May 1941, the Italians delivered their saboteur divers by aircraft to forward bases, where submarines came for them. En route to the North Sea, British midget submarines carried ferry crews.

Needless to say, operations against naval bases and ports depended to a considerable extent on weather conditions and the lighting. The time chosen for an attack was usually at night during the last phase of the moon in calm (due to the low seaworthiness of the special operations craft) and clear (because of the need for orientation by the stars) weather. In general, orientation was especially complicated. You see, midget submarines had imperfect magnetic and gyroscopic compasses. This very reason explains the loss of two midget submarines at Pearl Harbor and, possibly, the loss of one each at Diego-Suarez and Sydney. The low periscope height and the absence of other means of observation forced the commanders to begin penetration in an awash condition with the risk of being detected and to launch torpedoes from a distance of 200-300 meters.

Individual saboteur diver craft were generally equipped only with magnetic compasses. During the penetration into Palermo, two of the British crews that penetrated into the base could not find the entrance to the harbor. One of them ran into a rock at the entrance. The relative successfulness of the Italian saboteurs' operations at Gibraltar and Alexandria is explained partly by the fact that at night they could orient themselves by the lights of installations that were not blackened out. In disembarking from the submarine more than 3-4 miles from the entrance to the harbor, navigating with the aid of magnetic compasses was generally not done. Due to the low height of the look-out's eyes above sea level, it was difficult to determine the location and adjust the heading by reference marks on the shore. This required especially thorough navigational preparation.

Poor equipment was the most frequent reason for a plan to fail. Of all the sabotage operations, practically every one of them had some serious breakdown of the carriers or weapons. Thus, the attack by German midget submarines on Vayenga had to be called off because of damage to all six "mini-sub" during transport. Of the six midget submarines which were supposed to attack the Tirpitz, Luetzow and Scharnhorst, three could not take part in the attack due to troubles. It can be said that the equipment itself caused more damage to the saboteurs than the enemy did.

Submarines served as the main means for delivering midget submarines and other saboteur carriers to enemy bases and ports (35 out of 45 cases). Periodically

they were also used to rendezvous after an attack (at Palermo and Alexandria on 19-20 December 1941). The most effective method of delivering midget submarines to the area of combat operations proved to be towing, including while submerged. Thus, all the "mini-sub" returning from a mission and technically capable of being towed were safely towed to their bases. It is hard to judge the return receiving of midget submarines delivered on the decks of large submarines since only one of them returned after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and it did not find its carrier.

The procedure for launching saboteur divers with delivery vehicles was as follows: While the submarine was submerged, the drivers exited through the upper conning-tower hatch, descended to the containers where the craft were stored, opened them, and departed the submarine on the craft at a depth of about 15 meters. Beginning in May 1942, Italian submarines delivering saboteurs were equipped to launch them through the forward hatch.

The saboteurs' breathing apparatus operated on oxygen, with enough to allow them to remain underwater, according to some data, for up to 6 hours. There were instances of diving down to 40 meters. Some deaths can be explained by inadequate equipment and the saboteurs' lack of knowledge of the physiological peculiarities of an organism at depths over 20 meters.

The first actions of the carriers of saboteur divers proceeded practically without any anti-subversion defense. As the enemy began to understand what kind of a weapon he was dealing with, various precautionary measures were introduced: patrolling of the water area and shore; periodic inspection of the underwater portion of ships and vessels; occasional changing of anchorages; bombing of the roadsteads; increased guarding of bases from shore; blackouts; setting up torpedo defense nets and even barbed wire barriers.

An analysis of the actions by special operations subunits of the navies of various countries, in the opinion of foreign experts, once again indicates that as any new equipment showed up, its first use was almost always planned against targets in naval bases and ports.

In 1943, the Italians undertook attempts to sabotage transports on the outer roads. Later on this idea was also expanded in the British Navy. As effective defenses of bases and ports were organized, operations against them by underwater sabotage resources were not even planned. Thus, after June 1942 Japanese midget submarines no longer attempted to penetrate into enemy bases and began operations in the channels. Starting in April 1945, they began to use human torpedoes on outer roads and lanes. This is understandable: Of the eight submarine carriers lost, six were lost during operations against bases or near them. It must be noted, however, that during this period the Japanese submarine carriers were not yet equipped for transferring the drivers from the submarines to the torpedo while submerged, which forced them to surface before the attack and expose themselves.

In publications of the initial postwar period, the idea that special operations forces and equipment emerged and developed as a part of that navy which had to fight an enemy superior in strength can be tracked. However, today, as foreign press reports, the navies of almost all NATO countries,

regardless of their sea power, have special operations subunits. The fact that the mission of penetrating special operations resources into naval bases and using mines against the ships located there is being planned by the naval commands of the NATO countries is linked by foreign experts to the fact that their weapons arsenals contain, in particular, MK-21 (300 kg) and MK-11 (50 kg of explosives) charges designed for mining large combatants. In addition, they have limpet mines and other weapons.⁶

In place of the imperfect midget submarines of World War II, the navies of the NATO countries have modern midget submarines in service.

Their missions in the NATO navies have been preserved, the equipment is being improved, and the saboteurs are being trained.

FOOTNOTES

1. Luis de la Sierra. "Gli assoltore del maze", Milano, V. Mursia, 1971, cap. XVI.
2. "Kaiten" (path to paradise) is a torpedo controlled by a suicide drive. The torpedo weighed about 8 tons and had an explosive charge of 550 kg and a speed of up to 30 knots.
3. "Aviatsiya VMF v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Naval Aviation in the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1983, p 24.
4. ZA RUBEZHOM, 1983, No 506, p 18.
5. Borgeze, V., "Desyataya flotiliya MAS" [The 10th MAS Flotilla], Moscow, Izdatelstvo inostrannoy literatury, 1957, p 186.
6. ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 1981, No 8, p 69.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT OF MIDGET SUBMARINES ABROAD

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK No 6, 1985 pp 89-90

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Kucher: "Trends in the Development of Midget Submarines Abroad"]

[Text] Promoting subversive activities against countries of socialism, military circles of the US and its NATO allies are continually expanding their special operations arsenal and improving methods for employing it. Midget submarines, designed for transporting special operations teams and conducting sabotage during peacetime as well as wartime.

According to the classification established in foreign navies, they include submarines with a displacement of up to 100 tons.

Having thoroughly analyzed the combat utilization of midget submarines during World War II and also taking into account the increase in operational and tactical capabilities of modern equipment, foreign military experts believe that the main missions of midget submarines may include: delivering combat divers to the area of naval bases, anchorages and ship dispersal points in order to conduct sabotage; landing scouting parties on enemy territory; destroying submarines and surface ships at exits from naval bases, basing points, in channels and in narrow passages by using torpedoes and mines; carrying out antisubmarine and anti-sabotage defense, as well as actions against enemy surface ships and vessels in their own coastal waters; guarding underwater structures and participating in underwater engineering work.

Based on these missions, foreign experts have concluded that midget submarines must satisfy the following basic requirements: have minimum dimensions in order to make sonar detection difficult and the lowest possible level of sonar, magnetic and thermal fields; have an endurance of at least 10 days, a range enabling them to cross a defended area submerged, maneuverability, and good sea-going qualities; be very versatile and capable of carrying a wide assortment of interchangeable weapons (torpedoes, mines, anti-shipping missiles, underwater transport for combat divers, containers with special equipment for saboteurs); take aboard combat divers or a special operations team.

It is believed in the West that midget submarines must be equipped with special equipment for discharging, transporting and again receiving combat divers and special operations teams while submerged; have passive sonar equipment and an automatic submarine and weapon control system; be equipped with high-performance powerplants, and in the long-term not requiring a free air supply through out its endurance.

As foreign press maintains, using diesel-electric powerplants on midget submarines does not make it possible to fulfill these requirements fully.

Basic Tactical and Technical Data on Modern Midget Submarines


Characteristics	Italy		FRG				Great Britain
	SX756/W	Type 1100	Type 70	MSU75	Piranha	IKL100	Piranha
Displacement (tons)	80	114	70	75	75	100	...
	...	129	95	...	100	...	140
Hull Length (meters)	25.2	24.6	18	21	21.5	20	26
Hull Width (meters)	2.0	2.6	3.8	2.5	2.6	4.1	2.8
Hull Height (meters)	3.8	3.7	3.2	3.4	...	3.5	3.6
Powerplant Power (hp)	300	300
	55	200
Speed (knots)	8.5	7	8	8	...	8	...
	6	10.5	11	12	9	11	9
Range (nm)	1600	2000	1200	2400	1600	1680	2500
	60	50	62	65	65	...	60
Crew Size	6	9	7	...	7	9	9
Combat Divers	8	...	8	...	10
Endurance (days)	20	12	10	14	14	...	12
Working Diving Depth (meters)	100	100	100	130	...	100	...

Note: Figures above line are for the surface condition, figures below line are for submerged.

Midget submarines built in the late 1960s, the West believes, have reached the maximum displacement in their development. They have a continuous cruising range of 60-65 nm submerged and about 2,000 nm on the surface, an endurance of over 10 days and a speed of 6-11 knots submerged and 7-8 knots on the surface.

In the opinion of foreign experts, increasing the continuous submerged cruising range is quite a complex problem. Attempts to solve it by using a diesel-electric powerplant inevitably lead to an increase in displacement and

moves the midget submarines into the small submarine class. One way of turning midget submarines from "diving" boats into submarines, as indicated by foreign press, may be the use of electric powerplants based on new principles. However, it is believed that equipping midget submarines with new types of powerplants will not increase their endurance and speed, and, consequently, they will not be able to be used independently at great distances from their basing areas. As is believed in the West, it is still not possible to do without special carriers.



Midget submarine silhouettes (from left to right): SX756/W (Italy); Type 1100 (Italy); Type 70, IKL 100 (FRG); MSU75 (FRG); Piranha (FRG-Great Britain); Piranha (Great Britain)

The areas where sabotage operations could be carried out by midget submarines are identified in foreign press as the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, Mediterranean Sea, North Sea, Baltic Sea and the Mozambique Channel.

Presently, as foreign press reports, Italy, the FRG and Great Britain are involved in developing midget submarines. The silhouettes of modern midget submarines, reproduced from photographs published in foreign press, are shown in the figure above.

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POSSIBILITIES OF SPACE-BASED DETECTION OF SUBMARINES

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 8, 1985 pp 88-90

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Partala, doctor of technical sciences, professor:
"Possibilities of Space-Based Radar Detection of Submarines"]

[Text] As appears from foreign press reports, the US, striving to accelerate the militarization of outer space, has begun practical implementation of programs for developing equipment for space-based detection of submerged submarines. It is pointed out that research in this area, in which companies and specialist of the US, Great Britain, France and Canada are participating, has been going on for a long time, more than 20 years. It is being conducted within the framework of oceanographic space programs under the guise of developing and improving equipment for remote sounding of the ocean and methods of processing information on the nature of processes taking place inside the ocean and on its surface. Furthermore, various types of space sensors placed on aircraft and space platforms have been studied.

In publications on this topic, foreign press devotes special attention to the Seasat oceanographic satellite.¹ It has a radar altimeter, a scatterometer (measures the velocity and direction of surface wind), an optical and an infrared radiometer, a microwave radiometer (measures the temperature of the ocean surface and clouds), and a synthetic aperture radar. The data obtained is transmitted from the satellite to Earth on a real-time basis.

It is reported that information was not recorded on-board the satellite on the first flight; therefore, only the results of measurements made within radio range of the ground tracking stations were available for further processing. Synchronized measurement of the ocean surface parameters by ship- and airborne analog sensors was set up to check on the accuracy of satellite sensors and subsequent working up of algorithms for processing information received from the satellite during its flight.

Information from Seasat was made available to several groups of specialists. Some analyzed and evaluated the operation of all sensors and made up recommendations for their further improvement and use. Others studied different variants of processing algorithms in order to select the most effective ones. In the little over 5 years since the flight, all these materials have been published repeatedly in foreign scientific and technical

press. It has been noted that, along with oceanographic and geophysical research, the information from Seasat is actively used for studying the processes linked with the possibilities of detecting submerged submarines. Simultaneously, the results of experiments with other satellites (Skylab, GEOS-3, Nimbus-5, Nimbus-6) and aircraft platforms with similar equipment.

From materials published in open press and other data gotten in conversations with specialists, American columnists conclude that the most promising means of space-based detection of submerged submarines from is the synthetic aperture radar. It is reported that this is a pulse radar with internal-pulse linear frequency modulation.² The earth's surface was illuminated by the Seasat's synthetic aperture radar at an angle of 19-25 degrees. The scanning area (100 km wide) is to the right of the heading line to a distance of 240-340 km. Range resolution is 25 km, and satellite heading resolution is 40 m. Surface scanning rate is 700 square kilometers per second (10^6 resolution elements per second).

The level of signals reflected from each section of the earth's surface being resolved characterizes reflecting power of each element of resolution. This is source information. It was transmitted in analog form to the earth in real time.³ All information on magnetic tape was made available to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), which processed a large part of the data and gave it to other researchers. Analog (optical) and digital processing of the source information was done. As a result, visual images of the corresponding areas of the earth's surface were obtained. Foreign experts underscore the special complexity of synthesizing visual images from a synthetic aperture radar.⁴

The satellite's synthetic aperture radar was used intermittently. During this time information was obtained from 500 surface areas of various lengths (each averaging 2,500 km). As reported in open foreign press, only 10 percent of the information has been published, but it is emphasized that visual analysis of synthesized images of areas of the sea surface and special processing of them make it possible to determine: the length, height and direction of movement (with an accuracy of plus or minus 10 degrees) of surface waves; the boundaries, structure and dynamics of the ice cover; the direction and velocity of surface wind; the location, heading and speed of vessels (mainly thanks to the good observability of their wakes); and also the coordinates and configuration of internal ocean waves.

It is believed that, owing to the possibility of detecting internal ocean waves, the synthetic aperture radar will be used for mapping the ocean for and its underwater currents. But it seems especially promising to American specialists for space-based detection of comparatively small (with respect to underwater relief elements) objects in the ocean depths, above all, submerged submarines. A host of problems are being noted in the way practical realization of this possibility. Among them--developing methods of reliably identifying indications from the synthetic aperture radar, as well as the results of their ground processing, with specific phenomena in the ocean causing the formation of internal waves (currents, tides, changes in floor contour, moving underwater objects, and others). Ways are being sought to reduce substantially the synthesis and image processing time. Now, when

processing time is computed in hours, the practical importance of the results obtained is quite insignificant for antisubmarine warfare. There are other problems as well. However, American reviewers believe they are surmountable, especially with the intensification of military space programs being conducted the U.S. administration.

Since there are practically no financial limitations in the US on developing military space equipment, the American magazine SEA TECHNOLOGY believes that a working space-based submarine detection weapon system using synthetic aperture radar will appear in the not too distant future. In this connection, U.S. allies' plans to build satellites with synthetic aperture radar attract attention. In March 1982, the European Space Agency, which includes 12 European countries and Canada (without the US), approved a program for the series production of ERS satellites for remote sounding of the earth's surface. The first of these satellites is planned to be launched in late 1987 into a circular orbit 777 km high. Its main mission will be to study the ocean shelves and ice covers. The equipment is similar to that used on the Seasat. The synthetic aperture radar will operate in a mapping mode and a mode for measuring the parameters of ocean surface waves. In the first mode, raw data is transmitted to the earth from the synthetic aperture radar, as a result of which visual images of the surface are synthesized in a strip 80 km wide to a distance of 250 km to the right of the satellite's line of heading. In the second mode, the synthetic aperture radar operates intermittently, providing data from surface areas 5x5 km every 100 km over the flight route. This, they believe, makes it possible to reduce the amount of measurements and record them on-board for subsequent transmission to the earth, and also to set up practically simultaneous operation of microwave equipment in the scatterometer mode.

Methods similar to those used in working with the Seasat satellite are proposed to be used to process information received from the ERS satellites.

FOOTNOTES

1. On 28 June 1978, the first satellite of this type, weighing 2,290 kg, was launched into a circular orbit 790 km high with an inclination of 108 degrees. The satellite was scheduled to operate for 2 years. However, as a result of a malfunction of its power supply system, it ceased operation on 10 October 1978.
2. Carrier frequency of 1.275 GHz (23.5 cm wavelength). Pulse power of 1 kW. Pulse repetition frequency of 1,463-1,640 Hz, pulse duration of 33.4 microseconds, signal compression factor of 634, frequency deviation bandwidth of 19 MHz, dynamic range of receiver 30 dB. The synthetic aperture radar uses a flat phased array antenna 10.7x2.16 m with a 35 dB gain factor. The width of the antenna beam is 1.73 degrees in azimuth and 6.2 degrees in elevation. Signal polarization is linear and horizontal.
3. A special radio channel on frequency 2.265 GHz with a power of 5 watts was used for transmission. The information was received by five ground stations located in the US (Merritt Island, Florida; Goldstone,

California; Fairbanks, Alaska), England (Okanger)[Transliterated] and Canada (To-Kav, [Transliterated] Newfoundland), as well as some stations of France and the FRG. The video signals received are converted into binary code and recorded by digital tape recorders together with time signals and necessary service information.

4. A unique optical correlation system is used for analog processing at the JPL. Digital processing is characterized by a high labor intensiveness. It is pointed out that 5 hours of machine time is required to synthesize the image of one surface area 100x100 km, using the most efficient digital computers.
5. The following theoretical characteristics have been published in foreign press for the ERS-1 satellite's synthetic aperture radar: carrier frequency of 5.3 GHz (5.66 cm wavelength); peak power of 4.8 kW; pulse duration of 37 and 12.3 microseconds (in the mode of intermittent wave parameter measurement); pulse repetition frequency of 1,700 Hz. The synthetic aperture radar uses linear internal pulse frequency modulation with a frequency deviation bandwidth of 19 MHz. The signal compression factor is 578. The antenna is a 10x1 m flat phased array. The view of the earth's surface is at an angle of 23 degrees. Resolution is 30 m. It is reported that the synthetic aperture radar will ensure determination of the direction of movement and length of surface waves with an accuracy of plus or minus 15 degrees and 20 percent, respectively, as well as the nature of the surface being examined (dry land, sea, coastline, ice cover).

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LOS ANGELES SSN MODIFICATION--The West German magazine SOLDAT UND TECHNIK reports that the 32nd Los Angeles-class multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarine, the Providence, is undergoing sea trials in the USA (see photograph [photograph not reproduced]). Unlike its predecessors, which are armed with torpedoes and Sabroc antisubmarine missiles, the new submarine also has 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles with conventional or nuclear warheads and a firing range of 500 or 2,600 kilometers respectively. The cruise missile launchers are in the main bow buoyancy tank, six on each side. The foreign press has also stated that for purposes of enhancing the combat capabilities of Los Angeles-class submarines previously built, the U.S. Navy Department has decided to outfit them with vertically launched Tomahawk missile systems. It is planned to accomplish this during the next major refitting of the submarines. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Oct 85 p 3] 11499

CHERNAVIN TO VISIT INDIA--At the invitation of Vice Admiral K.K. Nayar, first deputy chief of staff of India's Navy, Fleet Admiral V.N. Chernavin, first deputy commander in chief and chief of Main Staff of the Navy, will make an official visit to the Republic of India at the beginning of October. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 September p 5] 11499

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